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Abstract 
 
The increasing prominence of multiculturalism and moral diversity over the past few 
decades has coincided with a theoretical expansion of the democratic project. In 
particular, so-called „deliberative‟ and „strong‟ theories of democracy have been 
offered and expanded as solutions to the various moral and political problems that 
have arisen. However, while democrats disagree in the literature about what form a 
strongly participative democracy should take, there has been little circumspection 
about the wisdom of expanding democratic mechanisms. This thesis attempts to fill 
this lacuna by examining the merits of the various democratic theories on offer. By 
analysing the dilemmas posed by diversity and multiculturalism, it shows that the 
efficacy of deliberative democracy rests upon its epistemic virtues. If a stronger 
democracy is to overcome the problems of pluralism, it needs to greatly improve the 
flow of information around society. 
 
The principal argument offered is that, in practice, strong theories of democracy 
would not be able to deliver the epistemic outcomes necessary to provide a desirable 
alternative to modern liberal democracy. Multiculturalists and strong democrats do 
offer compelling reasons to reject modern liberalism, but the various democratic 
positions they advance rest upon prima facie controversial assumptions about the 
good society. By presuming both the means and the end of social life, deliberative 
democracy would likely close down rather than increase the flow of information 
between social actors, to the detriment of those already marginalised by the liberal 
democratic system. As such, it is contended on pragmatic grounds that we would do 
better to return to a classical, „Austrian‟ form of liberalism to find a theory of 
multicultural accommodation. Since we cannot know in advance how we should live 
our lives, our best response to pluralism would be to renounce the political 
management of society in order to strengthen those social mechanisms which help us 
learn about and adapt to one another. 
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1. Introduction: Politics as a Problem 
 
„Politics is the art of looking for trouble, finding it whether it exists or not, 
diagnosing it incorrectly and applying the wrong remedy.‟ - Sir Ernest Benn1 
 
Students of politics have a unique if largely unremarked responsibility. By engaging 
variously with the institutions, activities and ideas which it takes to be its subject 
matter, political science effects an irrevocable change upon the world which is 
unparalleled within the academy. This is because the language of politics 
reconstitutes even the most self-evidently stable and harmless private phenomena as 
manifestations of the universal problems of justice, legitimacy and power. Under this 
political „observer effect‟, ever-more features of human behaviour are brought by the 
sometimes obscure theories and studies which fill the politics literature into the 
eternal court of public opinion, forced to justify their own existence on terms 
imposed from without. As the guardians of this process, political scientists are 
significant and powerful political actors themselves, and yet very few questions are 
asked of them. Following the academy‟s own example, it therefore seems apt to ask 
whether this creeping and seemingly irreversible politicisation of the social world is 
itself legitimate. 
 
It is of course true that any academic activity might have political ramifications. The 
physical sciences in particular continually erode at settled ideas of what we want to 
achieve as a species. Similarly, there is undoubtedly much political science which 
has a negligible impact on real-world politics, this very dissertation providing 
perhaps the most immediate example. Yet academic politics is notable because all 
political studies hold the potential – and many of them the explicit intent – to initiate 
political debates and influence their outcomes. In Friedrich Hayek‟s (1949: 424) 
                                                          
1
 This quote is commonly attributed to Benn, but it is not possible to identify the original source. 
Personal correspondence with the chairman of the Society for Individual Freedom suggests that the 
quote originated in a meeting of the then-named „Society for Individualists‟ in 1948. 
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terms, political scientists, philosophers and economists are significant because they 
are responsible for creating and disseminating many of the „fashions and catchwords‟ 
which shape the „climate of [public] opinion‟. Thus, while the physical sciences hold 
the distinction of creating genuinely new knowledge, it is only after this knowledge 
has passed the intellectual and ethical gauntlets created and shaped within politics 
departments that it can effect real world change.  
 
Accordingly, it is important to bear in mind the caveat that any problem that might 
be identified and bewailed in real-world politics might also plague the pursuit of 
political scholarship. As Ernest Benn‟s somewhat flippant criticism suggests, we 
should expect politicians to do more harm than good when operating under both the 
competitive pressures and epistemological challenges of modern, complex 
democratic politics. His observation counsels us to be sceptical of any politician who 
claims to have surmounted these limitations and to have discovered a „truth‟, to 
which we must all become subject. Now, since western universities face increasing 
national and international competition for both scarce funds and demanding students 
– competition which has only become more fierce in recent years – it is highly likely 
that politics departments face these same pressures to exert a high-profile and 
discernible influence on political debates. Furthermore, political scientists concern 
themselves with the same immensely complex social and political phenomena. Since 
they too are limited by their own particular spatial and socio-political contexts, 
academic „politicians‟ must face just as wide a margin of error as their professional 
counterparts (though without the possibility of being voted out of office for 
egregious error). 
 
Certainly, this does not entail a thoroughgoing critique of the entire field. Political 
science is not in and of itself either misguided or malevolent, and neither can we cast 
broad aspersions about its accuracy. Yet there can be no objection to testing this 
critique pragmatically, on a case by case basis. Intuitively, the most appropriate cases 
to examine are those which are highly significant, both in terms of their prospective 
political impact on society and their temporal relevance. Just such a significant and 
salient case is the attention given in some quarters to the increase in ethnic, religious 
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and moral diversity amongst modern democratic populations. The very nature of this 
attention is notable enough, for it inevitably problematises what would otherwise be 
seen as at most a fascinating late-modern development. What truly stands out, 
however, is how similar the numerous reactions to this „multiculturalism‟ are. 
Despite encompassing a number of somewhat inconsistent and contradictory 
arguments, the majority of commentators on the so-called „politics of difference‟ 
share a similar critique of the efficacy and justice of traditional liberal democratism.
2
 
Existing democratic institutions, they argue, must be both deepened and widened in 
order to better realise the democratic goals of equality and autonomy in our new, 
more diverse societies. 
 
The politics of difference is particularly interesting because it is not simply a 
transient political project, but a modern application and expression of the politics of 
the left. On Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson‟s (1996) influential argument, for 
example, multiculturalism is treated simply as another manifestation of the wider 
challenge towards inequality in late-modern society. On this argument, the claims of 
feminists, American civil rights activists and the new social movements have been 
just as significant in challenging the white, middle class Christian monopoly of 
power as those of heterogeneous cultural and ethnic groups. Moreover, as 
Baumeister (2000) shows, this social turn is itself an extension of the general 
challenge to liberal capitalism which has occupied much of the academy in one way 
or another since the Second World War. As such, it is likely that the politics of 
difference will be subject to the very same problems that plagued left-wing politics 
during the twentieth century and which motivated Benn‟s opening remark. And since 
these new arguments seek to politicise and problematise our private and moral lives 
even further, it seems only prudent to make an assessment of their utility and 
veracity. 
 
Before this can be done, however, it is first necessary to understand the aims of the 
                                                          
2
 The term „politics of difference‟ was popularised by Steele (1990) and Young (1990), who both used 
it to discuss and describe the way minority groups seek the expression and affirmation of their 
differences while retaining the right to equal respect and treatment. For a succinct discussion of the 
paradigm, see Baumeister (2000: ch. 2). 
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modern social democratic project. These aims are somewhat complicated by the 
uncertain relation between the politics of difference and the traditional socialist 
commitment to a class-driven economic revolution. For some writers (such as 
Phillips, 1996 and Butler, 1998), the former is seen as a useful reformulation and 
expansion of the long-standing but flawed accounts of structural marginalisation. 
Instead of seeking to educate and mobilise downtrodden classes, they suggest that the 
left should seek to realise genuinely fair and respectful relations between society‟s 
various and sometimes conflicting ethnic, cultural and religious groups. For others 
(most notably Fraser, 1997), however, this position too readily throws the materialist 
baby out with the Marxist bathwater. In order to achieve fairness and respect, this 
opposing argument suggests, it is still necessary first of all to realise economic 
equality between individuals. 
 
The principle challenge for the contemporary left is thus to offer a conception of 
„equality‟ which is relevant to morally diverse modern societies. Traditional socialist 
egalitarianism seems quite inappropriate because it assumes a form of ontological 
universality, whereby „difference‟ pertains only to ultimately superficial 
characteristics. Socialism seeks to deny or suppress the political significance of 
cultural or moral differences in order to focus attention on the universal features of 
humanity. In our increasingly religiously and morally divided societies, however, it 
seems both neglectful and inappropriate to ignore the subjective beliefs people hold 
about themselves. To truly respect our multiculturalism, we ought to treat our 
cultural and religious differences as ontologically significant. But it follows from this 
that interpersonal differences may provide both a rationale and a justification for 
differential or affirmative treatment. The modern left thus faces a dilemma between 
seeking to realise its traditional but somewhat simplistic aim of universal equality, 
and respecting the wishes and demands of many of the most disadvantaged to 
exacerbate inequality by pursuing dissimilar and divergent ends. 
 
A corollary of this dilemma is a second, less obvious choice, concerning who exactly 
should be the focus of calls for equality. Traditional arguments, based upon concerns 
over economic exploitation, suggest that the relevant ontological unit is, ultimately, 
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the individual. Since unconstrained activity is seen as having negative-sum 
implications, all unequal outcomes between individuals must be addressed to avoid 
wider social harms. Multiculturalism, however, departs from this analysis by calling 
attention to the non-economic inequalities faced by minorities in societies dominated 
by a majority culture. Unconstrained activity is seen on this account as having zero-
sum implications, for cultural and ethnic groups primarily seek to benefit and 
consolidate their positions at the expense of one another. As such, it is only by 
attending to the needs of socially and culturally defined groups that multiculturalists 
feel systemic injustices and inequities can be addressed. 
 
These problems are especially significant because they offer the individual an 
uncertain future. If it is indeed the case that on-going inequalities (however defined) 
still pose the greatest challenge for societies in the twenty-first century, then the 
solution can only be to undermine individual agency. Thus, while a progressive form 
of redistribution would recognise the individual, it would severely curtail her 
freedoms by taxing whatever is defined as her excessive earnings and preventing her 
from following any way of life which threatens her status as an „equal‟. Yet 
recognising the diversity of personal and moral ends is equally harmful, because it 
leads to the construction of individuals as merely members of „groups‟, defined by 
their arbitrary ethnic or religious characteristics. The individual, in this instance, is 
still subject to invasive redistributions and the curtailment of her freedoms, but these 
are to serve the interests of the group, rather than society as a whole. It follows, then, 
that the individual‟s freedom and well-being under any progressive political system 
would not depend upon any specific principle, but rather on how contingently similar 
their own ends are to those imposed upon them by the political process. 
 
Another way of putting this is to say that if differences are politically significant, 
then it is not at all clear which differences matter between whom. For any attempt to 
rectify one set of differences is bound to create another set. To some extent, some 
level or type of difference must therefore be desirable (otherwise no state of affairs 
can be desirable). The problem posed by modernity for the left is thus essentially 
epistemological, as the central requirement for justice and fairness is to discover 
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which pattern of outcomes should be realised. As such, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
the turn towards the politics of difference has coincided with a turn towards 
arguments for stronger and more decentralised democratic institutions. Democratic 
processes which promote deliberation and participation promise to mobilise and 
make sense of the mass of information pertaining to individual needs inherent in 
society. And they promise to distribute that information, both around society to direct 
and encourage individual behaviour towards positive-sum, socially beneficial 
outcomes, and upwards towards political institutions and policy-makers. Deliberative 
democracies, in short, are seen as the solution to both the left‟s epistemological and 
ontological problems.  
 
It is the aim of this dissertation to assess this „democratic turn‟. It is the principle task 
of the remainder of this chapter to explore the dilemmas a deliberative democracy 
must overcome if it is to take diversity and pluralism seriously. By exploring the 
exemplary arguments of Nancy Fraser and Charles Taylor, it is shown that 
democratic institutions must first provide both substantively and procedurally equal 
opportunities to all if it is to meet its aim of abolishing undesirable inequalities. But 
it must also satisfy the needs of endangered groups whilst protecting individual 
freedoms, if it is to uphold its promise to protect those at risk in society. By way of 
illustrating the argument of this dissertation, it is shown that these are dilemmas 
which simply cannot be overcome. The desire to politicise everything for everyone is 
bound to lead to some individuals and groups being systematically harmed and 
exploited. Because it must inevitably rest upon a contradiction of its very own aims, 
it is concluded that the progressive political project can claim little prima facie moral 
authority. 
 
On this basis, chapter two presents a review of the various democratic arguments 
which seek to address diversity and difference. Starting with the liberal democratic 
orthodoxy, from which the politics of difference departs, the four different possible 
conceptual responses to the multicultural dilemmas are immanently and critically 
examined. It is shown that they each construct the problem of modernity in differing 
but nonetheless equally flawed ways. As such, none of the four approaches can 
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overcome its dilemmas. Moreover, as chapter three shows, they rely on tenuous 
epistemological assumptions. By exploring the Austrian approach to political 
economy which underpins the classical liberal position, it is shown that democratic 
institutions simply could not mobilise the kinds of information necessary to 
politically solve the kinds of problems thrown up by diversity. Instead, we should 
think of politics as being a realm of irreducible and unavoidable ignorance. As such, 
it is contended that to fully understand the likely failures of democratically ordered 
but radically diverse societies, it is especially important to consider the four 
democratic positions from the classically liberal, epistemic point of view.  
 
This is done in chapters four through seven. To deliver on the dissertation‟s aim of 
pragmatically assessing the deliberative turn in political, these chapters move beyond 
the immanent critique of chapter two to explore each approach in more detail. In 
particular, they look at the practical issues raised by their real-world applications. In 
each case, the philosophy and aims of the position are examined, in order to illustrate 
how these aims might be realised in practice. These chapters have a critical tone, to 
be sure. But it is important to note that they each identify clearly the valuable 
insights and methods offered by the various democratic theorists. Deliberative 
democracy is shown to be a generally flawed idea, but it is suggestive of the kind of 
society we must move towards if we genuinely wish to respect and embrace 
diversity. Thus, each chapter ends by offering an alternative, more efficacious 
approach to the initial aims of the position under examination. 
 
In chapter eight, the final chapter, these liberal suggestions are brought together and 
expanded to provide a thoroughgoing Austrian solution to the epistemological and 
moral dilemmas posed by diversity. Drawing on and expanding the pragmatic theme 
which is implicit until this point, it is argued that, to the extent that we are 
increasingly being confronted by unavoidable differences, we must adapt to 
accommodate them, rather than seek to „solve‟ them. Differences, that is, cannot be 
eradicated or rationalised. This is not to say that social harmony doesn‟t necessitate 
agreement and compromise, of course, but rather that the terms of these agreements 
cannot be known in advance. Instead, they can only be discovered by real people 
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through the institutions and practices of a civil, liberal society. Accordingly, the 
dissertation concludes by arguing that, in order to achieve their own goals, modern 
liberals and multiculturalists ought to take a step back from their problematic, 
interventionist positions and endorse the more traditional, agnostic and pragmatic 
position offered herein.  
 
The nature of the problem 
 
As the twentieth century drew to a close, the political left faced what Francis 
Fukuyama (1992) called the „end of history‟. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
collapse of Soviet socialism signalled the triumph of liberal democratism, leaving 
socialism with little more than the hope of militating for a fairer distribution of the 
proceeds of capitalism. As Fukuyama was at pains to point out, however, liberalism 
is by no means certainly able to sustain itself into the future. In particular, the decline 
of trust and social connectivity in our increasingly international and pluralistic world 
threatens to undermine the social and political cohesion necessary to make liberalism 
work. By and large, it is to this challenge which the left has now addressed itself. 
Turning its attention towards the claims of feminists and other disadvantaged and 
marginalised groups, it has sought highlight how liberalism is not merely blind 
towards class stratification, but towards all forms of difference (Phillips, 1996: 139). 
Accordingly, recent scholarship from the left has focused upon the need for a loosely 
defined equality of status and esteem, based upon the celebration of difference (see 
Benhabib, 1996b). 
 
Yet, as Fraser (1998, see also Fraser, 1997; 2000) has instructively argued, this 
movement towards a socially liberal „politics of recognition‟ both legitimates 
structural inequalities and undermines the coherence of the traditional critique of 
exploitation. Thus, the uncertainty over which inequalities need to be addressed in 
society gives those who benefit from economic abuse a ready-made defence with 
which to excuse themselves from the claims of justice. Moreover, policies of 
recognition could also end up being counterproductive because of their potential to 
mistakenly reify simplistic and restrictive ideas of cultural identities (Fraser, 2000: 
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108-109). As such, it is necessary to take a more nuanced approach to the 
interconnections between cultural and economic forms of oppression. „Social justice 
today‟, in Fraser‟s (1998: 149, original italics) words, „requires both redistribution 
and recognition; neither alone will suffice‟. The problem for the modern left, 
however, is that these aims are mutually inconsistent and possibly even contradictory 
(Fraser, 1997: 16). 
 
To solve this dilemma, Fraser (ibid. 23) introduces a telling distinction between 
political aims which allows recognition and redistribution to be mutually supportive. 
On Fraser‟s account, the conflict between recognition and redistribution arises 
because these concepts are often seen as ends in themselves. But redistribution and 
recognition are in fact instruments to address injustices and social problems, and 
must be embedded within a wider strategy which can either affirm or transform a 
social identity structure. Analytically, this combined approach has the advantage of 
fixing attention on the way the mechanisms of cultural and economic marginalisation 
often operate in tandem. According to Fraser (2000: 113-116), processes of 
economic and cultural marginalisation are the joint result of prejudicial or 
stereotypical institutional structures, such as those of marriage (which underpins the 
traditional gendered, heterosexual dynamic in familial relationships) and motherhood 
(which tends to define the woman‟s role in that dynamic) which prevent individuals 
from treating and understanding one another as equals. As such, the answer to both 
cultural and structural inequalities seems to be to change our attitudes and behaviours 
in order to evince wider, progressive structural changes. 
 
On closer inspection, however, this impetus for general change (which leaves the 
dilemma between policy aims open) rests upon a particular view of what changes are 
desirable. As Fraser (1997: 27-31) shows, it would be unacceptable for any group to 
become dependent upon state affirmation in the long run. This would itself indicate 
that the institutional causes of both economic and cultural oppression were still 
operative, and it would necessitate iterative resource redistributions (such as long-
term positive discrimination) in order to prevent the group from falling behind. 
Accordingly, to help this group, the state would need to eventually abandon the 
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democratic tenet of equal treatment for all, which would only serve to emphasise the 
group‟s differences and cause social resentment. To avoid these consequences, the 
state would therefore need to address the affected group‟s social position, by 
strengthening its self-sufficiency and esteem, and instilling within the wider polity a 
sense of respect and fairness. To culturally and economically emancipate an 
oppressed group, in short, the state would need to transform social relations. 
 
This apparently whole-hearted support for transformation makes it difficult to 
understand precisely why Fraser sees a dilemma between redistribution and 
recognition for the left. Even when it is necessary to affirm a group‟s identity, it is 
the requisite economic redistributions which do all the work to promote equality. Of 
course, it might be objected that the necessary transformative strategy itself depends 
upon recognising the moral significance of individual differences so that they can 
confidently take advantage of redistributed economic and cultural resources (Fraser, 
2000). But this objection glosses over the contradiction between the long-term 
effects of these aims. Recognition cannot work as part of a long-term strategy of 
affirmation because it reifies an arbitrary identity and leaves structures of economic 
oppression untouched. In contrast, when the goal is a permanent transformation, 
there can be no intention to genuinely offer recognition to the identity at all. 
„Recognition‟ in this sense refers simply to the massaging of social institutions so 
that individual differences do not systematically disadvantage anyone, leaving all 
possible individuals with broadly equal and coterminous cultural and economic 
opportunities. 
 
The upshot of Fraser‟s nuanced redefinition, then, is that the wider dilemma between 
recognition and redistribution is left very much intact. Though they seek to bring 
together the two sides of the dilemma, her arguments are underpinned by the concern 
to avoid reifying and essentialising identities and to protect individuals from top-
down pressures for consistency (see Fraser, 2000: 112). But from this it follows that 
the only inequality which can be addressed is socio-economic, even if the members of 
oppressed groups do not appreciate this. Thus, against Iris Young‟s (1990) similar 
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marriage of recognition and redistribution, for example, Fraser (1997: 196) argues 
that Young still „implicitly privileges the culture-based social group‟. As such, 
  
in settling on such a conception, [Young] has succeeded in her professed aim 
of articulating the implicit theories of such groups. At the same time, 
however, to the extent that these movements may have misunderstood 
themselves, she risks reproducing their misunderstandings (ibid. my italics). 
 
The question of those who actually want recognition of their uniqueness and value, 
in other words, should be brushed aside. Since marginalised individuals are likely to 
misunderstand the causes of their marginalisation, it is up to the benign state to 
address their problems. The only choice for those who disagree with this analysis, 
therefore, is to reject it in favour of a procedural form of equality. 
 
The reasoning and implications of such a rejection are illustrated well by Taylor‟s 
contrarian „Multiculturalism‟. Taylor (1994: 52-61) explicitly contrasts his politics of 
recognition with what he sees as the „Kantian‟ conception of universal equality. On 
Taylor‟s argument, this does not mean that that the politics of recognition rejects 
equality. Both positions are based upon the same thing – a respect for the „universal 
human potential‟ (ibid. 41). However, while the politics of recognition extends this 
respect to the „actually evolved‟ cultural manifestations of this potential, Kantian 
universalism restricts itself purely to respecting the concept of the human agent and 
her metaphysical potential (ibid. 42). By concentrating on the ideal of autonomy, 
then, a politics of substantive transformation such as Fraser‟s would neglect the very 
freedoms and goods which individuals value. 
 
The appeal of this argument extends beyond contingent consequentialism, however. 
Appealing to Hegel, Taylor (ibid. 66) bases his communitarianism on the contention 
that „recognition forges identity‟. Just as a King‟s status depends upon his subjects 
recognising his title, the integrity of one‟s identity relies on others treating them in 
the same discursive terms as they understand themselves. The problem for Taylor, 
however, is that institutions which used to structure and influence societal discourses 
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and, consequently, our identities (such as the Church or feudal fiefdoms) have now 
withered or ceased to exist. Individuals in modern and diverse societies must look to 
the numerous, disparate and conflicting institutions around them to form their 
identities. Individuals, in other words, have more power than ever before to influence 
and shape one another‟s identities. As such, the left‟s concern with socio-economic 
justice must be expanded to recognise that decentralised and unregulated cultural 
freedoms are as divisive and damaging as decentralised and unregulated economic 
freedoms. 
 
This expansion of the left, Taylor argues, must move beyond impersonal or impartial 
understandings of equality. After all, the discursive structures of a procedurally equal 
society can only construct individuals as equals. But this would be to offend and 
destabilise those whose self-esteem depends upon their own perceived uniqueness. 
Moreover, such an impartial form of fairness can hide oppressive power structures. If 
what makes individuals unique is excluded from the political realm, the universal 
image of the individual, „what constitutes a proper person, a true individual‟, will 
simply be a reflection of the hegemonic ideal of humanity (Baumeister, 2000: 20). In 
place of a misguided universalism, therefore, the state should seek to allow at least 
enough variation in laws and rights to ensure the survival of those groups threatened 
by the hegemonic culture (Taylor, 1994: 61). Governments, that is, should seek to 
foster an equality of respect between different groups based upon the procedural 
presumption that they are each as culturally valuable and morally rewarding as one 
other (ibid. 66-71). 
 
In a similar fashion to Fraser‟s, Taylor‟s politics therefore ultimately aim to address 
inequalities through the transformation of social relations and institutions. Equality 
would pertain when all cultural groups, underwritten by public recognition and 
protection, face the future with the same stability and confidence. Even though the 
test of time might prove that some cultures are worthless, we cannot know in 
advance which cultures this might be true of (ibid.). For, as encultured individuals, 
we cannot make external judgements about other cultures. Yet this does not commit 
Taylor to cultural relativism, because it is based upon the role those cultures play in 
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providing a stable basis for human identity and agency. All cultures ought to be 
treated as equally socially valuable in their current form because there are 
individuals in the present who rely upon them. Once they cease to provide useful and 
meaningful identities, and once they become a poor guide of and basis for agency, 
these individuals must surely be free to either adapt or modify them. As such, and 
like Fraser, Taylor‟s equality is fundamentally an equality of autonomy. 
 
The problem for Taylor is that this argument poses a dilemma similar to Fraser‟s re-
worked recognition-redistribution dilemma. If all groups are to survive into the 
future there needs to be some form of automatic group recognition and substantive 
protection. However, if cultures are to underpin individual autonomy, they must be 
procedurally free to adapt and interact with other cultures, so that individuals can be 
aware of and learn from changing social norms and values. These two outcomes are 
in tension insofar as the state guarantee underlining cultural action can only insulate 
those cultures from wider society, making them less responsive to societal pressures 
and more prone to act in ways which would make their cultures less likely to survive 
in the absence of government assistance. The substance of cultural protectionism, in 
short, is antithetical to the procedural equality of agency Taylor aims for. Yet while 
Fraser constructs this as a simple problem of policy choice, Taylor seems to 
implicitly acknowledge that helping afflicted minorities requires both transformation 
and affirmation. Consequently, he cannot escape his own theoretical predicament. As 
it is shown below, this gives us a valuable insight into the constraints within which 
the politics of difference must operate. 
 
Individualism and multicultural order 
 
It would thus appear that redistribution and recognition do pose a dilemma for the 
left, in so far as they both imply inconsistent but equally plausible conceptions of 
equality and are each, alone, insufficient to ground a progressive politics in our 
multicultural age. Significantly, the source of this dilemma can be shown to lie 
within the left‟s neglect of individual differences. In the first instance, these 
differences obviously lead to diverse and unequal immediate outcomes across the 
21 
 
populace. In turn, at a higher level, individuals then go on to form different 
culturally-mediated opinions and wants about their first order outcomes. The 
traditional socialist response to these differences is to circumscribe our first order 
wants in order to pursue the second order goal of material equality which is 
ostensibly required by justice. The trouble with multiculturalism, however, is that it 
overtly politicises second order differences. Disagreement over what justice requires 
can no longer simply be wished away, because this would undermine the left‟s 
political and moral relevance to irreverent and diverse societies. The challenge for 
progressivism, then, is to realise some form of equality at the second order level (so 
that individuals are not marginalised because of their backgrounds or beliefs) without 
this leading to unacceptable inequality at the first order level. It must, in short, 
address the question of precisely what level of individual freedom is compatible with 
multicultural justice. 
 
As the analysis above shows, this question is poorly treated by the focus on 
redistribution and recognition. On the redistribution side, to repeat, Fraser is 
suspicious of liberty because of the possibility that individual acts are based in 
misapprehension. Yet this leads her to be sceptical of the basic freedom of defining 
one‟s own identity. Despite starting from an appreciation of the political complexity 
of the difficulties faced by different groups, she assumes a position that broadly 
rejects any diversity which might underpin and produce inequalities in either 
ambitions or prospects. Take, for example, her explanation of gender equality. 
Societies, Fraser (1996: 235-236) contends, are not only harmed by the express 
differences in well-being between men and women, but by the intentions of 
individuals to continue reproducing these differences. „The key to achieving gender 
equity‟, she therefore argues, „is to make women‟s current life patterns the norm for 
everyone‟ (ibid.). Individuals, in other words, should all have the same expectations 
and ambitions, so that social structures can offer everyone the same opportunities. 
 
Such a form of equality seems quite unsuitable, however, for individuals conceived 
in less paternalistic terms. Like Taylor, Fraser (2000: 109) accepts the Hegelian 
understanding of human identities. Because of their weakness in the face of 
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hegemonic discourses, she pessimistically assumes that downtrodden minorities can 
only achieve well-being and self-respect by passively accepting external valorisation. 
But since this valorisation will only reinforce their marginalisation, it must ultimately 
be abandoned in favour of transformation. There seems here to be some confusion 
between the individual and the group, however. Individuals do have the ability to 
react against and actively subvert prejudices, even if they cannot control those 
prejudices in the first place. Moreover, as Fraser‟s fear of essentialism recognises, 
different individuals have different identities, even within the same cultural groups. 
Those who require „group‟ valorisation must therefore be those whose identities 
depend upon the stable identities of others (such as community leaders or patriarchs). 
Since Fraser‟s egalitarianism cannot give these generic „others‟ equality-defying first 
order freedoms, her only alternative to valorisation is to break down cultural divides 
to leave them as equal members of a second order meta-group. 
 
Fraser‟s account thus seems unsatisfactory because it offers an insufficient treatment 
of actual individual interests. She seems to see herself as a leader who knows best for 
her community, when it is likely that differently situated individuals would disagree 
with her assessment. Yet Taylor‟s politics of recognition fares little better, for 
perhaps now obvious reasons. To be sure, it does seem to offer a more considered 
appreciation of individual agency. Taylor‟s inter-subjective ontology, for instance, 
requires that members of different cultural groups have access to open and 
constructive dialogical exchanges, so that they can discover and attempt to extend the 
boundaries of their identities. Individuals, Taylor (1994: 35) asserts, attempt to „win‟ 
their identities „through [dialogical] exchange, and the attempt can fail‟. It seems to 
follow from this that failure is as constructive for the individual as success. But 
Taylor does not actually see it like this, because of the importance he invests in 
cultural stability. As such, he extends cultural protections which seem to undermine 
the very agency he champions. 
 
As Milstein (2003) argues, cultural protections close cultures off from the very 
dialogues that they are supposed to be constructed from. Even within cultural groups, 
difference and conflict is intrinsic to individual action. Every person will have a 
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different spatial, temporal and moral understanding of their identity, and it is through 
the interplay of these understandings that people learn and grow. Thus, it is indeed 
important to move beyond the neutrality and legalistic impartiality of liberal 
democratism to free individual growth from the latter‟s biased restrictions. But, by 
condoning policies which protect from stagnation common cultural goods (such as 
the French language in Québec), Taylor imposes a set of equally restrictive external 
cultural boundaries (ibid.). Of course, different cultures will require different levels 
of protection. But what is protected will always be what is held to be sacred, that 
which in a dialogical exchange would invite the most comment (often for very good 
reasons), and which would therefore most enhance self-learning and development. 
 
As such, Taylor‟s argument inevitably privileges the future survival of the group 
over and above the well-being of its members. His argument implies a form of 
coerced equality between second order perspectives, to the detriment of first order 
freedoms. Consider, for instance, his requirement that we consistently approach each 
culture with positive expectations. „On examination‟, Taylor (1994: 69) concedes, 
„either we will find something of value in culture C, or we will not‟. But we should 
not act upon these judgements, because our perspectives are geo-politically situated 
and subjectively grounded (ibid. 71). This is of course right, but it points to an 
irrelevant truism. Regardless of our initial beliefs, we can only expand our cultural 
horizons if we can freely appraise and act upon what is of value in other cultures as 
others appraise our own. And this requires making fundamental moral judgements. 
But it is precisely this freedom that would be circumscribed by group rights, which 
do not so much nurture inter-cultural dialogue as demand inter-cultural deference 
(McBride, 2005: 502).  
 
In the same fashion as Fraser‟s, Taylor‟s argument thus precludes the very agency it 
aims to ensure. Recognising the danger posed by the former‟s acultural emasculation 
of first order freedoms from second order desires, he seeks to privilege the stable, 
second order group membership as the basis of autonomy. Yet his communitarianism 
itself risks ossifying cultural forms, making it likely that individuals would become 
trapped in path-dependent first order structures. The mutual inconsistency of Fraser 
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and Taylor‟s respective redistribution and recognition therefore points to a second 
multicultural dilemma, between the freedom of the individual and the coherence and 
cohesion of the group. In order to act autonomously as cultural and moral beings, it is 
necessary for individuals to have equally stable cultural and social bases to work 
from and fall back upon. Yet free, autonomous behaviour is likely to lead to 
divergent and unruly outcomes which would undermine those egalitarian bases, 
causing harm for others and, potentially, individuals themselves. Circumscribing 
these actions, however, would contradict the very aim of group stability. As such, it 
is fundamentally unclear whether the benevolent hand of the state should seek to 
realise our first order individual agency or our second order group interests.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Under the pressures of multiculturalism, the progressive left seems less able than 
ever before to provide a germane and authoritative vision of justice. As this chapter 
has shown, it is afflicted by two dilemmas, between the substantive equality Fraser 
and Taylor seek variously to provide, and the procedural equality their accounts 
intuitively require, and between the autonomy of the groups they both privilege, and 
the freedoms individuals would need to have in order to benefit from group 
membership. The modern response to these dilemmas has been to turn away from a 
priori reasoning towards democratic institutions which promise to deliver on social 
egalitarian and multicultural goals. It is the aim of this dissertation, however, to show 
that this turn towards democracy is counter-productive.  
 
In the first instance, as it is shown in the next chapter, the different types of 
democratic reasoning pertinent to multiculturalism are themselves undermined by the 
two central multicultural dilemmas. Moreover, as the dissertation illustrates more 
generally, such forms of democracy have the potential only to politicise further the 
inevitable differences between individuals and to exacerbate the destabilisation of 
society. This is perhaps predictable; by their very nature these dilemmas are not 
easily solved without a rhetorical sleight of hand. But participative and deliberative 
democratic institutions seem particularly poorly placed to address them, because of 
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their epistemological flaws. We therefore have no way of knowing in advance how 
to go about solving the problems of multiculturalism. As such, any viable solution 
must surely be one that does not specify any outcome as always and everywhere 
better than any other. Given the pace of social, cultural and demographic change, as 
this dissertation shows, we would do far better to rely upon the discovery processes 
of a classically liberal society to elucidate and realise the best outcome for any given 
culturally and socially diverse population. 
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2. Critical Literature Review 
 
The politics of difference is by no means a fully coherent or consistent paradigm. 
Nonetheless, on balance, the benefits of conceptualising „multiculturalism‟ in a 
unitary fashion do outweigh the costs. Besides presentational simplicity, it allows us 
to recognise and evaluate the collective contribution modern political theorists offer 
to our understanding of the problems posed by moral and cultural differences. As this 
chapter shows, the various disputes and inconsistencies that have arisen over the 
goals of a modern society are particularly edifying. For they move the theoretical 
debate beyond the mere moral foundations of democracy towards practical questions. 
Thus, the chapter begins by introducing a parsimonious analytical framework to 
simplify the egalitarian and ontological dilemmas introduced in chapter one. By way 
of a literature review, this is used to explore the politics of difference. It is shown 
that deliberative and radical democrats reject liberalism because it seeks to offer an a 
priori solution to moral and political problems. These problems, such theorists 
contend, can only be solved democratically. However, the deliberative „solutions‟ 
they offer are just as contentious, because they mobilise mutually inconsistent 
political norms. Modern democrats, in short, commit their own aprioristic fallacy, by 
presupposing solutions to the problems of pluralism. To solve modern political 
problems, it is concluded, we must therefore move beyond the certainties of the 
politics of difference towards the agnostic politics of classical liberalism. 
 
Overview 
 
In the last chapter, it was shown that the political project of the modern left faces two 
fundamental and related problems. The first is that of reconciling substantive with 
procedural equality; the second, that of reconciling group-level autonomy with 
individual freedom. It is worth noting here that both of these dilemmas are variations 
of the structure/agency dialectic. On the one hand, substantive equality is an 
essentially structural concept, concerned principally with ends. It is achieved by 
directing the outcomes of social processes to achieve pre-determined goals, and by 
limiting the ability of either the constituent parts of those processes or external events 
to disrupt those goals. On the other hand, purely procedural forms of equality are 
concerned only with initial conditions. They aim to equalise people‟s means, so that 
no one is systematically disadvantaged. Given this, and in contrast with substantive 
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equality, they allow freedom of agency, and do not seek to directly influence 
outcomes.  
 
This contrast is mirrored in the dichotomy between group and individual outcomes. 
Policies aimed at protecting group autonomy (however autonomy is defined) are 
necessarily structural because they focus upon ends. While it might be argued that 
group autonomy is a procedural concept – a starting point from which unspecified 
and substantial group outcomes originate – the inherent instability of unconstrained 
group formations means that for the idea of a „group outcome‟ to have any 
coherence, the parameters of the population for whom the end is to apply must 
themselves be specified as a part of that end. Since the aim for cohesion is manifest 
in the very idea of group autonomy, group members must inevitably have 
constrained freedoms. Of course, if the idea of group autonomy is to provide 
members of that group with individual autonomy, then their membership of that 
group is inconsequential, and subsequent outcomes will not be „group‟ outcomes at 
all. For, granting individuals autonomy entails giving them freedom to determine the 
nature and quality of their own lives through their own actions. This is clearly 
antithetical to the former concern with collectivities.  
 
Since these dichotomies both embody the distinction between structure and agency, 
it is ultimately this dilemma that must be overcome by the politics of difference if it 
is to „solve‟ the political problems stemming from diversity. This is not to deny, of 
course, that some might reject the dilemmas altogether. In this case, one might 
simply assert that one side of each dilemma is right, arguing, for instance, that 
methodological individualism shows the ideas of group-level autonomy and 
substantive equality to be incoherent. Yet this would be to take a prima facie 
controversial normative position which must unequivocally exclude its opposite 
numbers. While this would be perfectly valid, it would seem to contemptuously belie 
the extent of normative disagreement concerning how to approach diversity, both 
within and without cultural movements. To avoid the cynicism of this approach, and 
to show good will and respect towards moral disagreement, it is therefore necessary 
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to consider those strategies which seek to overcome the two dilemmas and provide 
answers to each of the conflicting positions. 
 
Although these strategies attempt to overcome these dilemmas, it is useful at this 
point to pre-empt our conclusion, and to contend that they are ultimately 
unsuccessful. As it is argued later in this chapter, the different positions within the 
politics of difference ultimately cannot avoid taking an explicit, one-sided position 
on each choice. Accordingly, they can helpfully be located according to these 
positions along the two axes illustrated below in figure 2.1. This visual 
representation is useful because it clarifies the connections between each position. If 
they are to be coherent, it is necessary that they combine the two dilemmas within a 
single means/end relationship. As chapter one illustrated, for instance, a substantive 
form of equality cannot cohere with unstructured individual freedoms within a list of 
political goals. If this seemingly contradictory pair is to be compatible, only one of 
these patterns of relations can be the end of political action; the other must be a 
means to that end. Thus, one should view individual freedoms as a means to 
substantive equality. To put this more thoroughly, the dilemma between the 
individual and the group is inherently a dispute over the appropriate means to social 
ends, because it concerns the very nature of autonomy. Similarly, proceduralism and 
substantivism refer ultimately to opposing normative judgements about social ends 
themselves.  
 
Given this relationship, it follows that the nature of the equality being sought is likely 
to be influenced by whether the means being pursued are intended to foster group- or 
individual-level autonomy. When the means are group-based, the type of equality 
sought will be an equality between groups. This will inevitably be a structural form 
of equality, because it determines the conditions within which individuals must act, 
rather than their actions themselves. Contrastingly, when the means are individual-
based, the equality sought will pertain to individual characteristics. It will pertain to 
aspects of agency, that is, because it must refer to a specific similarity of abilities or 
freedoms across individuals. Likewise, the procedural and substantive forms of 
equality which divide the politics of difference refer to equality defined respectively 
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by agency and by structural patterns. As such, it must be the case that the four simple 
positions that might be taken on the two dichotomies are unique and incompatible. 
As figure 2.1 illustrates below, we can thus coherently and without contradiction use 
these positions to structure our analysis of the literature on the politics of difference. 
 
    
Procedural Equality Substantive Equality 
Liberalism 
Procedural individualism 
(Agency/Agency) 
E.g. Rawlsian institutional 
justice 
Substantive individualism 
(Agency/Structure) 
E.g. Benhabib‟s cultural 
egalitarianism 
Communitarianism 
Procedural 
communitarianism 
(Structure/Agency) 
E.g. Gutmann and Thompson‟s 
deliberative democracy 
Substantive 
communitarianism 
(Structure/Structure) 
E.g. Sandel‟s republicanism 
 
Figure 2.1: The four unique democratic solutions to the dilemmas of equality 
and ontology 
 
Nevertheless, it is first important to note two caveats with regards to this model, in 
order to clarify the nature of the comparisons it proffers. First, the picture it paints is 
rather simplistic, suggesting that all those within each category have the same 
distinct views. This is clearly not the case. Instead, the categories simply refer to 
arguments with the same analytical structure, which use the same type of means to 
reach the same type of ends. The model is therefore an heuristic device, which must 
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inevitably hide some of the nuanced similarities between different authors. While 
this is perhaps regrettable, however, it does not undermine the usefulness of the 
exercise. The point here is simply to outline what different approaches might be 
taken, in the light of the dilemmas of multiculturalism, rather than to forensically 
examine different writers‟ works. 
 
On a related note, it is secondly important not to make assumptions about intentions 
based upon the representation of political theorists in this model. The representation 
says nothing about the aims of different theorists, but rather describes the likely 
outcomes of their ideas. Importantly, it is compatible with the assumption that all 
those theorists concerned are well-intentioned and desire the highest level of well-
being for individuals in a diverse society. Once we make this assumption, it follows 
that if we can identify logical fallacies and non sequiturs in the politics of difference 
which are not present in a viable alternative, then we will have a compelling reason 
to abandon the former and embrace the latter. Our present task, therefore, must be to 
analyse each of the positions in turn to clearly identify their internal, logical or 
philosophical problems, in order that we might, later on, have a solid, non-
ideological basis from which to assess the viability of alternatives. 
 
Procedural individualism 
 
The procedural individualist position is exceptional in that it provides the basis from 
which, essentially, the rest of the literature considered here begins. Its fundamental 
aim is to facilitate individual autonomy in order to maximise the fulfilment of human 
potentials, and it consists accordingly of an emphasis on individual rights within a 
complementary welfarist backdrop intended to ensure procedural equality. Broadly 
speaking, much of the western world can be characterised as following this 
procedural individualist model. Yet in the opinion of many modern democratic 
theorists, lived experience shows that it is clearly unable to cope with the pressures 
of modern pluralism. As such, and on their own terms, the value of multicultural 
critiques and alternatives to the liberal hegemony must hinge upon how well they can 
overcome the problems they see as inherent in liberal politics. 
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Even at the outset we can note that liberal democratism – based as it is on a fusion of 
elements of individualism and republicanism – offers little by the way of conceptual 
stability and coherence (Carter and Stokes, 2002: 1). Instead, paradigmatic unity 
comes from the general commitment to self-determination shared by both republican 
liberals, who emphasise participation within structures of self-governance, and 
liberals from the British tradition, who emphasise the importance of individual 
freedoms. These twin schools offer a somewhat contradictory basis for liberal 
democracy which is readily exploited by the democratic theorists considered below. 
Nevertheless, their respective emphases on structure and agency raise the question of 
whether liberal democratism might itself be able to overcome the twin dilemmas 
outlined above. A good place to begin our review question is thus with the seminal 
thought of John Stuart Mill, who, as David Held (2006: 79) observes, „conceived of 
democratic politics as a prime mechanism of moral self-development‟. 
 
John Stuart Mill 
 
Mill (1991a) was primarily concerned with securing the sovereignty of the individual 
over her own thought and action. He presented instrumental arguments, based on the 
contention that individual liberty is consequentially more desirable than an 
overweening state or dictatorial majority opinion. Instead of concentrating on the 
individual‟s intrinsic rights and duties as Kantian individualism tends to do, Mill‟s 
arguments are based upon a concern for the freedom and autonomy of society‟s 
various minorities because of their role in promoting the welfare and progress of 
humanity as a whole. He praised the freedom to hold unconventional or undesirable 
thoughts and opinions, for instance, because they are indirectly edifying and 
stimulating for us all (ibid. 22-59). Similarly, individuals should be at liberty to act in 
ways some or even most others see as disagreeable, so that they – and, in turn, the 
rest of society – might learn how best to live their lives and promote human 
flourishing (ibid. 69-76). 
 
Mill‟s arguments clearly support an optimistic evaluation of modern pluralism, 
because it seems quite simply to be the natural consequence of our collective 
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ignorance as to how best to live our lives (see ibid. 26-28, for instance). Since we 
have no access to any a priori truths, we can only evaluate diverse cultural and social 
mores as experiments in living, from which we all have much to learn. Mill‟s (ibid. 
ch. 4) well known argument that freedom in action should be permitted until the 
point at which it harms another should therefore be seen as an essentially pluralist 
argument (Gray, 1996). Democratic and state functions should be limited not in order 
to privilege elites but to protect those most at risk. For, individual liberties enable 
communities themselves, rather than those who control or wield the instruments of 
state power, to choose and control their own futures. 
 
A closer examination of Mill‟s aversion to statism, however, is suggestive of why 
multiculturalists are rarely Millian liberals. Mill‟s arguments had two broad targets: 
the assumed moral supremacy of majoritarian opinion, which he argued could lead to 
a „tyranny of the majority‟, and the unrestrained power of bureaucratic state 
institutions, which would inevitably promote despotism (Mill, 1991a: 8-9). These 
problems need addressing, he contended, because they are likely to retard the ability 
of individuals to engage in intellectual and moral development. Besides being able to 
effectively perform only one experiment in social organisation at any one time, the 
state also tends to hamper individual creativity, crowd out private experimentation 
and increase individual apathy, the more powerful it becomes (ibid. 120-128). 
Further, such statism is likely to have reinforcing feedback effects, because the more 
people withdraw apathetically from their communities, the greater the need for 
corrective state interventions. Yet as the state tends towards absolute despotism, the 
power and ability required to uphold its hegemony will become unfeasible, and 
societal collapse is certain (Mill, 1991b: 239).  
 
In this account, individual agency and democratic structures are indivisible. The 
health, vitality and ultimately even the continued existence of the democratic system 
is a function of the development, engagement and maturity of individuals. And, at 
the same time, 
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[t]he maximum of the invigorating effect of freedom upon the character is 
only obtained, when the person acted on either is, or is looking forward to 
becoming, a citizen as fully privileged as any other (ibid. 254). 
  
When individuals are excluded from democratic processes, they are liable to be 
passive, dreary and unfulfilled. But „[g]iving [them] something to do for the public, 
supplies, in a measure, all these deficiencies‟ (ibid. 254). Individual agency and well-
being, in other words, require strong and legitimate democratic institutions. 
 
Mill‟s account thus rests fundamentally upon an impartial and procedural 
formulation of the individual. That is, for a healthy society, citizen relations with one 
another and the state must be regulated by formal democratic procedures. 
Accordingly, Mill‟s liberalism abstracts away from the social, temporal, cultural and 
bodily differences which characterise diverse populations, in order to focus more 
generally upon the conditions favourable to autonomy. No concern is offered for any 
specific individual or group. On this basis, the institutions that matter are state 
institutions, such as the legislature or the judiciary, and the only way they can act 
justly is to treat everyone equally. And because active state power is on Mill‟s 
account inimical to individual equality, then these state institutions must restrict their 
activities to ensuring equality of opportunity. In contrast with Taylor‟s general 
sympathy for endangered cultural groups, Mill‟s approach is therefore more 
concerned with limiting the moral power cultural power structures have over 
individuals. The question of cultural survival is marginalised. As long as no-one is 
prohibited from free thought and action, and all are empowered by democratic 
institutions, individuals should have the ability and knowledge to guide and adapt 
their own culture, if indeed they wish it to exist into the future.  
 
This neglect for group outcomes must undermine the appeal of Millian liberalism to 
those who feel their cultural or national identities are threatened by liberal 
institutions. Moreover, for our purposes, it unhelpfully only reconciles the question 
of structure and agency by thoroughly prioritising the latter. As a result, it asserts the 
need only for an impartial equality of treatment, which, though likely to be beneficial 
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to the polity in general, would likely result in „winners‟ and „losers‟ stratified by 
cultural identities – the very problem the politics of difference takes as its inspiration. 
The problem, then, is that Mill‟s aims appear under-determined. His liberalism 
allows people to choose their own goals, so it can consequently offer no guidance for 
overcoming the profound moral disagreements which exist around choice itself. Yet 
these are debates which concern the very nature of human freedom. To simply leave 
it to people to make up their own minds here at best ignores society‟s underlying 
power structures and, at worst, actively imposes individual autonomy as a meta-norm 
for „all ways of life‟ (Kane, 2002: 98).  
 
To illustrate these points and set the scene for the multicultural critiques to be 
discussed presently, consider here Iris Young‟s attack on liberal impartiality: 
 
The ideal of impartiality is an idealist fiction. It is impossible to adopt an 
unsituated point of view, and if a point of view is situated, then it cannot be 
universal, it cannot stand apart from and understand all points of view 
(Young, 1990: 104). 
 
Young‟s claim is that our autonomy is circumscribed by the social conditions in 
which we find ourselves. Differently situated social groups cannot help but have 
different perspectives which must be relevant to collective moral decisions (Young, 
2000: ch. 3). To remain relevant to the politics of difference, Mill‟s arguments would 
need to show precisely how liberal institutions could mobilise these group-based 
perspectives in order to underwrite individual freedoms. Since they cannot do this, 
Mill remains open to the charge that he privileges a specific and partial form of 
communication and interpretation. It appears to be necessary to move beyond his 
position in order to recognise and empower groups so that their perspectives can be 
considered in a more comprehensive and fair decision-making process. 
 
John Rawls 
 
While they do not explicitly follow Kant, Mill‟s arguments are comparable to Kant‟s 
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in their strict adherence to the value of autonomy. This is problematic, in Rawlsian 
terms, because Kant‟s is merely one of many competing comprehensive moral 
positions. Because it could not command agreement among the adherents of all 
„reasonable‟ comprehensive doctrines, it could only survive with the help of 
government coercion, which could not be justified to those being coerced (Rawls, 
1993: 37). The early Rawls was of course himself arguably committed to a somewhat 
similar comprehensive form of liberalism in his A Theory of Justice (Rawls, 1999: 
37). He later sought to clarify this position, however, after realising that it is 
inappropriate for societies comprised of individuals situated within different and 
incommensurable but at the same time eminently reasonable moral frameworks. 
 
As such, Rawls‟s later arguments embody what might be called an epistemic moral 
pessimism. Like Mill, he takes the paucity of objective truths as proof that it is 
unreasonable to presume that a consensus could or should be reached on complex 
issues of morality (Rawls, 1993: 54-57). The most we can hope to achieve is a 
constitutional settlement which manifests and safeguards „reasonable pluralism‟. 
Thus, his arguments seek to avoid and defuse conflict by setting out the principles of 
a just state upon which diverse individuals can reasonably and without sacrifice 
agree. This sharply contrasts with both Mill‟s comprehensive individualism and, 
notably, with the deliberative approaches examined below. Assuming a more 
optimistic outlook on the epistemic capacities of the citizenry, these approaches seek 
to limit rather than increase the fixity of political decisions.  
 
Like Mill, the early Rawls sought to justify and entrench equal individual liberties 
because of their instrumental value (see Gray, 1989: 153-154 for a comparable 
analysis). Liberty, Rawls (1999: 441-449) argued, is fundamental to individuals 
realising their potentials as human beings, capable of both acting upon a vision of the 
good life and according to the requirements of an idea of justice. In a Kantian, 
constructivist fashion, therefore, Rawls tied the human good to the innate „desire to 
express most fully what we are or can be‟ (ibid. 225). For Kant, moral statements can 
approximate objectivity if they can be derived from the principles which arise from a 
process of pure reasoning (Freeman, 2003: 27-28). Rawls sought to emulate this 
36 
 
process by positing an „original position‟, within which individuals must collectively 
decide how to organise society on the basis of their rationality and moral 
potentialities alone. Since their reasoning would lead them to universal liberties, he 
thus argued that these freedoms have an objective moral value. 
 
Nonetheless, despite relinquishing Kant‟s more controversial deontological 
foundations, constructivism remains central to Rawls‟s later work. Instead of a 
thoroughgoing change, he simply seeks to limit the aims of his argument, by 
separating the procedural questions of political organisation from the normative 
questions of metaphysics and morality (Gray, 1989: 166-167). Thus, Rawls‟s 
political liberalism abandons the commitment to realise our innate autonomy in order 
to focus upon democratic citizenship. The two central moral powers no longer denote 
the defining features of moral human actors but are instead the pre-requisites 
necessary for individuals to partake „in a fair system of social co-operation‟ (Rawls, 
1993: 18-19). Since no (democratic) citizen can fail to agree with this morally neutral 
„political conception of the person‟ (ibid. 29-35) it is „freestanding‟ from any 
particular comprehensive doctrine (ibid. 10). Accordingly, the reasoning embodied 
by „political constructivism‟ (see ibid. 125-129, my italics) can embody the desire 
only to construct the principles of fair co-operation. The liberal recommendations of 
Rawls‟s political philosophy should be seen not as controversial „truths‟, but of 
pragmatic guides to just conduct. 
 
As Rawls‟s political liberalism is explicitly intended to appeal to pluralist and even 
non-liberal philosophies, it perhaps unsurprisingly offers a stronger approach to the 
twin dilemmas of diversity than Mill. In particular, the later Rawls‟s rejection of full 
autonomy means that he is not beholden to such a strict form of individualism. 
Instead, because he is concerned with autonomy only in so far as it is integral to 
democratic participation, the only individual rights necessary in a politically liberal 
society are those which democratic citizens would not object to: those necessary to 
participate as equals in the institutions of democracy and government. This has two 
advantages. The first is that Rawlsian liberalism must be neutral with respect to all 
concepts of the good, be they substantive, communitarian or otherwise, which fall 
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outside and do not affect democratic participation (see Rawls, 1993: 214-215). In any 
case, (reasonable) individuals will not desire any form of the good which does 
undermine democratic equality because, by definition, citizens wish it to be 
immutable. Thus, in a Rawlsian world, Taylor‟s threatened cultures will, as long as 
they are democratic, have recourse to self-preservation. 
 
The second advantage is that Rawls‟s procedural arguments themselves incorporate 
elements of substantive equality. Joshua Cohen (1993: 595-597) argues that it is not 
possible to separate procedural and substantive values in Rawls‟s account, because 
Rawlsian liberalism essentially seeks to „reconcile‟ liberty and equality.3 The original 
position itself, for example, embodies a form of substantive equality in the guarantee 
that the decision-making procedure would be just. And the democratic polity which it 
would produce would be characterised by such substantive goods (such as education 
and welfare) as are necessary to guarantee the „openness‟ and „fairness‟ of the 
democratic process while allowing individuals to realise their own moral vision (ibid. 
601-606). As Rawls (1993: 164-167) contends, a procedural „constitutional 
consensus‟, designed in the first instance to avoid strife, will always tend towards a 
more substantial „overlapping consensus‟ as individuals with different moral 
worldviews learn to treat each other as worthy of reciprocity and respect, and thus 
seek to widen the terms of fairness in order to strengthen political cohesion. It would 
seem, therefore, that Fraser‟s demands for material equality could also be satisfied in 
a Rawlsian world. 
 
These theoretical strengths are, however, illusory, since Rawls‟s political liberalism 
remains hampered by the limitations of his earlier Kantianism. For the problem with 
the latter was not simply its conception of practical reason qua human nature, but the 
ostensibly neutral constructivist dependence upon a process which removes all 
personal knowledge of circumstance and identity. This relies upon the 
epistemological assumption that the two moral potentialities are alone a sufficient 
                                                          
3
 Cohen actually draws this account from the principles of justice in A Theory of Justice. But, as he 
(1993: 598) argues, „the more recent modifications of [Rawls‟s] views do not require any change in 
[the relationship of substance to procedure]‟, so the reasoning stands. 
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basis to make seminal decisions about how human beings in general should live their 
lives. But for the determination of the terms of political association, as Seyla 
Benhabib (1992: 164-170) and John Gray (1989: 30) note, any truly universal human 
characteristics will be so vague and so abstract that they would be practically 
meaningless. If Rawls wishes to ground his arguments in human ontology, then he 
can only appeal to cultural and temporal specificities which are inappropriate for 
grounding a universal form of social organisation (ibid. 30-31). Inevitably, then, 
Rawls ends up covertly injecting controversial norms (such as those embodied by the 
„primary goods‟) into his theories which, had his subjects more knowledge about 
their identities and interests, they might not consent to (Schwartz, 1973). 
 
This problem is clearly not addressed by political liberalism. Indeed, the absence of 
real, substantial information is even more conspicuous here because the whole point 
of this project is to justify a liberal theory of justice by reference to democratic 
institutions. Rawls himself even likens it to deliberative democracy (Saward, 2002: 
112). Yet it is difficult to reconcile the idea of deliberation based upon almost 
complete ignorance with the more common notion of an exchange of ideas and 
perspectives. And it is not just the deliberative credentials of Rawlsian political 
liberalism that are questionable. Its democratic basis itself is of dubious integrity. As 
Rex Martin (1993: 751-752) contends, Rawls‟s political ontology has little relevance 
to real-world democratic institutions. If political liberalism was based upon the 
principles of democracy, it would have to specify the foundational institutions and 
values, such as the universal franchise or majoritarianism, and show how the 
principles of justice can be arrived at from these (ibid. 753-754). This would be to 
abandon any pretence to universality, however. To ground the principles of justice in 
contemporary liberal democratic practices and arguments would be to ground them 
firmly in controversial contemporary ethical discourses. 
 
Chantal Mouffe (1996a: 249) tellingly observes that political liberalism‟s conception 
of reasonable pluralism is effectively a tool by which Rawls „draw[s] a frontier 
between those who accept the liberal principles and those who oppose them‟. His 
apparent ability to overcome the equality and ontology dilemmas is based upon the 
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tautologous logic that people would agree to reasonable principles of justice because 
they are themselves reasonable. But the claim that the principles of justice are 
reasonable is clearly disputable. Because of their foundationally thin, procedural 
nature, they would be unlikely to support a consensus between individuals keen to 
politicise and act upon their substantive goods. As such, and despite his attempts to 
adapt liberalism to fit the demographic and political conditions of our post-socialist 
age, Rawls‟s ultimate contribution is to illustrate the limits of liberal democratism. 
 
Beyond liberalism 
 
The critiques herein notwithstanding, this brief survey of two of liberalism‟s most 
seminal thinkers has illustrated a promising approach to the central dilemmas of 
diversity. It will be recalled that Mill saw the connection between the individual and 
the collective as being one of mutual development. The group cannot develop if the 
individual is prohibited from growing. Rawls, similarly, has shown that procedure 
and substance should also be viewed as inseparable. Procedural liberties cannot be 
exercised without their attendant substantive liberties. The problems neither 
approach can overcome, however, are those posed by irreconcilable value and moral 
pluralism, which both see as something to be embraced, rather than changed. As 
noted earlier, this is one of the greatest differences between liberals and deliberative 
democrats. For the latter do not subscribe to Rawls‟s epistemic pessimism. Instead, 
they believe that democratic procedures can be used to address, rather than simply 
accept difference. To assess this strategy, it is to these accounts we now turn. 
 
Substantive individualism 
 
In contrast with liberalism‟s pessimistic and debilitatingly strict proceduralism, 
deliberative conceptions of democracy promise to solve the equality and ontology 
problems with ease. While it may not be possible to truly satisfy everyone, if the 
disagreements which characterise pluralist politics can be shown to be essentially 
tractable, then it is at least possible that there is a substantial, unitary end which may 
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command legitimacy. This end cannot be known a priori, however. A formal, 
democratic procedure of some form is necessary in order to discover its composition. 
It is not, therefore, that procedures are outcomes, as Rawls seems to say, but that a 
just procedure inevitably leads to a just outcome. The challenge for deliberative 
democratic theorists, then, is to discover procedures, and thus outcomes, which are 
truly just.  
 
Substantive individualists address this challenge by ultimately seeking to allow the 
individual to define the contours of justice. Like liberals, they are wary of the 
dangers of giving groups too much power over their members, so they lean towards 
privileging individual autonomy rather than group identity. Nevertheless, to reconcile 
individual freedoms with pluralism, they allow that justice must entail the substantial 
recognition of cultural and moral norms. This position is exemplified by Benhabib 
(2002: 70), who contends that „we can and should do justice to certain claims for 
recognition without accepting that the only way to do so is by affirming a group‟s 
right to define the content as well as the boundaries of its own identity‟. Since 
Benhabib addresses her concerns directly to the question of justice, it is apposite to 
begin here by analysing her contributions. 
 
Seyla Benhabib 
 
Benhabib‟s deliberative approach rests upon setting out a dynamic, sociological 
theory of culture and identity which can displace the „mosaic multiculturalism‟ 
which defines much orthodox pluralist thought (ibid. 7-8). She contends that 
 
cultures are not homogenous wholes; they are constituted through the 
narratives and symbolisations of their members, who articulate these in the 
course of partaking of complex social and significant practices (ibid. 61). 
 
As such, cultures are „communit[ies] of conversation‟ which arise only out of the 
shared interests, shared projects and shared experiences of individuals (ibid. 33). 
This is a clear departure from the argument offered by those such as Taylor who 
41 
 
believe the individual to be constituted by culture. Because of our multitudinous and 
various characteristics (ranging from age and gender to education, hobbies and 
political views), any one individual will be a member of countless different and often 
competing cultures. Moreover, each and every culture will itself be a melting pot of 
different influences and interests which must vie for narrative primacy. There can 
thus be no basis for the state to arbitrarily prioritise one part of an individual‟s 
identity over any other. Individuals must themselves discover their own identities via 
discourse and deliberation. 
 
This throws up an immediate problem. Since everyone must have a unique set of 
viewpoints, then it must be difficult to reach a consensus over a just democratic 
procedure. The problem for Benhabib is that in order to construct this consensus, she 
must introduce subtle yet controversial value judgements, which ultimately only 
prove the stark and irreconcilable nature of moral conflict. In and of itself, of course, 
her social ontology is value neutral. Benhabib (2004a: 176-183) adds a normative 
twist, however, when she argues that, in the face of this reality, the task of politics is 
to unite the disparate elements both within and without society through all-inclusive 
democratic interactions. In a similar vein to Fraser‟s approach to diversity, this 
unification depends upon the democratisation and transformation of both the 
relations between maligned and dominant groups and even the internal constitutions 
of the groups themselves. For true democratic relationships require a „complex 
cultural dialogue‟ whereby identities and cultural boundaries between the „self‟ and 
„other‟ are called into question and are openly and critically evaluated (Benhabib, 
2002: 70). 
 
This appraisal imbues Benhabib‟s cultural ontology an odd duality. On the one hand, 
it is a simple fact that everyone is different. But on the other, it is also a functional 
good. Given the political aim of initiating critical self-reflection on both the 
individual and communal scale, internal cultural heterogeneity with its attendant 
disputation must be something to be celebrated. For, not only does it stimulate 
interaction and learning, the absence of cultural wholes means that there are rarely 
instances of incommensurability even in the most diverse societies. When radically 
42 
 
different individuals cross paths, the process of exchange can be different in nothing 
but scale from the internal discursive exchange when, for example, one‟s sexuality 
contradicts one‟s religion – conflicts which are overcome in the real world of 
inherently contested cultures. Accordingly, any possible challenge that the norms 
embedded within complex cultural dialogues are partial with respect to any particular 
culture or moral position can be dismissed. Deliberation is instead the (ostensibly) 
logical answer to the necessary task of co-ordinating the diverse and frictional, yet 
structurally similar, cultural constellations within our global „community of 
interdependence‟ (ibid. 36). 
 
On the basis of this argument, it seems safe to assume a consensus around the 
„normative rules‟ Benhabib sets out to ensure the justice of the discursive process 
(ibid.). These are based on the rationale of discursive interactions, and the intuitive 
„presumption that the instances which claim obligatory power for themselves do so 
because their decisions represent an impartial standpoint said to be equally in the 
interests of all‟ (Benhabib, 1996a: 69). Of course, for this to be the case, deliberation 
and debate must take place in conditions in which all participants have equal control 
over the content, direction, duration and rules of the intercourse (ibid. 70), conditions 
described by the principles of „egalitarian reciprocity‟ and „universal moral respect‟ 
(Benhabib, 2002: 106-107). Moreover, in situations of inter-cultural dialogue, these 
procedures require equal treatment of members from all cultural groups, the freedom 
of all to decide which groups, if any, they „belong‟ to and the freedom of entry and 
exit into groups (ibid. 131-132). 
 
At first sight, this is a compelling argument. In particular, the link between difference 
and learning is persuasive. We can indeed learn about both ourselves and one another 
by respectfully talking and listening, and the more we differ, the more we can and 
often should learn. Moreover, analytically this argument seems well-placed to 
overcome the dilemmas of multiculturalism. Benhabib‟s strict limits on fair 
discursive interactions ensure that, in theory, all situated moral viewpoints and 
perspectives can be articulated and appraised. In consequence, when individuals 
make arguments and express their interests, they would have to reflect over what 
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meaning these arguments and interests have for others, who would surely take 
offence at expressions of pure self-interest (ibid.). Benhabib‟s deliberative 
democracy would therefore stimulate intra-cultural learning and respect, by 
removing the fear of the unknown. It seems to follow, then, that individual agency 
and cultural structures would become more and more interconnected, as discussants 
would internalise and form links with an ever more inclusive set of socio-cultural 
ideas. Individuals would thus presumably learn to recognise and respect one others‟ 
cultural norms. They would be well-positioned to identify and arrest both intra- and 
inter-cultural oppression. 
 
These strengths are illusory, however. The ostensible universality of Benhabib‟s 
discursive ethics is thoroughly undermined by their contestable quasi-Rawlsian 
constructivist basis. As David Peritz (2004: 269) illustrates, political theorists can 
only identify issues in need of democratic deliberations; they cannot resolve those 
issues „once and for all‟.4 Thus, while Benhabib convincingly shows that mosaic 
multiculturalism is problematic, this does not itself prove that her deliberative 
alternative commands the legitimacy necessary to ground democratic theory and 
practice. Indeed, her account of the radical partiality of individual identities within 
heterogenous social and cultural structures seems to imply that „all conceptions of 
culture [including her own] with sufficient normative content to play an important 
role in democratic deliberation or theory are reasonably controversial‟ (ibid., my 
italics). Thus, the claim that individuals should „adopt a self-reflective attitude 
toward their own culture‟ cannot be accepted at face value (Pensky, 2004: 262). This 
would require members of cultural minorities to abandon any claims to „truth‟ or 
cultural integrity in favour of instrumentalism or relativism. And supposing that 
minorities did accept this, it is hard to see how it could do little other than aid the 
spread of the secular majority culture (ibid. 263). 
 
                                                          
4
 Indeed, this is a point that seems to be implicit in the idea of democratic deliberation. If individuals 
are seen to be moral agents, who can responsibly make decisions about their own lives, then there can 
be no justification for limiting the scope of debate a priori, because this would seem to either pre-
empt the outcome of those deliberations, or else (unjustifiably) exempt certain issues from 
examination.  
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The problem, in short, is that Benhabib relies upon a naturalistic fallacy. Intriguingly, 
as Peritz (2004: 273) notes, this is exactly the same problem she excoriates Charles 
Taylor for (see Benhabib, 2002: 65). Now, the shift from ontology to advocacy is 
certainly understandable. After all, Benhabib‟s arguments are based on the basic 
agency and autonomy inherent in all individuals, and it is this agency which explains 
and fills out her epistemic optimism. This is simply not enough, however, to 
overcome the plausible claims of rivals that such autonomy is undesirable. One need 
only imagine here the Catholic Church‟s reaction if the Pope were forced to admit 
that atheists were just as likely to be correct on theological issues as he, and that we 
should all be agnostic to the rights and wrongs of abortion or stem-cell research. 
Benhabib‟s apparently empowering account is thus a mirage. At its base, it is simply 
an assertion of the importance of universal, substantive equality – in terms, we might 
contend, of the distribution of the „demassified and shifting‟ cultural resources which 
constitute the social world (Fraser, 1997: 30) – between individuals. 
 
This is not to denigrate Benhabib‟s insightful argument. Her response to Peritz, for 
instance, asserts that the separation of political and moral autonomy would leave 
women and minorities stranded and vulnerable, which she would be „unwilling to 
accept‟ (Benhabib, 2004b: 297). What is needed, amongst other things, is the 
encouragement of „women‟s equal citizenship and moral self-determination‟ (ibid.). 
This is a powerful argument, which refers to one of the most influential and 
important claims of twentieth century feminism. But it illustrates the centrality of 
contestable norms to her account, justifying her normative place within substantive 
individualism. She thus sits in the curious position of advocating precisely the kind 
of deconstructive, agency-centred view of culture which was one of the motivating 
factors for multiculturalism in the first place. 
 
John Dryzek 
 
Dryzek‟s (2000; 2001) „discursive democracy‟ promises to circumvent many of these 
problems whilst remaining true to the emancipatory promise of Benhabib‟s 
arguments. Thus, Dryzek shares the latter‟s concern with essentialism, but he sees 
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deliberative democratism as itself liable to veil individual differences within an 
ostensibly unitary identity. The problem is that deliberation must presuppose a set of 
norms and deliberative ideals, which, like Benhabib‟s above, risk reproducing a 
particularly abstract, secular and culturally biased view of the world (Dryzek, 2000: 
25). Recognising this, many „difference democrats‟ have sought to undermine the 
influence of liberalism by injecting marginalised voices and groups directly into the 
political process. For Dryzek (ibid. 62-67), however, this risks an even more 
insidious form of oppression, whereby the individual must accept a reified and 
fundamentally arbitrary understanding of their identity or else give up any hope of 
influencing the political process. 
 
In contrast to a deliberative democracy based upon the representation of and 
interaction between persons and identities, Dryzek thus offers a democratic system 
based upon the interaction of society‟s various discourses. Drawing from Foucault 
and like Benhabib, he understands individual identities to be essentially contested 
derivations of the numerous competing discourses which vie for „truth‟ status in 
society. As such, a more extensive representation of identities or individuals is likely 
to make no difference to the boundaries of democratic freedom (ibid. 74-80). Such 
official recognition is likely to capture and represent only those who accept the 
dominant social discourses concerning marginalised groups and their place within 
Western societies. To extend the boundaries of democracy, and to make democratic 
control more effective, it is necessary instead to mobilise all of the different 
discourses at work in society, including those which represent the interests of 
animals and the environment (ibid. 147-148). This would shatter illusions of cultural 
and social unity and emancipate those minority perspectives which exist across social 
groups but run counter to the liberal and capitalist hegemony.  
 
Dryzek offers two ways in which to mobilise society‟s marginalised discourses. The 
most direct way is to formally admit them into the democratic parliamentary process. 
This could be done by systematically selecting discursive representatives according 
to the extremity of their views or the moderate way in which they combine different 
positions (Dryzek and Niemeyer, 2008: 485-488). Selected individuals could thus be 
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admitted into democratic chambers or given powers of oversight and contestation 
through mechanisms such as citizens‟ juries or polling groups. Since Dryzek (2000: 
ch. 4) is wary of the stifling, innovation-crushing aspects of public institutions, 
however, this form of representation would need to take place within a wider 
contestatory and „insurgent‟ public sphere. Privileging hitherto marginalised 
discourses would require the allowance and endorsement of non-liberal dialogical 
forms, such as shifting patterns of rhetoric and story-telling. Moreover, it would 
require giving the new discourses which arise out of these dynamic interactions 
instant recognition, lest they wither under pressure from extant, institutionalised 
discursive power. As such, a discursive democracy requires a vibrant and dynamic 
civil society in which individuals can freely challenge existing institutions and 
demand changes to „the terms of political discourse (ibid. 101). In this sense, the key 
role for democratic institutions is simply to test the validity and fairness of discursive 
claims. Discursive action is to take place primarily in the public sphere.  
 
„Discursive‟ democratism provides a seemingly less biased view of individual 
emancipation than Benhabib‟s because it relies upon a contestatory process that 
leaves explicit room for fundamentalist, non-secular and illiberal discourses. Thus, 
the two-tier democratic process would provide space for the structural order some 
might want in order to secure the future of their cultures because it privileges 
discourses, rather than individuals. Since discursive views could be effectively 
concretised (much like Britain‟s shrinking Anglican Church is still enshrined by 
religious peerages in the House of Lords), marginalised groups would be guaranteed 
a dialogical and moral space within which they would effectively be guaranteed 
some influence on political decision-making. Yet, significantly, this would not 
impinge upon individual freedoms (qua agency), which would be underwritten by 
the autonomy of the public sphere. This autonomy is fundamentally necessary in 
order to move beyond mere procedural liberal rights to give people a genuinely equal 
franchise (ibid. 86). As Dryzek (ibid. 161-166) suggests, in practice such a strong 
form of equality would therefore sustain a form of reflexive, critical autonomy 
amongst the citizenry towards what could otherwise be oppressive discursive 
structures. 
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It is not hard, however, to see the danger this reflexive autonomy poses to established 
cultures and religions. For it relies fundamentally upon the separation of the 
individual from her constitutive discourses. These discourses are to be treated, in 
effect, as free-floating legislative building blocks with equal status and input into the 
political process. Their validity is dependent upon the reaction of the public sphere, 
in which individual action is to play a consciously subversive role in challenging 
parliamentary discourses according to autonomous moral evaluations of their 
practical effects. In so far as the public mood shifts or new civic discourses emerge, 
these would effect a change upon the composition and content of institutionalised 
discourses, which would then be subjected, during the political process, to fresh 
democratic assessments of their generality and beneficence. As such, the stability and 
security of cultural and moral discourses and their attendant structures would always 
be under threat. Their demands for protection and respect on the basis of truth claims 
would inevitably be marginalised by the thoroughgoing consequentialism which 
would pervade the public sphere. 
 
It is therefore difficult to see how Dryzek solves the problems he identifies in liberal-
leaning deliberative accounts. His system would erode the ability of any discourse to 
assert metaphysical claims which cannot be subjected to some form of rational 
deliberative process, which is tantamount to saying that „truth‟ is dialogically 
constructed. Such a claim is obviously controversial, and it leads Dryzek to base his 
account on individuals having substantive equal positive freedoms in the face of 
competing claims to their adherence. The seemingly fair settlement which would be 
offered by political institutions to competing discourses is therefore neither here nor 
there; like Benhabib, Dryzek is committed to the inseparability of moral and political 
autonomies. Forms of cultural or moral agency which require the curtailment of 
certain freedoms in order to preserve their stability would thus be untenable. And 
groups such as Catholics and conservatives that seek to present a unified, group 
identity would be undermined by the fundamental elevation of the individual as the 
unit of agency in the political process. Accordingly, like Benhabib, Dryzek can only 
be evaluated as presenting an unremittingly substantive individualist response to the 
problems of modernity and diversity.  
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Towards an alternative deliberative democracy 
 
This deliberative project simply proves the objection to epistemic optimism. 
Benhabib and Dryzek‟s arguments only provide an equal and just outcome for all if 
we all agree on the value of their social constructivist and discursive ontologies. Yet 
neither author provides any reason to believe that we would all agree with that 
model. Simply being participants in daily discourses does not mean that all 
individuals will understand their daily lives as primarily and importantly discursive, 
especially when this leads to the undermining of their sacred or central ideals. 
Moreover, neither does it necessarily mean that individuals would not seek to stop 
discursive challenges to their beliefs if they could.
5
 Substantive individualists 
therefore continue to beg the question of agreement on just procedures. What are we 
to do when people disagree, reasonably enough, over such complex moral and ethical 
issues? Are some always doomed to discontent and dejection? As we will presently 
see, the deliberative democrats Gutmann and Thompson attempt to overcome these 
problems through an alternative idea of democracy which seeks to reconcile short-
term stability with long-term change. 
 
Procedural communitarianism 
 
This second set of deliberative arguments is in many ways similar to the substantive 
individualist position set out above. An obvious parallel is the shared optimistic 
assumption that deliberation can overcome intractable moral conflicts, at least in the 
short run. And no less significant is the shared intention to overcome the dilemma 
between structure and agency by treating both as integral parts of the deliberative 
process. Indeed, this is more explicit in arguments characteristic of this position, 
which place emphasis more on the procedural equity which underpins democratic 
practice rather than the substance of democratic outcomes. To counterbalance this 
proceduralism, however, they clearly depart from the individualistic emphasis on 
autonomy. As Gutmann and Thompson‟s arguments show, procedural 
                                                          
5
 Islamic reactions to Salman Rushdie‟s Satanic Verses and the publishing of cartoons of the Prophet 
Muhammad in the Danish press are good examples of this argument.  
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communitarianism seeks to strengthen the moral obligations placed upon individuals 
in order to provide more substantially group-friendly outcomes.  
 
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson 
 
The procedural basis of Gutmann and Thompson‟s ostensibly liberal project is based 
on their conviction that deliberative democratic processes can only be provisionally 
justified. Although they believe deliberative democracy to be morally preferable to 
any alternative democratic arrangements, „[p]rocedural and substantive principles 
should both be systematically open to revision in an on-going process of moral and 
political deliberation‟ (Gutmann and Thompson (hereafter GT), 2004: 25-26). GT 
define deliberative democracy as  
 
a process that requires decision-makers to accept the responsibility of 
justifying the substance of the decisions they make on behalf of others–their 
fellow citizens, and at least some of their fellow human beings in the rest of 
the world (ibid. 62). 
  
For GT, as with Benhabib, Democracy embodies the principle of reciprocity, the 
imperative that individuals must explain those decisions which would impact on 
other people to those people. Reciprocity is particularly important for GT, however 
because it is the only premise which cannot be rescinded democratically (ibid. 114-
115). Reciprocal respect must be ongoing, and people must continually 
accommodate one another‟s viewpoints and objections if democratic interactions are 
to be fair and effective. Otherwise, decisions are likely to be made illegitimately by 
force or bargaining (ibid. 98-99).  
 
The movement from this procedural basis to some form of substantive equality 
blends aspects of Rawlsian liberalism with Habermasian discursive norms (such as 
those of Benhabib, above). Since participants must all agree that the justifications 
used within a reciprocal deliberation are at least reasonable, it follows that such 
justifications must appeal to the basic requirements that all free and equal individuals 
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would reasonably desire for themselves (GT, 1996: 60-61). Accordingly, a 
deliberative democracy would presumably provide the Rawlsian „primary goods‟ – 
the basic liberties and protections necessary for general autonomy (see, for instance, 
GT, 1996: ch. 8). Legitimate deliberative action, in other words, implies a respect for 
substantial rights by definition, because a decision process that overrides or 
circumvents inevitable and intuitive objections would have no legitimacy. Like 
Benhabib and Dryzek, GT‟s theory therefore provides a basis for objectively 
criticising the legitimacy of deliberative outcomes, even when they are apparently 
procedurally fair (GT, 2004: 104). 
 
Yet GT avoid the objections raised above against Rawls and the substantive 
individualists by emphasising the provisionality of their arguments. They seem 
innocent of the kind of assumptions which Rawls makes about universal reason by 
suggesting that the requirement for welfare would be the outcome of real 
deliberations amongst socially situated individuals. And they avoid dubious moral 
assumptions by accepting that their moral bases are partial with respect to the 
contemporary political context. If it can be shown that „there are better arguments for 
competing principles or conclusions in the same context‟, then we should adjust our 
moral principles as necessary (ibid. 122). But this in itself must involve some form of 
deliberation in order to evince the necessary consensus around the new principles. 
Iterative deliberations, in other words, are essential for any inter-temporally 
legitimate form of democracy. GT‟s substantive, egalitarian commitments therefore 
appear to be the logical corollary of legitimate democratic practice. Structure and 
agency work together in their account to create fairness. 
 
By rejecting the more libertarian and agnostic aspects of liberalism, GT (1996: 201-
208) thus move deliberative democracy towards satisfying really-existing groups. 
They take issue with the basic liberal premise of toleration because, they claim, the 
neutrality this requires between different moral or religious truth claims is 
unacceptable for people who believe in specific truths (GT, 2004: 67). Those who 
believe that truth does exist will regard it as sacrosanct, and so would find the 
requirements of neutrality unbearably onerous. It would be unjust, therefore, to 
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expect individuals to accept the „reasonable‟ argument that we have no means of 
verifying the truth of any moral claim because, as far as the religious and morally 
self-assured are concerned, we have all the means we need. In such a case, „toleration 
(which ex hypothesi rests only on skepticism) does not seem to have enough weight 
to override the claims of faith [sic]‟ (ibid. 68).  
 
In place of liberalism‟s misguided commitment to metaphysical autonomy, GT thus 
advocate the „Lockean‟ principles of preclusion (ibid. 68-78). On this account, it is 
assumed that there is religious truth, such that if the state knew that truth, it would 
rightly use it in making policy. Of course, the unrestrained state cannot be trusted not 
to exploit its power or make mistakes, and neither should it command religious 
adherence. Instead, government action should be based upon „rational deliberation‟ 
to approximate truth as closely as possible (ibid. 69), which just happens to require 
the principle of reciprocity (ibid. 72-73). In contrast to the Millian discursive 
liberalism characteristic of Dryzek, which „locks into place the moral divisions in 
society and makes collective moral progress far more difficult‟, deliberative 
democracy promises to solve moral conflicts whilst respecting the substantive claims 
of disparate cultural groups (GT, 1996: 62-63).  
 
To be sure, with its quasi-Rawlsian procedural basis, GT‟s argument is intended to 
offer a liberal solution to the conflicts which arise from cultural pluralism. But, in 
seeking to explicitly reject agnosticism, it fundamentally misrepresents liberalism‟s 
account of pluralism. The underlying premise of liberal toleration is not a substantial 
claim about the substance and veracity of morals themselves – which would indeed 
be offensive to those strong moral beliefs – but a normative observation of our social 
world. We live in a world in which there is considerable disagreement, and even 
violent confrontation, over issues of morality and religion. Liberals claim that the 
freedom to pursue one‟s own moral ends can prevent such violence and social 
conflict between all but the most unstable and extremist individuals by neutralising 
one of the most fertile battlegrounds – the state legislative apparatus and its totalising 
potential. As Chandran Kukathas (2003: 2) states, toleration requires us to allow 
„different beliefs and ways of life to coexist‟ without impinging upon the freedom of 
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association or beliefs of any individual. This is quite contrary to GT‟s baffling 
accusation that, in contrast to their own epistemic optimism, toleration requires 
universal adherence to controversial metaphysical claims. The liberal challenge for 
GT is to show why encouraging tolerance between a plurality of beliefs is more 
likely to lead to conflict than requiring people to both argue about and present their 
most cherished beliefs to examination and dissection (on this criticism, see Simon, 
1999: 50-52).
6
 
 
By obliging even the most deeply opposed sectors of society to seek common moral 
grounds, like Benhabib and Dryzek GT fallaciously assume that societies can be 
peaceably constructed around a commitment to on-going deliberation and open-
mindedness. Regardless of their Rawlsian intent, however, the effect of this 
argument is to make individual privacy the enemy of the collective good. GT‟s 
(2004: 68) deployment of the Lockean „validity premise‟ in order to orient 
democratic practice towards common truths tellingly illustrates this aversion to 
genuine diversity. The problem is that intractable differences do exist, even within 
seemingly unified groups, and these disagreements often extend beyond the contents 
of values to call into question their very existence and importance. By ignoring this 
uncertainty, GT‟s democracy would tend to shift power towards cultural and moral 
hierarchies, who would be free to use deliberative institutions to target and politicise 
subversion, both in their own communities and even in wider society. 
 
Accordingly, GT seem unable to offer anything more than a relentlessly procedural 
form of democracy. This would be unpalatable, firstly, to those more 
individualistically minded democrats, who envisage democratic freedoms as those 
opportunities necessary to promote individual development and well-being. More to 
the point, it would offer nothing to those really-existing cultural groups generally 
concerned about their future. To genuinely satisfy these concerns, the institutions of 
                                                          
6
 Intriguingly, GT come close to actually recognising this point, when they accept the existence of 
some moral conflicts, such as that over abortion, which persist even when individuals meet the 
demands of reciprocity (see GT, 1996: 73-79). In such cases, they inexplicably suggest little more 
than liberal toleration. 
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democracy would need to guarantee the freedom of group action, which, in effect, 
requires protecting groups from one another‟s demands. To be sure, this means that 
fervent opponents need to be able to freely voice their mutual disdain. But, if group 
freedoms are to sustainably co-exist alongside the freedom of the individual to 
choose their own future, it also means that they need to be able to ignore one another, 
if necessary, in order to pursue their interests. This is a point completely missed by 
GT, who, guided by their faith in deliberation, seem intent instead on stoking a 
destructive, rent-seeking war of group against group. 
 
Iris Young 
 
Young attempts to avoid these problems by taking a more unorthodox approach to 
democracy. While sharing GT‟s intention to realise the intrinsic justice of 
democracy, she concentrates more on its potential ability to promote the necessary 
skills, opportunities and abilities to partake in meaningful and rewarding social 
interaction (Young, 2000: 31-32). The value of deliberative democracy on this 
account lies in its ability to overcome the oppression and domination which prevent 
universal autonomy. The problem, Young argues, is that dominant conceptions of 
deliberation, which privilege civilised, first-person argumentation and aim to reach 
consensus, may be „too narrow‟ or „exclusionary‟ to overcome these problems and 
deliver justice (ibid. 36). Young thus seeks to move beyond the abstract 
individualism of Benhabib and Dryzek and the untenable impartiality of GT to set 
out a more comprehensive and inclusive „communicative democracy‟ (ibid. 18). 
 
While this model rejects liberal individualism, Young nevertheless shares 
liberalism‟s rejection of the essentialising tendencies of communitarian, nationalist 
and Marxist arguments. These arguments, Young (ibid. 83-89) argues, arbitrarily 
define human associations according to national or class boundaries. Social 
groupings, she contends, are defined relationally. A social group exists in so far as its 
members share a certain practice or characteristic not shared by the rest of society. 
And since the social and economic relations between individuals are „complexly 
mediated rather than direct and face-to-face‟ (ibid. 45), as soon as we move beyond 
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the most observable relations, it must be effectively impossible to know who is a 
member of any particular intricately defined „group‟. As such, the concept of 
elemental or intrinsic social characteristics is a fiction. Democratic institutions have 
no place in seeking to realise or manifest patterned and unequal cultural outcomes. 
 
Despite this nuanced account of identity, however, Young‟s arguments still focus 
pragmatically upon the social group. For, whether groups theoretically exist has no 
bearing on the social reality within which „groups are a given, and people treat one 
another partly on the basis of imparted group membership‟ (Young, 2002: 285). The 
risk that individuals might be systematically and relationally disadvantaged is 
therefore real, and it requires a concerted effort to ensure self-development and self-
determination for all. For this purpose, Young seeks to celebrate the procedural 
aspects of democracy. Everyone should have access to the deliberative process, 
which should be transparent, reasonable and, above all, inclusive (Young, 2000: 52-
53). To this end, deliberation should allow „greeting‟, „rhetoric‟ and „narrative‟ 
alongside the traditional, formal styles of argumentation (ibid. 57-77). Such 
inclusivity would both force the majority to acknowledge minority claims and 
democratically mobilise the radically situated knowledge which is often excluded 
from the political process. For it is only through the inclusion of such situated 
perspectives that democracy can begin to approach objective, rather than partial and 
nepotistic knowledge about the social world (ibid. 112). 
 
That individuals all have unique backgrounds and perspectives is an important point. 
But it sits uneasily with Young‟s commitment to group representation. Young 
justifies this latter commitment by invoking Derrida‟s concept of „différance‟. 
Representatives, who inevitably differ from their constituents, must speak for them, 
rather than as them (ibid. 126-127). The efficacy of representation, on this argument, 
turns not upon how comprehensively representatives mirror (qua essentialise) their 
constituents, but upon how satisfactorily they represent and reflect the group‟s 
various perspectives, grievances and demands in decisions that cannot be known a 
priori. The role of individuals, in Young‟s communicative democracy, is to search 
for one another, to „organise and discuss the issues that are important to them, and 
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call upon candidates to respond to their interests‟ (ibid. 130). Armed with the 
contents of these discussions, and the knowledge that their conduct will be appraised 
and criticised later, representatives thus have the information necessary to act 
autonomously in complex and unforeseen political circumstances.  
 
In so far as the problems arising in diverse societies do concern the recognition of 
maligned identities, this argument seems to work. Since atomistic liberalism 
emasculates individuals of their associational bonds, it would appear that group 
representation is necessary (Young, 1990: 99-102). Even on Young‟s own argument, 
however, these problems are actually the manifestation of power inequalities 
between the hegemonic majority and the excluded and even ignored minorities. Her 
attempt to outline a just democratic procedure thus relies upon empowering groups 
so that they can impose their interests onto the political process, in order to push it 
towards a fairer settlement. It is in this vein, for instance, that she argues for „group 
veto power[s] regarding specific policies that affect a group directly‟ (ibid. 184). But 
this bleaches justice of its substantive content. Moreover, and even more explicitly 
than in GT‟s account, this solution to the dilemma between groups and individuals 
only works at the expense of any kind of accommodation for the latter.  
 
Contrary to Young‟s argument, the only real difference between group agency and 
individual agency concerns power. Within liberalism, the cultural hegemony to 
which all individuals are equally subject (but which, to be sure, will provide more 
opportunities to those who fit the desirable image) is one that all individuals have 
some measure of ability, however small, to change, through the determined 
realisation of their own and their associates‟ identities. Contrastingly, a polity which 
defines groups for specific treatment must monopolise power within those 
institutions which administer and regulate group identities, because it could be easily 
destabilised and made unworkable by the freedom of association and recognition 
inherent within liberalism. As such, the ostensible freedom of identity provided by 
groups within such political systems is in fact simply the freedom to act within an 
environment sedated by authoritarian power, and is circumscribed accordingly. 
Power, in short, is here a zero-sum game. 
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Young‟s own ontology, however, effectively illustrates the dangers of ossifying 
group identities. Individuals often do form political associations, but they also leave 
them, often to join direct competitors. Her argument therefore seems self-defeating. 
As Tebble (2002: 269-270, my italics) argues, advocates of group rights, such as 
Young,  
 
merely repeat the errors of atomism they claim mark individualism. That is, 
they too fail to consider that groups are themselves never ontologically given 
but, rather, are always constituted within a matrix of sociality. Indeed, this is 
the whole point of Young‟s claim that the borders of groups are undecidable. 
 
It is within complex, temporally and spatially mediated relations that community 
differences and „group‟ appellations form (Tebble, 2002: 262). So while individuals 
within the public sphere might naturally form coherent perspectives, this is unlikely 
given our inevitably fragmented loyalties. All public debates are fundamentally 
intertwined, so it is effectively impossible to decide who „belongs‟ to any given 
position (Barry, 2001). The dispute over the marginalisation of Muslims, to take a 
contemporary example, is simply part of a wider debate concerning, among other 
issues, extremism, assimilation, poverty and domestic violence. So how could we 
ever know who belongs to even the relatively simple „Islamic‟ group? When 
individuals are free to define themselves, it is impossible to tell where a group begins 
and ends. Against the aims of Young‟s arguments, her insistence on respecting 
arbitrarily defined group boundaries will therefore tend to exclude much of the 
knowledge necessary to help the disadvantaged. 
 
Whether or not ordinary citizens benefit from Young‟s politics, it is likely the major 
benefits would accrue to cultural leaders, who would, it is reasonable to expect, 
exercise the most power over the representative process. In coming down so firmly 
on the side of the collective over the individual, Young, like GT, is thus open to the 
same criticisms as Taylor and the other communitarians. At the same time, it is 
doubtful whether her arguments could even satisfactorily overcome the equality 
dilemma, despite their strong logic. For, despite nominal procedural equality, the 
empowerment of groups would simply increase the uncertainty that any particular 
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universal substantive equality would obtain, because of the likelihood of different 
groups aiming for different outcomes. This does, of course, excuse Young from the 
question-begging problems of the epistemic optimism shared by GT and Benhabib. 
But this is at the considerable expense of providing a workable theory of justice and 
equality at all. 
 
Substantive communitarianism 
 
Substantive communitarianism presents the starkest multicultural departure from 
liberalism. Indeed, by combining an ultimately substantive form of equality with a 
focus on the community as the locus of justice, it also differs considerably with the 
two deliberative alternatives set out above. Theorists in this position see individuals 
as inseparable from their various group connections and commitments, so they 
refrain from setting out any form of transcendental or pre-social ethics or procedures. 
As Benhabib (1996b: 7) suggests, the „agonistic model of democratic politics‟ 
conceptualises political life as inherently afflicted by deep social divisions over both 
procedures and substantial ends. Liberalism in its various guises therefore seems to 
err by oppressively seeking to suppress these conflicts. As Michael Sandel‟s forceful 
critique of Rawls‟s Kantian constructivism shows, on the substantive communitarian 
account individual freedom and equality can be realised only by genuinely 
recognising the depth of our social identities and the conflicts these identities lead to.  
 
Michael Sandel 
 
Sandel‟s argument is based upon his rejection of the Millian argument for liberal and 
procedural forms of fairness. Mill, Sandel (1982: 4-5) suggests, rests individual 
freedoms rather too precariously on the assumption that we will all collectively 
benefit from the consequences of those freedoms. This is an unstable case for justice, 
because our commitment to individual freedom and equality would surely be 
abandoned as soon as it looks possible to benefit from an unjust state of affairs. As 
such, the strongest case for an individualistically conceived form of justice relies 
upon the deontological separation of the right from the good. Since justice cannot be 
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grounded upon our proximate ends, it must be justified instead by reference to the 
„apparently indispensible features of our experience‟ (ibid. 7). These universal 
features must exist outside of and prior to our inevitably plural experiences, however, 
so it follows that our conception of justice – our „right(s)‟ – must pertain to the 
autonomy with which we choose and learn from our activities (ibid. 9). On this 
thoroughly Kantian view, therefore, justice requires an unconditional respect for both 
individual autonomy and the diverse outcomes which result from that autonomy.  
 
Sandel largely associates this deontological liberalism with Rawls. As we saw above, 
Rawls‟s political liberalism postulates that individuals in a democratic society would 
agree to the priority of the right over the good. As they would all want the freedom to 
pursue their own ends next to their political freedoms, democratic citizens would 
respect the basic principles of justice. For Sandel (ibid. 62), however, even this 
political liberalism cannot work without abstracting from those aspects of our 
identity which could motivate anti-liberal political viewpoints. Such an abstraction 
requires conceiving of communities, religions and perspectives as attributes rather 
than „constituents‟ of the individual (ibid. 64). As such, the individual self in a 
Rawlsian society can only be radically disembodied, emasculated from those 
connections and meanings which would bias their thinking against the pure reason 
required by Kant‟s constructivism. 
 
If there are any reasons to reject this transcendental unity, then the right cannot have 
priority over the good (ibid. 133). One such problem concerns the fundamental 
claims Rawls‟s society would endow each citizen with to a basic system of welfare 
and positive liberties (ibid. 148-149). For, to avoid conceiving of others as means to 
our ends, these claims require our being willing to relinquish our wealth to our fellow 
citizens when they are in need. We would only accept this duty, however, if we 
conceive our communities as constitutive of who we are (ibid. 150). Our goods, in 
other words, must determine our rights. If this is to be accepted, however, then it 
follows that we cannot conceive of individuals as „private‟ and unencumbered 
bearers of rights (ibid. 181). Our conception of justice cannot rest upon 
59 
 
individualism, but must manifest Taylor‟s communitarianism and offer protection 
and encouragement to our various religious and cultural groups. 
 
The implications of this argument for procedural and substantive individualism are 
palpable. On Sandel‟s argument, Benhabib and Dryzek, like Rawls and Mill, would 
likely do more harm than good by emboldening the individual against their group 
commitments. For even if the numbers of individuals who seek to challenge group 
boundaries and obligations is small, such behaviour would be likely to have negative 
consequences for everyone. Further, and perhaps surprisingly, this same problem 
seems to afflict procedural communitarian arguments such as Gutmann and 
Thompson‟s. For these theorists follow Rawls by placing too much emphasis on 
legal and constitutional processes. Given their heavy reliance on democratic 
procedures for the delivery of a quasi-Rawlsian set of goods, Gutmann and 
Thompson‟s deliberators would ultimately have to rely upon coercion to construct 
the requisite communal and moral ties (Sandel, 1996: 319). In contrast to the other 
three positions considered above, therefore, a deliberative democracy could only 
achieve justice by realising a more explicitly agonistic and republican search for the 
common good (ibid. 274). 
 
Such a good might be supposed to combine substantive and procedural forms of 
equality, and sufficient freedoms for both individuals and the community all in one. 
The task for a thoroughly republican society is to increase individual participation in 
community politics and institutional life in order to foster our public selves. And this 
requires fostering „a knowledge of public affairs and also a sense of belonging, a 
concern for the whole, [and] a moral bond with the community whose fate is at 
stake‟ (ibid. 5). Individuals, in short, need to be freed from the constitutive penury of 
liberal privatism and taught the civic virtues they need in order to construct a 
mutually fulfilling and beneficial common society (ibid. 6). It follows that we should 
ultimately aim to dispense with justice as a regulatory ideal. Justice can only be 
necessary when our differences conflict. But because our civic identities and 
allegiances exist prior to our chosen goods, once we are eventually constituted as 
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citizens of a fraternal republic, all conflicts will be publicised and solved as part of 
the search for the common good (Sandel, 1982: 179-180). 
 
This argument relies upon effectively dismissing the dilemmas of multiculturalism. 
Diversity and plurality, it would seem, pose a problem for social organisation only in 
so far as, combined with the steady movement towards conceiving of individuals as 
consumers rather than citizens identified by Sandel (1996), they deepen our 
commitment to treating differences as obstacles to community. According to 
Sandel‟s (ibid. 320) neo-Tocquevillianism, however, an essential aspect of our 
coming together as a community is to learn about all of the different habits and traits 
which „both separate and relate‟ us. For it is only thus that we can develop the 
„character of mind‟ and „habits of heart‟ necessary to come together to forge a 
common good out of our various identities (ibid. 321). Once these traits have been 
inculcated, however, it is difficult to see what more the common good can provide. 
Sandel‟s republican account is tellingly vague on the implications of the republican 
mentality, presumably because the specificities of the common good are less 
substantial than the mentality needed to pursue it. Once individuals have this 
mentality, they will surely accept democratic outcomes almost automatically. As a 
result, there is little to distinguish between the procedure and the outcome, or 
between the individual and the group. 
 
This account seems simultaneously to do too little, given the communitarian account 
of the self, and too much, given the aims of liberalism. Thus, on the one hand, Sandel 
seems to contradict his own commitment to the centrality of individual goods to their 
identities. If it is indeed the case that identities, beliefs and moralities run to the very 
heart of our selves, then bringing diverse peoples together to construct new 
thoroughgoing republican identities is akin to offering them frontal lobotomies. If the 
„good‟ is central to our „right‟ then the kind of republic we wish to form will be 
coloured by our various backgrounds and realities. Since republicanism would only 
lead to extensive conflict, Sandel‟s account therefore seems to point towards the 
inevitable break-up of diverse societies into numerous (in all likelihood oppressive) 
republics. Yet this extreme implication goes far beyond any multicultural or liberal 
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account of diverse society, which seek only to bring people together as closely as 
their diverse wants allow. If the complete politicisation of our selves would lead to 
social fragmentation, this does not mean that a loose democratic community is 
impossible (Marks, 2001: 621). It simply means that individuals need a set of basic, 
unconditional freedoms underpinned by access to a democratic decision-mechanism, 
neither of which are provided by Sandel‟s utopia. 
 
Sheldon Wolin 
 
In a similar fashion to Sandel, Wolin‟s agonistic project grounds well-being in 
political interaction. Wolin insulates his arguments from the problems set out above, 
however, by basing his account on a sceptical critique of the „community‟ which 
results from seemingly democratic politics. Democracy, he argues, is in fact a 
fleeting phenomenon that is external to and separate from really existing political 
practices (Wolin, 1996: 39). In exceptional circumstances, individuals come together 
despite their differences to realise a moment of political co-operation in the service 
of the common good (ibid. 32). Democracy is thus a moment of transformation, 
whereby the citizenry comes together to realise its republican potential to construct 
and realise a collective identity. These instances, such as the combination of the 
American Civil Rights and Anti-War movements in the 1970s, are nevertheless very 
rare, and are always vulnerable to the power of established interests (Wolin, 1993: 
471-472). By and large, „politics‟ is therefore simply an institutional tool, used by 
hegemonic interests to shape society after their interests. 
 
Wolin‟s simultaneously cynical and optimistic argument has much in common with 
both Bernard Crick‟s (1964) conception of politics as the contingent ability of a 
people to question the use and concentration of institutionalised power, and Marx‟s 
(1976) identification of the contradictory tendencies of capitalist societies. In a clear 
parallel with Sandel‟s (1996) account of the demise of republican politics, Wolin 
(1993: 477-479) argues that nations such as the United States has abandoned the 
commitment to democracy so emphatically identified by Tocqueville and embraced a 
neo-Hobbesian view of political order. The citizenry look to the state not to realise 
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the political essence of their social being, but to provide a short-cut to their well-
being. Yet this laziness obscures the difficult work we must engage in if we are to 
accommodate different individuals and lifestyles in our political community (ibid. 
480). The order we associate with liberal constitutional democracies, therefore, is 
simply an artefact of our own oppression. By allowing the expansion of the state 
Western citizens have simultaneously licensed and hidden their own oppression. 
 
This oppression can nevertheless be shattered by fleeting moments of democracy. By 
coming together as citizens, we can disrupt the „heterogeneity‟ which characterises 
the neo-Hobbesian state of nature (Wolin, 1996: 41). On a wholeheartedly political 
note, Wolin (ibid. 42-44) argues accordingly that it is the explicit task of political 
theory to understand the relations of power in order to enable and strengthen the 
ability of citizens to collectively disrupt politics and create new political moments. 
This is not to say that he seeks any particular end, such as substantive equality in and 
of itself, or some kind of metaphysical „truth‟, of course. His arguments, though 
particular, have the potential to appeal to all. Instead, on Wolin‟s agnosticism, the 
suppression of democracy inevitably creates a void within which power interests can 
operate, to the detriment of society. The democratic project should therefore be to 
challenge these illegitimate power interests in order to emancipate oppressed 
individuals. 
 
The ability of this argument to both appeal across normative divides and circumvent 
the problems inherent in Sandel‟s communitarianism rests on whether it is always 
and necessarily the case that liberalism manifests systematic abuses of power. If it is 
not, then Wolin‟s account would seem to rest on shaky foundations. To see why, it is 
apposite to explore the implications of this account for the relationship between 
proceduralism and substantivism. Like Sandel, Wolin‟s argument suggests that there 
is no real dilemma here. There can be no real choice between procedure and 
substance, because the power inequalities which constitute democratic politics 
preclude the neutral application of any democratic procedure, deliberative or 
otherwise. The substantive good which comes from the transformation of individual 
interests into a common good is necessary to unite individuals because this appears 
63 
 
to be the only way of achieving any kind of freedom or equality. From the point of 
view of the average individual, it would seem that the substantive communitarian 
good is the only possible good. 
 
It seems pertinent, however, to recall here the political rights and norms which 
underpin both liberal and deliberative democratic procedures, such as the freedoms 
of association and thought offered by Mill. It would seem as though Wolin‟s account 
must regard these at best as a distraction from the real task of politics, and at worst as 
tools, akin to the „ritualistic‟ politics of elections, which are necessary to keep the 
masses in line (ibid. 34-35). Liberal rights, on this account, underpin an effectively 
coercive heterogeneity, leading to division rather than unity (Wolin, 1993: 478). This 
fetish for unrestrained liberty seems to be breathtakingly naïve, for it rests upon the 
assumption that the popular will is always liberal – a condition which has frequently 
shown to be false in reality.
7
 The failure to provide and enforce rights would 
undermine the ability of the citizenry to come to any fair outcome, in either 
procedural or substantive terms, because there needs to be some rubric by which to 
assess the fairness of an outcome before it can be deemed fair. 
 
Thus, when Wolin writes „[t]he possibility of renewal draws on a simple fact: that 
ordinary individuals are capable of creating new cultural patterns of commonality at 
any moment‟ (Wolin, 1996: 43) he must presuppose the political and legal autonomy 
to associate in such a fashion. Unless these „patterns of commonality‟ can be known 
a priori, there needs to be some kind of procedure by which they can be discovered 
and, indeed, protected. However, once this point is accepted, it follows that Wolin 
should be concerned first and foremost with securing as many individual freedoms as 
possible, to make it as easy as possible for people to associate and work together 
towards common ends. But as soon as these rights and their procedural consequences 
are accepted, it seems difficult to sustain a substantive, communitarian scepticism 
towards procedural individualism and liberal democracy. In the final analysis, then, 
                                                          
7
 Whether in the Milgram experiments, Vietnam, Nazi Germany, Abu Ghraib, the Sudan, Rwanda or 
Roman Catholic Ireland, human beings have repeatedly proved Lord Acton‟s famous dictum about the 
corrupting nature of power. 
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Wolin‟s substantive communitarianism can do nothing other than leave the twin 
dilemmas of multiculturalism open. 
 
The limits of democracy 
 
The casualty of these communitarian accounts of politics is the contribution they 
could otherwise offer to the difficult choice between group and individual outcomes. 
To some extent this is intentional, for they are wary of the brakes a reified 
individualism applies to root-and-branch political change. Substantive 
communitarianism‟s error, however, is to assume that such revolutionary changes 
have to be intentional. The community must come together as one, which means that 
contrarian individualists cannot stand in its way. Thus, we have seen that this 
position inevitably reinforces the group as the only ontological locus of politics. For, 
a polity that rejects individual procedural rights whilst espousing open conflict can 
only privilege the group hierarchy, which is not only better placed to withstand and 
counter protracted external challenges, but can also crush internal dissent. If these 
authors are to reconcile the multicultural dilemmas, then, they would clearly need to 
import some form of liberal rights in order to fill out the structure/agency dynamic. 
But this would be to undermine the significant and edifying criticisms they offer 
against the hubris of modern liberal democratism. 
 
Democrats and reasonable pluralism: a fatal conceit 
 
Since the politics of difference and recognition are based upon the moral appraisal of 
deep and normatively significant pluralism, it seems hardly surprising that each of 
these theoretical positions have been found wanting. This is not because of their 
disputable normative assumptions; Young‟s forceful argument about the 
impossibility of impartiality is, after all, persuasive. The problem is rather the 
attempt to use these assumptions as universalising norms in order to direct the 
politics of multiculturalism down the narrow walkways provided by each of their 
ideologies. It seems contradictory, for instance, for the substantive individualist and 
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procedural communitarian positions to advocate their particular universalising norms 
to guide what is essentially a democratic discovery process. Substantive 
communitarianism, on the other hand, threatens to place the fortunes and well-being 
of future generations in the hands of contemporary political activists, whilst 
procedural individualists seem paradoxically determined to take these decisions out 
of the hands of individuals altogether. 
 
The problem faced by all democratic theories is that, by its very nature, democracy 
cannot but seek an inclusive solution to the problems presented by apparently 
reasonable conflicts between democratic and non-democratic values. For when a 
theory seeks to co-opt non-partisan individuals, its legitimacy rests upon their 
actively consenting to the theory‟s norms and values. Real-world liberal 
democracies, of course, can only assume such assent, which perhaps explains the 
resurgence of social contract arguments for their continued justification. The three 
deliberative and participative democratic responses to liberal democracy examined 
here seek to challenge this reliance upon „hypothetical‟ consent by appealing to the 
steady increase of cultural and religious plurality. By simply assuming that their own 
forms of democracy are the best available, however, they rely upon the same non 
sequitur. As it is argued in this dissertation, therefore, the deliberative turn in modern 
democratic theory practically begs to be challenged by traditional liberalism, which 
can incorporate radical disagreement within its institutional norms without having to 
force a substantive consensus between opposed groups. 
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3. Classical Liberalism 
 
In chapter two it was shown that the various advocates of the politics of difference 
can be characterised according to the way in which they seek to move beyond 
liberalism. For heuristic purposes, it was assumed that liberalism is indeed unable to 
cope with the demands of contemporary pluralism. This somewhat simplistic 
assumption belies the diversity of liberal arguments however, so it is here 
relinquished. This chapter introduces a rather different, more resilient form of 
liberalism than that attacked by multiculturalists. On the classical liberal argument, it 
is argued that the principle problems which we face as social actors are 
epistemological. We need to be able to co-ordinate our activities, regardless of what 
we think of one another and regardless of what we want to achieve. Yet our co-
ordination is effectively impossible outside of the market institutions which have 
evolved for this very purpose. Multiculturalists therefore err by treating value 
pluralism as a separate class of problem from the usual socio-economic fare of 
politics. In fact, the liberal governments they reject are as ignorant about how to 
improve well-being for cultural minorities as they are for economic and social 
minorities. Accordingly, it is contended, if we want to offer a genuinely free and 
equal society for all, we have much to learn from the classical liberal rejection of 
social democratic intervention. 
 
What’s so ‘classical’ about classical liberalism? 
 
Hayek noted in 1978 (119) that 
 
[t]he term [liberalism] is now used with a variety of meanings which have 
little in common beyond an openness to new ideas, including some which are 
directly opposed to those which were originally designated by it during the 
nineteenth and the earlier parts of the twentieth centuries. 
 
To clarify the term, Hayek traces liberalism back to the individualism of the „English 
Whigs‟ of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (ibid. 124-126). This classical 
form of liberalism fell into decline in Britain in the early twentieth century, as 
liberals became increasingly associated with more progressive ideals (Hayek, 2007: 
66-67). As Hayek spent much of his career arguing, however, these seemingly 
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reasonable developments in liberal politics have undermined the very institutions 
which underpin individual liberty, and which are integral to the success and stability 
of society (Hayek 1978: 186-189). It is for this reason, he contends, that it is so 
unhelpful to conflate disparate definitions under the catchall term „liberalism‟. 
 
Regardless of their appellation, classical liberal arguments are rarely addressed in 
contemporary political theory. It is worth stressing, then, that this form of liberalism 
is classical in name only. Given the legislative, technological and economic 
expansion of „liberal‟ state institutions around the world in the first decade of the 
twenty-first century, liberalism‟s early analysis of the dangers posed by arbitrary 
state power is clearly as relevant today as it was at the close of the Enlightenment. 
Moreover, as this chapter sets about arguing, we should take a principled scepticism 
towards political authority in general for the simple reason that the state is likely to 
do more harm than good in the pursuit of its goals. Even when the state‟s ends appear 
to be desirable, we would all do better to rely upon the self-correcting and 
competitive mechanisms of the market to secure our social outcomes.  
 
Given its central goal, this is clearly a project which will remain relevant so long as 
the power to coerce is either presently or has the potential of being concentrated in 
the institutions of the state. For both theoretical and contingent reasons, however, it 
is all too easy to dismiss as irrelevant to really-existing modern democracies. Even 
before the calamitous failure of global banking seemingly exposed the shambolic 
workings of the market alternative, the classical liberal argument was already tainted 
by association with its more extreme offspring, libertarianism (see, for example, 
Sandel, 2009: chs. 3-4). On this understanding, the liberal focus on negative liberty 
simply represents the ideological rejection of the very real benefits that can be and 
are in practice gained from the democratically-directed redistribution of resources 
and opportunities. This conflation is nothing short of devastating, because it threatens 
to stereotype classical liberalism as the merely opinionated and partisan assertion that 
freedom is intrinsically valuable. Because it is impossible to disprove, like all 
dogmatic positions this assertion is easily ignored in discussions concerning diversity 
and value pluralism. 
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This theoretical irrelevance is damaging enough, but once viewed in the context of 
the recent financial crisis the classical liberal argument seems almost perverse. Of 
course, this argument has run against the grain of orthodox economic thinking since 
the Keynesian revolution of the 1930s. With the looming threat of climate change 
and after the fallout of successive recessions, however, the last few decades have 
seen the case for state intervention in the market system strengthen even further. 
Accordingly, to demonstrate the continuing social importance of individual and 
market freedoms, the chapter begins by considering the seemingly compelling claim 
that markets need to be regulated and directed in order to realise public goods. By 
exploring the case against free markets and the example of the financial crisis in 
some detail, it is shown that inappropriate government regulations are actually the 
most likely cause of so-called „market failures‟. Markets are integral to social co-
ordination and well-being because the trade-offs they force us to make send price 
signals which prompt other actors to adjust their plans spontaneously. When the state 
steps in, it inevitably disrupts these signals, with the result that social action which is 
no longer appropriate is mistakenly continued.  
 
Now, it is possible to argue in response that this consequentialist account still does 
not adequately ground the classical liberal case for negative freedoms. Indeed, 
liberalism‟s implied egalitarianism seems to presuppose social democratic 
interventions, because it highlights the importance of equal opportunities. As it is 
argued in the chapter‟s last few sections, however, this objection greatly 
underestimates the epistemological difficulties of social action. Our understanding of 
the social problems which lead to large numbers of people languishing in poverty is 
inevitably limited and inaccurate because the causal mechanisms responsible are 
complex, hidden and dynamic. While we need somehow to increase our 
understanding of these mechanisms, the democratic process is singularly 
inappropriate because, whichever form it takes, it is concerned only with the 
integration of individual decisions into a single, overarching vision of society. And 
any errors contained within that vision will tend to systematically spread through 
society so that, over time, it is effectively impossible for the citizenry to trace those 
errors back to their originating democratic decisions.  
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In contrast, the market process systematically punishes those responsible for 
erroneous outcomes. As the „Austrian‟ economic argument expounded in this chapter 
teaches, the idea that the market requires a set of optimal criteria to succeed – such as 
equal knowledge or equal buying power – is mistaken, because it ignores the 
tendency for spontaneous error-correction inherent in conditions of suboptimality. 
For, these conditions simply indicate the possibility of large profits for anyone who 
can identify and correct ineffective allocations of resources. Since the poor are kept 
down precisely because of such erroneous allocations, it follows that the best thing 
we can do is to unleash the competitive forces of the market in order to discover how 
they might be corrected. In short, we should stop wishing away social problems via 
democratic decisions and concentrate upon invigorating the marketplace. This might 
require encouraging and assisting the marginalised to act as consumers, to be sure, 
but first and foremost it requires re-establishing the necessary negative liberties and 
rolling back the state. 
 
Market failures and the ‘credit crunch’ 
 
The most direct challenge to classical liberalism is that markets can and do fail, often 
with catastrophic results. In his critique of „utopian‟ free market economics, John 
Cassidy (2009) powerfully argues that markets are frequently compromised by 
„rational irrationality‟, where perfectly understandable individual responses to 
prevailing incentives create universally harmful collective outcomes. Even though 
markets are immensely productive under ideal conditions, Cassidy contends that 
economists have become entranced by this ideal. The argument against government 
interference, he seeks to show, is based upon the mythical homo economicus 
character, whose acts are socially beneficial because they are based upon perfect 
knowledge, including that of how others will respond to different courses of action. 
In reality, Cassidy argues, individuals are wildly ignorant and prone to bouts of 
irrationality, and markets are characterised by extensive externalities which distort 
prices and transmit erroneous signals (ibid. 164). 
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Cassidy‟s argument is worth considering because he employs it to mount an 
excoriating attack on the laissez-faire mentality which precipitated the global 
financial crisis of 2007-10. He traces the roots of the crisis to the „deregulation‟ of 
the banking sector in the 1980s and 90s (ibid. 229-234). Under the new regulations, 
commercial, „high street‟ banks (the deposits of which are guaranteed by the state) 
were allowed to engage in specialised investment banking. This greatly expanded the 
supply of borrowed money for investors and speculators and, significantly, led to 
many previously obscure banks becoming „too big to fail‟. Additionally, the increase 
in financial trade led to the invention of various new investment devices, which gave 
the illusion of investor security. Nevertheless, the governments of Britain and the US 
stubbornly refrained from introducing new regulations to govern the banks. 
According to Cassidy (ibid. 230), the quasi-libertarian Chairman of the Federal 
Reserve Alan Greenspan vigorously resisted what he saw as damaging interference 
in the financial sector on the basis that markets can effectively regulate themselves. 
 
When the Federal Reserve dramatically reduced interest rates in response to the 
shocks of 2000 and 2001, the resulting combination of cheap money, implicit 
government guarantees and high confidence led banks to invest in the risky but 
extremely profitable income streams derived from low-grade mortgages: the so-
called „sub-prime‟ market. This resulted in price increases among the various sub-
prime derivatives which, in turn, encouraged front-line brokers to persuade ever 
more unlikely consumers to take out unaffordable mortgages. And as house prices 
rose in response to the increasing number of homebuyers, the apparent gains to be 
made from mortgage derivatives increased even further. Despite the risks, 
homebuyers and investors alike were caught in a prisoners‟ dilemma (ibid. ch. 21). 
Consumers felt that they would miss out on guaranteed capital gains unless they 
joined the housing ladder, and banks felt compelled to invest in the ensuing boom to 
avoid losing ground to competitors. The laissez-faire reliance upon the rationality of 
the marketplace thus only served to deepen the recession which inevitably began 
when the property bubble burst. 
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At first sight, the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression does appear to be 
a damning indictment of free market liberalism. Cassidy (ibid. pt. 2) therefore 
appears justified in joining popular calls for more far-reaching and comprehensive 
government regulations in the economy. On the basis of the „reality-based‟ 
economics propounded by the likes of John Maynard Keynes, John Kenneth 
Galbraith and Hyman Minsky, he argues that the pursuit of profit leads businesses to 
systematically neglect public goods, such as effective self-regulation and long-term 
planning, and to over-provide public bads, such as pollution and risk. Monopolies 
emerge which stifle competition and extort consumers, insurance and second-hand 
markets alike succumb to the costly presence of „lemons‟ and the kinds of bubbles 
which caused havoc in the housing and hi-tech markets recur on a regular basis. On 
the basis of this last claim alone, Cassidy (ibid. 339-342) argues on the one hand that 
regulators ought to actively prevent banks from taking undue risks, and boldly 
beckons with the other for a new regulatory body to certify investment products in 
the same fashion as children‟s toys. 
 
On reflection, however, Cassidy‟s critique is telling only against those who 
credulously believed that the banking sector was approaching a state of welfare-
optimal equilibrium. As Peter Boettke (1997) illustrates, these utopian economists do 
indeed oversimplify the economic system, but so too do the ostensibly realist 
economists Cassidy reveres. For, following Paul Samuelson‟s mathematical 
formalisation of their discipline, economists in general have tended to treat social 
phenomena as simple, linear functions which either lead straight to market-clearing 
optimality or else deviate only in a systematic fashion. As such, market champions 
and critics alike assume that the information that we would need to reach equilibrium 
exists; they simply disagree on whether rational individuals will seek to make use of 
it. On reflection, this representation of the economy as the sum of pre-defined and 
discrete variables is clearly tautologous. But it has led even the most lauded 
economists to view either the simple rejection of all interference or the deux ex 
machina interventions implied by their models as the key to Pareto efficiency. As a 
result, the academy and the citizenry alike are wont to see market actors as either 
impossibly saintly or unreasonably dangerous, with the result that we have no idea 
what is actually going on (ibid. 38-42). While Cassidy rightly criticises the „Chicago 
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school‟ of neoclassical economics for the former error, he is himself guilty of the 
latter. 
 
Instead of focusing upon rationality, to appraise the market it is more edifying to 
look at how well-informed individual actors actually are. For, as Cassidy rightly 
suggests, market failure is as likely to be caused by pervasive ignorance as 
irrationality, and while we might have reason to see regulators as reliably rational, 
where ignorance abounds we have no reason to think of them as reliably informed. 
Indeed, nowhere has this been better illustrated than by the financial crisis. Cassidy‟s 
disdain for self-regulation is based on his (2009: 262-264) belief that the market-
based regulators (the credit rating agencies) manifestly failed in their duties. Since 
recalcitrant judgements would see the agencies lose custom, profits and prestige to 
one another, they effectively sold the much-feted „triple A‟ ratings whenever a bank 
presented them with a derivative. As it happens, the agencies did fail in this regard, 
but their failure is not indicative of the failure of the market for regulation because 
there was no market for regulation. As Jeffrey Friedman (2009) shows, the credit 
rating agencies did not fail because they conspired with the banks, but because over-
confident regulators bestowed upon them a legal monopoly and then effectively 
encouraged their involvement in the sub-prime market. 
 
Under Federal regulations, American banks were only allowed to trade in derivatives 
which had been rated at „investment grade‟ (i.e. very reliable) or above. But these 
regulators would only recognise a derivative as investment grade if it had been 
conferred by one of the three big rating agencies (ibid. 133-134). With such a 
guaranteed income, the agencies had no incentive to monitor the accuracy of their 
judgements. Moreover, when successive American governments directed the state-
backed mortgage companies to increase mortgage lending to poor and ethnic 
minority communities (who present a relatively high risk of default) and used 
legislation to motivate private lenders to do the same, the ratings companies had no 
reason not to simply treat the state-backed companies‟ attempts to pool and spread 
their risks as sufficient for the whole industry (ibid. 129-132). 
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This complacency was not prima facie irrational, because on the basis of the very 
equilibrium theories Cassidy (2009: ch. 7) castigates, the securitisation of even sub-
prime debts does decrease risk to manageable levels. But it was ignorant, because 
these theories later proved themselves ill-suited to an environment in which large 
increases in the money supply had injected unsustainable inflationary pressures into 
the housing market. This would surely have been exposed had the rating agencies 
faced genuine competition from ambitious upstarts, especially since a number of 
banks mistrusted the existing ratings system and pointedly erred on the side of 
caution (J. Friedman, 2009: 153). But with no available information on risk other 
than that provided by the established agencies – which had clearly convinced state 
regulators and even the international regulators based in Switzerland (ibid. 143-145), 
and thus had likely convinced shareholders too – one of the seemingly safest routes 
would have been into sub-prime mortgages. Banks did tend to invest in the very 
safest of these derivatives (ibid. 147), but because of the systemic errors in the 
ratings this was to no avail. 
 
It is difficult to see what tighter regulations would have accomplished here – or, for 
that matter, what they could be expected to achieve in future – because the problem 
stemmed from a lack of innovation rather than complacency. Like all other 
participants in the crisis, the rating agencies were acting under conditions of intense 
uncertainty. Since the future is inherently unpredictable, the only way they could 
offer judgements about risk was to employ theoretical models which, because based 
upon past events, were inevitably of questionable validity. Now, the Cassidy critique 
suggests that it was the choice of models which was at fault here, because it 
embodied an untenable and relentlessly ideological optimism about market 
outcomes. But as Friedman (ibid. 157) notes, the interconnected processes which 
determine the results of social action are simply too complex to understand without 
making ideological assumptions about the causal mechanisms at work. As such, 
regardless of their impartiality and decency, governmental regulators would have had 
to employ similarly ideological models in order to direct banks towards favourable 
outcomes. And, since these regulators would have had the same monopolistic 
authority that was granted to the rating agencies, their models would have been just 
as presumptuous. 
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The models used to calculate and control risk could have been improved only by 
being subjected to rigorous and decentralised market testing. For, the lesson of the 
financial crisis is not that markets are apt to fail, but that they can be destabilised by 
systemic errors, whereby the punishment and reward system is exogenously skewed 
in favour of a particular theory of merit (qua prudence, success, beneficence, etc.). In 
genuinely free markets, each actor must act upon their own theory of merit. Whether 
they work in banks, rating agencies or bakeries, and whether they are at the 
beginning or end of the supply chain, capitalists must make their own predictions, 
both about which needs exist in society and about how these needs can be met 
(Boettke, 1997: 26-27). 
 
Indeed, in practice market actors actually test different combinations of these 
theories. Any individual must rely on other individuals further up and down the 
supply chain, so her success depends as much on the validity of their theories as on 
her own. This means that enterprising market actors have a clear interest in following 
market signals and avoiding troublesome partners. In the case of banking, for 
instance, cautious investors (who may have been few in number, to be sure) would 
have gravitated towards the theories on risk which they felt limited their exposure to 
defaults. As a consequence, and regardless of the attitudes of the rest of the banking 
community, those differences in investor philosophies which were hidden by the 
stagnant ratings would have been rendered explicit and the danger of the sub-prime 
market would have been more apparent. In turn, this would have pushed stock 
market investors to re-evaluate their choices and, regardless of their individual 
motivations and failings, financiers would have been forced to respond accordingly. 
 
To achieve the same results, centralised, democratic regulators would have had to 
second guess all of these developments. And their challenge would not have ended 
there; to direct the market toward a welfare-efficient outcome, their interventions 
would also have had to dovetail precisely with every other democratic intervention in 
markets deemed integral to the public weal. Otherwise, any number of these 
interventions could have interacted to create unanticipated and possibly destabilising 
problems. Friedman (2009: 263-264) shows that the financial crisis was precipitated 
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by just such a set of unintended regulatory interactions. The decisions to mandate 
high grade investments, to grant legal monopolies to the rating agencies, to increase 
home ownership in poor areas and to inflate the money supply (as well as those 
decisions by individual states to allow mortgage defaulters to walk away painlessly) 
were each made at different times and by different actors for probably perfectly good 
reasons. But to have been socially beneficial, each successive decision needed to 
have been based upon an accurate and complete account of how it would interact 
with all of the previous decisions, so that regulators could avoid the creation of 
counter-productive incentives. It is difficult to see how this could have been 
accomplished without a comprehensive plan of the whole economy. 
 
Naturally, this argument might be supposed to cut both ways. Why are market actors 
any better at dovetailing their aggregate decisions when they only care about their 
own limited interests? The premise of democratic interventionism is that it can 
correct for socially harmful and inequitable private decisions by imposing the 
wisdom of the many. Democracies leave the final judgement to the electorate so that 
they can monitor the performance of governments, so that they can use their 
decentralised knowledge and so that it is the popular vision of justice which is 
imposed upon society. The citizenry, in other words, are assumed to be well-placed 
to decide what is wrong with society and how to resolve it. In „reality‟, however, 
individual citizens have no idea what is wrong. It is simply too difficult for any one 
person to master the necessary historical and theoretical details to understand 
precisely why the current state of affairs came into being, and what needs to be done 
to change it for the better (ibid. 268-269). As a result, widespread government 
failures are inevitable as successive democratic reactions to the unintended effects of 
past problems inject new and essentially arbitrary regulations which interact with the 
former in unanticipated and damaging ways.  
 
The problem with the interventionist argument is that it confuses goals with 
outcomes. Democratic actors mean well, so they must do well. Similarly, private 
actors only care about themselves, so they must only benefit themselves. This 
simplistic way of thinking completely misunderstands both the nature of human 
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action and the workings of the market mechanism, but it lies at the heart of the 
interventionist social democratic case against free markets. To truly comprehend the 
beneficial effects of competition and market freedoms, it is therefore necessary to 
explore the vital role that profits and losses play in transmitting socially useful 
information, and how this information triggers the spontaneous co-ordination of 
social acts. And to do this, we need to turn away from both neoclassical and social 
democratic utopianism towards the Austrian school of economics. 
 
Austrian economics and spontaneous order 
 
The Austrian economic argument is based upon the recognition that our inherent 
epistemological constraints impose a limit upon the possible goals we might achieve 
as a society. As Hayek (1980c: 91) characteristically argues, the starting point of all 
social inquiry must be „the unavoidable imperfection of man‟s knowledge and the 
consequent need for a process by which knowledge is constantly communicated and 
acquired‟. Since the knowledge possessed by social actors is subjective and 
fragmented, the co-ordination of complex social activities could not be directed by 
any one or group of individuals, because they would need to know a priori precisely 
that which needs to be discovered (Pennington, forthcoming). Instead, we must rely 
upon the spontaneous co-ordination achieved by the freely adjusting institutions of 
civil society. On the Austrian view, in other words, our social achievements are and 
could only ever be „bottom-up‟, rather than „top-down‟ creations. 
 
The unintended origins of human prosperity were first systematically identified 
during the Scottish Enlightenment. Adam Ferguson, for instance, reasoned that 
individuals concerned primarily with their own interests seek instinctively to 
improve society in a manner beneficial to all (Hamowy, 2005: 69). He saw primarily 
inward-looking choices as the cause of institutions ranging from criminal justice 
(ibid. 73) to language (ibid. 24). But it was Adam Smith who most clearly identified 
the significance of the spontaneous market order. Smith (1981) saw that the 
complexity of society could not be achieved through first-hand co-operation alone. 
We rely upon too many unknown and remote individuals to produce the necessary 
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goods and services than we could possibly find or appeal to. If we need their help, 
we must instead encourage these individuals to find us, by appealing to their self-
interest. It follows that human „society‟ could only arise once localised bartering had 
given way to complex, large-scale markets based upon money as the medium of 
exchange (ibid. ch. 1-4). And the well-being of society rests upon the continued 
ability of these markets to bring buyers and sellers together efficiently. 
 
The Austrian contribution to this theory of spontaneous social order was to elucidate 
its epistemological dimension (Horwitz, 2001: 86). Hayek in particular showed that 
not only was the development of productive society unintended, but that it could not 
be directed according to any notion of „rationality‟. If we envisage the economy not 
as one finite system (i.e. the market for one particular good) but as an innumerable 
set of systems connected by convoluted and conditional interdependencies, it 
becomes clear that a reference to any individual phenomenon (the demand for that 
one good, say) is an implicit reference to all of the unknown interconnections which 
created that phenomenon. Since our knowledge of these interconnections is 
inevitably limited, there is simply no way in which we could apply our technical or 
scientific nous in order to recreate the same orderly adjustments. For such an order to 
occur, everyone must constantly communicate their ever-changing plans. And the 
only way in which can they do this is if they are all allowed to act, unimpeded, in the 
pursuit of the very opposite of social order – their own broad self-interests. 
Economic co-ordination did not therefore simply arise spontaneously: it could only 
arise spontaneously. 
 
On this basis, Austrian economists emphasise that the wider import of our acts and 
plans can only be communicated spontaneously to other social actors by way of the 
price signals sent during economic action. Prices allow us to publicly communicate 
all of our multifarious preferences in an intelligible fashion because they are inter-
related across a single, ordinal scale of value. The price of any one good is a function 
of both the prices of all of the goods necessary to produce and transport it and the 
prices of all competing (substitute) goods. As such, prices embody all of the 
information that we need as individuals to dovetail our plans with the aggregate plans 
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of others. To borrow Hayek‟s (1980c: 85-86) example, regardless of whether she 
actually knows anything about the factors affecting its supply and demand, the tin 
consumer can act as if she followed the activities of the tin market religiously by 
simply updating her plans in response to changes in its price. By way of negotiating 
or simply reacting to price changes in this way, even the most remotely distant actors 
can thus communicate their needs intelligibly with one another. 
 
The problem with equilibrium-based economics is that it views prices as the basis of 
negotiation within a static system (Boettke, 1997). This allowed Hayek‟s socialist 
opponents Abba Lerner and Oskar Lange, for instance, to argue that the socialist 
state could utilise prices in order to replicate market equilibria. But this conflation 
rests upon a complete misunderstanding of the Austrian argument. As Israel Kirzner 
(1973: 33-34) argues, prices do not serve simply to allocate our resources efficiently. 
Prices are instead necessary because we are largely ignorant about the resources we 
have at our disposal, and because we are even more ignorant about the preferences 
and needs these resources could be employed to satisfy. Furthermore, we are forced 
to act under conditions of both inescapable scarcity and of constant change (Kirzner, 
1997). As a society, we therefore disagree strongly about both how to act now and 
how to adapt to future changes. And since everyone has a different stock of 
knowledge, there is no way of knowing what our goals should be a priori. Prices 
facilitate action under these conditions because they lead us to generate knowledge 
about our social environment. 
 
This is because the prices of resources (qua goods, services, etc.) are set according to 
the competitive bidding of potential buyers. Since using resources for any particular 
project will incur the opportunity cost of the next best alternative use, individual 
buyers bid for those resources up to and on the basis of the highest value they expect 
the resources to realise. In the terms referred to above, actors bid according to their 
private theories of the marketplace, so resources tend to be allocated towards those 
who believe that they have discovered the most profitable use for those resources (in 
other words, that use which maximises the value of income over outgoings). As a 
result, the actor‟s private theories quickly become public as the relevant resources 
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increase in price and the actor begins to market their own good at its own price. As 
the market continues to operate, the profitability of the original theory gradually 
becomes clear, and other actors update their theories and understandings of the 
marketplace accordingly. 
 
According to equilibrium theorists, the process ends here, because over time all 
resources will be bid up to the marginal cost of their next use. Yet this cost is clearly 
not a constant. According to Kirzner (1973: 41-48), markets succeed instead because 
they continually reward those producers which best track this changing cost and 
punish those which fail. For, besides continually updating our own theories in the 
light of the results of others, prices lead profit-hungry market actors to act as 
entrepreneurs by seeking to take business away from those businesses and theories 
which seem inappropriate to the current or future environment. Where prices suggest 
that buyers are presently overlooking cheaper alternatives, or else that sellers 
underestimate the future prices that could be commanded by a different allocation of 
their good, the perceived profits available will outweigh current profits, and 
entrepreneurs will step in to shift resources (and prices) towards where they expect 
future demand to be (Kirzner, 1999: 12-15). Consequently, the less able a market is 
to satisfy potential consumer demands, the more it will see its general profit margins 
fall towards the break-even point as a proliferation of producers engage in a tussle 
for marginal, discerning consumers. Thus, even when the majority of consumers do 
not genuinely evaluate the products they consume, the choices of those who do will 
often be enough to tip the better providers into profit and the poorer into loss. And as 
a result, the market as a whole will tend to shed the least accurate theories and move 
towards those which best approximate social needs. 
 
Clearly, the entrepreneurial act is unique and exceptional. Prices are thus necessary 
but not sufficient for the success of the market order. What is also necessary is the 
agency of individuals with access to the kind of information necessary to spot 
potential entrepreneurial opportunities. This is not so much the knowledge of prices 
as the knowledge which ultimately informs prices. Hayek (1980c: 80) talks of such 
wisdom as „the knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place‟. It is the 
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kind of understanding we pick up about our particular jobs, the institutions in which 
we perform them and the industries which we are situated in. Just as businessmen 
and women use their expertise to predict the needs of their customers, entrepreneurs 
constantly mine it in the search for possible future opportunities. It is obviously 
fallacious to imagine that such practical intelligence might ever be centralised or 
directed. Like the market order it precipitates, it can only occur spontaneously in 
response to changing conditions, and we can never predict its occurrence in advance. 
 
Prices thus form the vicarious but essential link between freedom and prosperity. 
Because of our pervasive ignorance, we need to be able to act freely in the face of 
both opprobrium and doubt. After all, innovation would be effectively impossible if 
entrepreneurs had to obtain popular or political approval before acting. If individual 
actions were completely disconnected and immune to judgement, however, there 
would be no way of either selecting for those which are socially beneficial or 
weeding out those which are harmful. Prices allow us to solve this problem by 
imposing a reliably strict, universal and impartial discipline of their own. They offer 
both a carrot, in that they promise large rewards to those who can successfully 
discover and address a misallocation of resources, and a stick, in that they make 
damaging and inefficient behaviour very costly. Moreover, they also lead economic 
actors to set public examples, even when they would prefer not to. Where 
entrepreneurs stumble upon a significant resource misallocation (in the form of an 
unmet need or an externality, etc.), the high prices they can command and their 
attendant profits will draw speculative competitors. In contrast, their loss-making 
counterparts will prompt other actors to either avoid their activities or else seek to 
innovate further. 
 
Accordingly, as Cassidy (2009: 43) suggests, prices do act like an intelligent 
telecommunications system, but their accuracy does not rest upon the Herculean 
rationality of individual actors. Instead, they are illuminating because, rather 
mundanely, they simply track all of our socially relevant activities, whether they are 
rational, useful, intelligent or otherwise. As such, they cannot be expected to function 
properly when social action is insulated from the market mechanism. Where 
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externalities exist or when it appears that information is not being efficiently 
mobilised – in the market for regulation, say – the right thing to do is not to turn to 
the state, because without the benefit of price signals its arbitrary action is only likely 
to make matters worse. Instead, it is to create new forms of price competition in 
order to evince the necessary comparative judgements. Clearly, it was this 
competition which was necessary in the market for financial regulations. But its 
import should be obvious in the management of public services, the environment 
and, significantly, our cultural relations as well. 
 
Positive liberty and the case for fairness 
 
It is worth considering here the likely social democratic response to this liberal 
argument, because it is the same response which we might expect to meet from 
multiculturalists. Prices, this argument would suggest, cannot fully reflect subjective 
preferences in society if socio-economic or cultural phenomena systematically 
exclude some groups from participating. In any case, it is simply not fair that some 
individuals dictate what „works‟ and get what they want, while others do not. This 
critique may be levelled with different degrees of force, and in its mildest form it 
may well be defused by the liberal support for a limited fiscal safety net. But, taken 
to its logical conclusion, it suggests that we should strive towards equal positive 
liberty, whereby each has what she needs to operate effectively as a market actor. 
The liberal argument, in short, seems to imply that we should all have equal 
opportunities, which must entail some form of economic and cultural settlement. 
 
If we take this objection seriously, it would appear that the Austrian rejection of state 
intervention in principle is a self-defeating position. Shorn of its technical facade, it 
is vulnerable to the claim that it rests upon a dubious laissez-faire morality which 
prizes efficiency above all else. Paradoxically, this position must maintain the 
„nonsensical‟ commitment to the right to do wrong (J. Friedman, 1990: 639). Since 
all choices involve moral judgements, a viable theory of choice-making cannot rest 
on efficiency alone. Instead, it must incorporate in some form a theory of the good. 
The Austrian commitment to market freedoms, however, relies upon a „relativist‟ 
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agnosticism as to the nature of the good (Sandel, 1984: 1). This is morally vacuous 
because it simply shifts the burden of moral judgement onto the individual, who 
cannot be assumed to always choose what is „right‟. And yet free-market liberalism 
is not devoid of moral content. By seeking to limit individual freedoms to those 
which are compatible with similar freedoms for others, liberals rely ultimately upon 
an account of equal rights in order to protect the weak from being used for the well-
being of others (ibid. 2-3; J. Friedman, 1990: 641). Given this implicit egalitarianism, 
however, it is hard to see why they do not seek to limit individual behaviour to 
realise a more substantive form of equality. 
 
Forms of this criticism are levelled even from within the liberal canon. Despite the 
importance of individual liberties to social co-ordination, numerous liberal authors 
question the uncompromising liberal aversion to state intervention exemplified by 
Hayek. Jeremy Shearmur (1996: 68-69), for instance, questions the benefit of 
untrammelled freedom from the state. Hayek (1960: 21) contends that the 
spontaneous ordering of society relies upon the individual acting freely „according to 
a [subjectively] coherent plan of his own‟. At the same time, he accepts assistance 
for individuals when their access to goods „crucial to [their] existence or the 
preservation of what [they] most value‟ is threatened (ibid. 136). Is this not 
inconsistent? Surely, Shearmur contends, the individual needs more than the basics 
in order to benefit the public weal by testing the viability of a life-plan. Moreover, 
Hamowy (2005) argues that this seemingly high threshold for state assistance is 
incoherent. If restrictive prices for life‟s essentials are themselves the outcome of 
myriad individuals acting rationally according to their life-plans, then upon what 
basis can any intervention in their affairs be justified? 
 
The problem, stated simply, is not the underlying logic of the Austrian argument, that 
intervention in the self-co-ordinating mechanisms of the market order is dangerous, 
but rather that it need not be disastrous. Evidence of this might be seen in the general 
health of modern democratic welfare states (J. Friedman, 1990). Many of Hayek‟s 
critics and followers alike (such as Bellamy, 1994, Gamble, 1996, Johnston, 1997, 
Shearmur, 1996) assume that as long as governments do not try to plan and direct all 
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economic activity, intervention merely leads to a loss of efficiency and growth. And 
this is undoubtedly for many a price worth paying for what they regard as a moral 
necessity. After all, state action was apparently necessary to achieve many of the 
more progressive developments in society, such as the stigmatisation of racism and 
sexism. As such, whether or not to intervene in a given situation appear simply to be 
„alternatives, each with their characteristic costs and benefits, between which we 
would seem simply to have to make a choice‟ (Shearmur, 1996: 201). 
 
This contention is at the heart of the modern liberal rejection of classical liberalism. 
If liberty is but a value to be traded-off against substantive equality and if the only 
obstacle to „social justice‟ is efficiency, then classical liberalism is just as subject to 
the multicultural dilemmas as other political theories. And in this case, there can be 
no objection to the state acting wherever a compassionate justification can be 
offered. If this is conceded, however, it is difficult to see what could be salvaged 
from the Austrian argument. For, if we see the problem of society as simply deciding 
what is right to do, we have no alternative but to return to social democracy and 
entrust our well-being to the state.  
 
In order to substantiate the contemporary value of classical liberalism, it is therefore 
necessary to demonstrate that market freedoms are not simply a means for reaching 
efficiency, but are instead an essential tool for solving the very social problems 
which make social progress so difficult. Furthermore, it is also necessary to show 
that the epistemological problems facing governments are significantly 
underestimated by Hayek‟s critics. It is not simply that governments face the same 
knowledge problems as other individuals in society. Because of their unique position, 
they face an even greater obstacle. Despite the emotive draw, any attempts to move 
towards greater equality (whether in opportunity or outcome) would thus be 
counterproductive, because the state is bound to make systematic errors which, 
because directed at the very poorest, would harm those who have most to gain from 
more effective social action. Such a case is not obvious in the literature, so it must be 
constructed here. 
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Inter-temporal knowledge and the sensory order 
 
The obvious strength of the Austrian explanation of our societies is that it rests upon 
a manifest reality, rather than the ideal constructions of democratic and equilibrium 
theorists. That is to say, we can reliably predict the occurrence of spontaneous co-
ordination and prosperity even though individuals are both generally ignorant of their 
social surroundings and prone to mistakes. Liberals can comfortably accept, then, 
that because we are restricted by our immediate senses and experiences, we are 
indeed likely to follow the herd and act upon prejudices. We can, of course, appeal to 
others to appraise our beliefs. But the number of individuals even government actors 
have time to genuinely learn from is severely limited. The importance of an adaptive 
mechanism such as market pricing is that it allows us to use the knowledge of 
innumerable other actors without ever intending to. Market institutions thus allow us 
to approach the most accurate beliefs we might possibly hold about our social 
millieux, with negligible effort. 
 
This understanding of our current order is by no means obvious. As humans, we tend 
to anthropomorphise even while we assume that our interpretations of the external 
world are true. It is consequently difficult to comprehend the limits of our 
knowledge. It is all too easy, for instance, to believe that governments are 
responsible for social and economic outcomes, even though these are uncontrollable 
and chaotic orders. This is perhaps baffling, because since the Copernican revolution 
scientists have progressively shown that the real world is very different from how we 
perceive it. In his theoretical psychology, however, Hayek sought to demonstrate that 
individuals never experience an item or event as it actually is (Caldwell, 2004: 264). 
Instead, we only ever construct abstract interpretations, which allow us to react to 
and classify phenomena according to properties we recognise from previous 
phenomenal experiences (Leube, 2007: 19). It seems to follow, then, that our 
confusion between the state‟s abilities and its inherent limitations is simply a 
corollary of our more general confusion between the certainty of the physical 
sciences and the speculative but apparently authoritative „scientism‟ of state action 
(Hayek, 1955). 
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Hayek‟s psychology is apposite here because it also provides a nuanced 
understanding of the relations between structure and agency (which, it will be 
recalled, are central to the dilemmas of multiculturalism). According to his 
understanding of „the sensory order‟, our internal classification systems are built 
through experience, in the form of an increasingly complex map of the external 
world (Butos and Koppl, 2003: 14). In order to function in society, humans rely on a 
model of the situations they find themselves in, which they derive from this map and 
which is „anticipatory and embodies the system‟s expectations of likely subsequent 
stimuli‟ (Hayek, 1952: xx-xxi). These models allow us to plan and execute our 
actions. Where external stimuli do not correspond with our expectations, the model 
and, consequently, the map, are revised to better equip us for future situations 
(Caldwell, 2004: 269). Since these maps are manifest in the structure of our neural 
networks, the networks we inherit through early socialisation undergird our species-
level evolution (Butos and Koppl, 2003: 11). Human agency thus provides and 
develops the very mental structures which are essential both for conscious action and 
reaction, and for further structural development. At the deepest level of human 
consciousness, in short, structure is agency. 
 
The upshot of this account of human action is that, because of unique genes and 
histories, no two individuals have the same cognitive maps. Further, because of the 
intricacy and multi-layered complexity of our neural networks, the ways in which we 
react to complex stimuli, such as our professional interests, can never be fully known 
to us and can certainly not be articulated (ibid. 27). This observation is supported by 
Michael Polanyi‟s account of „tacit knowing‟. Polanyi (ibid. 120-122) contends that 
living organisms aim instinctively to find solutions to the problems in their habitual 
environments. Such activity, he argues, can be traced to the „innate sentience and 
alertness‟ exhibited by even the lowest taxonomical orders, which seek to both „make 
sense of their surroundings‟ and satisfy drives (ibid. 96-100). These activities 
stimulate learning, through the identification of relationships between means and 
ends and between signs and events (ibid. 71-77). Consequently, through these 
cognitive advances, organisms experience „latent learning‟, whereby they come to 
internalise a comprehensive understanding of their problem-situations which is, 
crucially, more than the sum of its parts (ibid.). 
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Once an individual has a complete understanding of their environment, they will 
have internalised the „rules‟ for action in that environment (ibid. 49). These rules can 
then be applied algorithmically to analyse the myriad possible options and their 
likely outcomes. Intuitively, such an understanding can only come from acting in the 
environment, and „learning by doing‟. New drivers, for instance, learn almost 
exclusively by practicing the act of driving. Resultantly, the results of this learning, 
manifest in the kind of entrepreneurial expertise mentioned earlier, are to some 
extent always inarticulable (ibid. ch. 4). For such latent understanding comes only 
after one has learnt to understand a problem-situation holistically. At this point, the 
actor can have only a „subsidiary‟ awareness of the micro-actions necessary to 
negotiate a problem, because these will have passed out of conscious awareness. 
When new drivers focus consciously upon their steering or road position, for 
instance, they are apt to err elsewhere. It is only by mastering driving itself that the 
learner becomes proficient, and thus able to cope with far more situations than were 
ever intimated by their instructor. 
 
Our latent learning, however, can never be complete. Our goals, beliefs and 
environments constantly change (with innumerable reinforcing effects between 
them), so our understanding of how to solve problems must continually change 
according to new experiences. The upshot is that knowledge is not just „information‟ 
that can conceivably exist objectively, but is embodied in „adaptive responses‟ to the 
world around us (Butos and Koppl, 2003: 32). The pertinent social question is 
therefore not how can we use our assumed knowledge to improve our circumstances, 
but instead how can we generate knowledge about our circumstances (Buchanan and 
Vanberg, 2002)? How can we encourage latent learning of social, moral and political 
problems? 
 
As suggested above, the liberal answer to this question suggests that we must rely on 
freely adjusting market prices because they „make privately held, and frequently 
tacit, knowledge socially usable‟ (Horwitz, 2000: 30). Entrepreneurial budgets, for 
instance, are analogous to our individual cognitive models (ibid. 32). Because they 
set out the plans by which businesses structure their activities, budgets effectively 
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embody the latent trade-offs between different resource allocations and between 
short-term risks and long-term investment that business leaders expect to maximise 
profits. And where these expectations prove to be flawed, budgets allow actors both 
to identify precisely where they were mistaken and, following the examples of 
successful and profitable businesses, to incorporate more accurate and valuable 
expectations and trade-offs. Contrastingly, as the financial crisis illustrates, 
intervening in the economy inevitably leads to the disruption of this discovery 
process, by distorting the problem environments in which entrepreneurs act and 
learn. Intervention, therefore, is not „merely‟ a matter of efficiency. Distorting the 
market ensures that a stock of valuable knowledge pertaining to our social and 
economic problems will simply never be discovered or disseminated. 
 
This point can be more rigorously set out by articulating a new conception of the 
knowledge problems facing social actors. Hayek‟s observations concerning our 
perpetually improving mind-maps and Polanyi‟s emphasis on the irreversibility of 
changes in our tacit knowledge are suggestive of just such a conception, because they 
suggest that we can never make judgements about our existing stock of knowledge 
by examining it at any one instance in time. To judge our ability to solve problems, 
we must instead seek to judge the effectiveness of our inter-temporal learning; we 
must judge, in other words, how much our knowledge of the past tells us about the 
future. For, the principal difficulty we face in confronting our social problems is that 
no individual agent can know with certainty how to interpret the past in a way which 
is meaningful and useful. The choice we face as a society is thus not between 
positive and negative liberties per se. It is instead between the state, which, however 
democratic, can only test one theory of events in the past at a time, and a competitive 
process that promises to eliminate all of those theories of and adjustments to the past 
which would serve us all – but especially the worst off – poorly in future. 
 
The ghost of knowledge past 
  
The inevitability of inter-temporal change presents us with three distinct challenges. 
The first and most obvious of these concerns the dearth of information we have about 
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the vast majority of humanity‟s past. Historical records are by their very nature 
selective for what seems to be the most significant information, and while historians 
might be content that major events are amply recorded, the more mundane facts 
about everyday life are easily lost. Since only those who live through a certain 
experience can truly know and learn fully from it, it would seem to follow that our 
knowledge about anything other than our own individual pasts is intrinsically weak. 
Once the experience of the Holocaust or the atomic bombings of Japan are lost from 
living memory, for example, we will cease to have any true knowledge of the horrors 
they entailed, despite their extensive descriptions. Since we lack any comparable 
point of reference, we as members of recent generations will have no way of 
empathising with those directly involved. As Mises (2005: 191) observes,  
 
[w]hat the historical account provides is the description of the situation; the 
reaction [to that situation] depends on the meaning the actor gives it, on the 
ends he wants to attain, and on the means he chooses for their attainment. 
 
It is precisely these reactions to historical events which history itself cannot provide.  
 
Nevertheless, we can still access knowledge from and about the past by observing 
traditions, and it is to these traditions we often turn in order to make up for shortfalls 
in our problem-solving knowledge. Thus, on a personal level, we often rely upon the 
guidance of manners to engender a favourable social environment for our acts. 
Moreover, besides this immediate benefit, traditions also embody historical 
knowledge of how exactly it is that we know things, and how we might increase that 
knowledge (Polanyi, 1958: 53-54 and ch. 7). In particular, the Western scientific 
tradition with its tenets of free and uninhibited inquiry has been fundamental to the 
growth and refinement of our technological, industrial and economic expertise 
(Quinton, 1988: ch. 1). And in a similar fashion, the social mores that develop within 
free societies tend to embody historical knowledge about the customs and laws that 
must be adhered to in order to maintain intellectual vigour and promote the good life. 
For it was through the collective respect for their growing civic consciences that 
those societies were able to develop and improve, so a continued respect would seem 
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to augur for continued growth (Polanyi, 1958: 222-223, see also Hayek, 1960: ch. 2-
4, and Popper, 2003, ch. 9). 
 
Governments faced with a vicious cycle of social problems and socio-economic 
inequality therefore face two inter-related problems. The first is that, because they 
are directed by often progressive political imperatives, it is doubtful whether they 
could ever either sufficiently accrue knowledge about any inevitably local and 
contextual problem to resolve it. Indeed, it bodes ill for interventionism that those at 
„ground zero‟, who will tend to have the most accurate primary knowledge about the 
problem, do not yet know how best to act. Paternalists often neglect this fact, of 
course, because they conceive of the disadvantaged as victims. But those same 
individuals often develop complex and surprisingly effective coping mechanisms 
which prove that they are not powerless.
8
 In comparison, governments are limited to 
the use of only that readily articulable knowledge that can be garnered from external 
observation. The latent contextual understandings and the „rules‟ of the environment 
which stabilise social interactions – and which rely upon socialisation for their 
diffusion – are inevitably lost as the problem is transferred from the local and 
traditional realms to the central and governmental. 
 
This is complicated further by the second problem, which pertains to the unintended 
consequences of disrupting the learning mechanisms institutionalised in free 
societies. For, even if the state could subdue a problem, there is a high chance that 
once the intervening variable is taken away the problem would simply reappear, 
because in the mean time no one will have learned any more about solving it. Indeed, 
in such a case the problem would probably be even more harmful, because the 
individuals concerned would have grown dependent upon the state, to the detriment 
of their adaptive autonomy. In so far as interventionism embodies progressivism, 
                                                          
8
 Arthur Seldon (2007) shows, for example, that despite their lack of resources the poor and working 
classes of the late nineteenth century had developed rapidly expanding „self help‟ schemes to provide 
housing, health insurance and pensions before the state began to intervene. Moreover, in his study on 
education in some of the poorest areas of the developing world, James Tooley (2009) found the 
private schools set up by members of those communities to consistently outperform – and to be 
consistently preferred to – the better equipped but poorly run public schools. Despite operating as 
businesses, many of these schools offered flexible scholarships and discounts to the poorest parents, 
and most voluntary offered extra services or assistance outside of school hours. 
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therefore, it seems set to fail, for it is likely to foreclose those historical flows of 
knowledge which must form the basis of any problem-solution. As a result, 
individuals targeted for government intervention will be hostage not only to its 
under-informed paternalism, but to its capricious attentions and political whims as 
well. 
 
The ghost of knowledge present 
 
Social democrats might wonder why we cannot simply mimic the natural sciences 
and apply knowledge from one part of society contemporaneously within another. 
Given the right „evidence-based‟ research, for instance, we might create a curriculum 
which offers equal opportunities for all, develop teaching styles which evince the 
best results from students and provide tailored tuition for those from disadvantaged 
backgrounds. Indeed, there seems little reason to stop there. On the basis of its 
assessment of social needs and the capabilities of schools, and in addition to the 
policies above, the UK government has sought in recent years to use schools to 
improve childhood nutrition, to promote responsibility and prevent antisocial 
behaviour, to tackle teenage pregnancy and even to encourage better „citizenship‟.9 
Indeed, so ambitious have recent governments been that it seems difficult to see how 
inequality could still persist. 
 
The problem for these noble aims is that accurate knowledge transfer is incredibly 
difficult, because each individual‟s capacity for action is heavily constrained by their 
own historical experiences and cognitive development. Indeed, it is for this reason 
that Hayek (1978: ch. 2) explicitly rejects the conflation of the social and physical 
sciences. Unlike the physical sciences, wherein „observed phenomena‟ are „functions 
of comparatively few variables‟ (ibid. 32), the social sciences are concerned with 
incorrigibly complex interactions which cannot be described according to general 
laws. It is as difficult to decipher the specific mechanism which led to success 
amongst one set of actors as it is to decide how to activate it in another. The concept 
                                                          
9
 These initiatives and more are set out in the UK Government White Paper Your child, your schools, 
our future (DCSF, 2009). 
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of „social engineering‟ and its welfarist social policy offspring, which assume 
common and relatively simple stimuli-response relationships, are thus completely 
wrongheaded (Mises, 2005: 162-163). What might appear to be perfectly reasonable 
in one problem situation might prove to be wildly unreasonable in another. 
 
This radical subjective variation is clearly explained by Viktor Vanberg‟s (2004) 
work on „program-based behaviour‟. Psychologists researching this concept see 
behaviour as essentially rule-based, whereby decisions are made according to the 
rules embodied by specific and tailored cognitive programs which develop over 
time.
10
 In this sense, the Hayekian mind-maps discussed above contain not only 
quasi-topographic data about the environment, but also conjectural information about 
the expected effects of different courses of action (ibid. 177). So, while it is likely 
that all humans are endowed with similar genetic inheritances, the results of 
individual behaviour feed back into programmatic conjectures, systematically linking 
each person‟s unique programmatic behaviour with her environment (ibid.). If we 
incorporate Polanyi‟s insights here, it is clear that programmatic knowledge is likely 
to become latent and subconscious once programs have become stabilised to their 
environments. 
 
As such, while it may be theoretically possible to understand individual decisions in 
different situations along cause/effect lines, it is clear that the massive complexity 
and interconnectedness of such causal chains would prohibit anything but a general 
„pattern prediction‟ (ibid. 178). Thus, in the context of social or political problems, 
such as those which regularly crop up in education, the difficulty is that because we 
do not intimately know the experiences of all those involved, we cannot fully 
understand the reasoning which led each of them to choose conflicting or detrimental 
courses of action. It follows that intervention based upon cross-sectional data is 
unlikely to be successful, because it cannot make use of all of the relevant but 
dispersed information. As noted above, it is instead simply likely to impose 
erroneous practices which interfere and override local practices and „solutions‟. Far 
from spreading and reinforcing success, such interventions are only likely to „cancel 
                                                          
10
 Such rules take the form of „if x, then y‟ imperatives. 
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out‟ the sporadic good practices which arise even within state-run services (albeit 
rarely). 
 
In function, there is little difference between even the most considered interventions 
and the mere preferences of state actors. Despite the high hopes of successive 
governments, this is well illustrated by schools in the UK. Besides the initiatives 
above, which essentially only draw time and resources away from core teaching, 
British schools have been severely hampered by the very National Curriculum 
designed to deliver excellence. Tooley (1996: 67) describes how this curriculum was 
first envisioned by Margaret Thatcher as a way of allowing senior science, 
mathematics and English teachers to decide the content of those skills important 
enough to be taught nationwide. Importantly, local teachers were to be allowed 
flexibility around this curriculum, so that they could tailor their classes. In practice, 
however, the curriculum quickly expanded to cover not only the entirety of all 
teaching subjects, but also the methods by which they are to be taught and assessed. 
As such, despite ostensibly being a tool to standardise best practice across schools, 
the curriculum has simply provided a mechanism fought over by self-declared 
experts and interest groups to impose their beliefs and preferences on the many (ibid. 
69-71). It has also led to stagnation in how we raise our children, by consistently 
prioritising the academic subjects favoured by the middle classes and stigmatising 
the more vocational subjects. 
 
Not only is this state of affairs clearly inappropriate in an economy struggling to give 
all of its graduates skilled jobs, but it rather more importantly compounds the 
disadvantages experienced by the poorest children. Tooley (ibid. 11-12) argues that 
these children are the most likely to be illiterate and unqualified, and are clearly 
over-represented in those sections of the populace who feel „alienated‟ from and 
intimidated by mainstream society. It is not unreasonable to suggest that the problem 
here is the poor and inappropriate way in which children are taught. After all, the 
curriculum fallaciously treats all children as equals when they have manifestly 
different needs. Whilst middle class parents find it easy to supplement inadequate 
school teaching and to encourage their children to persevere in the face of 
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innumerable examinations, those children who have little or no parental support 
unsurprisingly fail to progress. What is desperately needed to help these children is 
innovation in both teaching content and style, in order to allow schools to discover 
„what works‟ and for whom (Tooley, 2003). This would require free and unrestrained 
price competition, to be sure, so it would raise fears for those „left behind‟. But it 
would also allow schools to learn and specialise, and it would exert intense pressure 
on those which fail to do so. The existing centrally directed standards, in contrast, 
allow very little learning and exert no such pressure, so as long as they persist they 
are guaranteed to continue creating losers. 
 
The same failures are endemic to other publicly run services such as the NHS, which 
has persistently struggled to rectify health inequalities between the richer and poorer 
members of society. As Walshe (2002) shows, this is not through want of trying; 
over recent decades the NHS has seen a raft of new regulatory bodies seeking to 
spread „best practice‟ and smooth out inequalities in treatment. These bodies employ 
experienced and qualified clinicians, and they make use of the most recent research. 
The problem is, however, that while they were set up to encourage „compliance‟, 
they have tended (with government support) to focus upon „deterrence‟ and 
punishment (ibid. 969). As with the National Curriculum and indeed American 
financial regulators, this mission creep was perhaps inevitable because of the paucity 
of knowledge of the centralised regulators. Regardless of their expertise, these 
guardians of the public good simply have no basis upon which to adapt their 
guidance to specific cases. Instead of spreading good ideas which can be applied 
when medics think it appropriate, all they can do is to act as watchdogs in order to 
enforce specific practices (ibid.). And in so doing, they illustrate the central 
weakness of interventionism, which, based upon „one size fits all‟ policies, inevitably 
becomes more concerned with their imposition than with the question of whether the 
outcome is desirable or not. 
 
From these examples we can start to concretise the normative case against 
compassionate interventionism. Just as different children and different patients 
require different treatment in different circumstances, there is no universal basis to 
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„positive liberty‟. What individuals find valuable, and the paths they seek to follow to 
pursue the good life, depends upon their specific histories and beliefs. Both the 
prescription of those activities which supposedly lead to equality and the proscription 
of those which apparently erode it are doomed to failure, because both of these 
measures leave the decision mechanisms and connected conceptions of value which 
drive our social behaviour unchanged. Subject to such unanticipated external 
interferences in their environment, those affected by intervention are likely to simply 
continue acting according to their programmatic understanding of the world, but, 
crucially, they will lack viable alternative choices. As such, the most we can hope for 
from compassionate interventionism is that those affected will flout its travails. For, 
the likely alternative is that they will turn to even more damaging behaviours.
11
 
 
The ghost of knowledge yet to come 
 
It should be clear by now that we simply cannot mine apodictic prophecies from 
history (however we seek to define it). The best we can do is to use our knowledge of 
past human action to make speculative guesses about the future (Mises, 2005). Since 
the development of our cognitive anticipatory frameworks is dependent purely upon 
our past and necessarily limited experience, our ignorance of the future is inevitable 
(Butos and Koppl, 2003: 30). As Vanberg (2002: 28) asserts, human reasoning 
„cannot guarantee pre-adaptedness‟. That is, our cognitive apparatuses „cannot 
provide better guidance than the continuity of present to past problem-environments 
permits‟ (ibid.). Yet we are faced with new and unique situations on a daily basis. 
Consequently, our expectations of an event or action will rarely, if ever, tally with 
reality. Examples abound, from the highs and lows of a general election to the fallout 
and patterned knock-on effects of financial crises. 
 
There are obvious exceptions to this hypothesis. British students no doubt come to 
hold fairly accurate expectations of written examinations, for instance, while Cabinet 
                                                          
11
 Albert Hirschman (1992: 743) makes an analogous argument. If the state were to proscribe certain 
acts (such as excessive overtime) to improve the happiness of its citizens, he argues, it would probably 
to lead to individuals – used to trying to maximise their status – interacting in far more nefarious 
ways. 
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Ministers will know exactly what the drudgery of compromise requires. But what is 
notable about these somewhat trivial exceptions is that they rely on the individuals 
concerned experiencing something intimately, frequently and recently. Such 
conditions preclude the corrosive effects of time on programmatic knowledge, and 
maximise the chances that significant variation in analogous problem-situations will 
be experienced gradually, allowing incremental rather than shock changes to latent 
knowledge. What we might term cognitive accuracy, then, can result only from 
continuous learning. 
 
This kind of learning is unlikely to occur in the public institutions of the state which, 
however much experience they may amass, remain funded and directed from the 
political centre. This is because, as illustrated by the examples above, political 
institutions seek to impose upon local requirements rather than adapt to them. The 
very point of democracy is to derive goals from either regional or national public 
opinion which can then be realised locally. Whilst „street-level bureaucrats‟ do learn, 
they can only learn within the constraints of this political environment, so that their 
knowledge pertains more towards how to adapt their behaviour under specific 
circumstances to meet their political goals than towards meeting the needs of the 
circumstances themselves. Indeed, where local actors do orient their behaviour 
towards these circumstances, they are often accused of contributing to „postcode 
lotteries‟, and centralised political action tends to swiftly follow. 
 
Tebble‟s (2006) account of „identity liberalism‟ provides an especially apposite 
example here. He suggests that liberal democracies in practice demonstrate a form of 
nationalism which is not easily classified as either left- or right-wing. Instead, states 
such as the UK and France pursue decidedly assimilationist policies towards 
immigrants and minorities on ostensibly multiculturalist grounds. To ensure their 
„autonomy‟, for instance, individuals must embrace the mainstream culture to be 
eligible for public services such as education and welfare (ibid. 472-474). While this 
might be democratically justifiable on the grounds that public services are paid for by 
national taxation, it belies the fact that individual needs are likely to be culturally 
mediated. Plainly, children destined to live in traditionalist religious communities 
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would benefit more from an education tailored to these circumstances than one based 
upon the secular desires of the state. More to the point, the ability of public servants 
to impose the state‟s wishes blurs the boundaries between alien cultural mores and 
different individual desires. The ability of the NHS to pursue patients‟ ostensible 
interests against the wishes of families, and in some cases even the patients 
themselves, for instance, leaves little room for differences even between members of 
the indigenous culture. And instead of learning about these differences and their 
specific needs, the public servants in question here are required only to learn about 
how different individuals might be either persuaded or forced to accede to the 
nation‟s political goals.  
 
From a classical liberal perspective, the inequalities which are maintained by the 
democratic state‟s inability to learn and adapt to its problem environments are 
egregious and lamentable. As such, this perspective implores us to re-think our 
whole approach to social problems and interventionism. We need to accept that our 
knowledge will always be too limited to provide either large-scale or long-term 
solutions to our problems. As Buchanan and Vanberg (2002: 125) argue, since we 
cannot know what knowledge we will go on to have, we cannot know what we will 
regard in future to be the best solution to our problems. Indeed, we cannot even know 
what we will perceive to be problematic, for what is seen as acceptable now will no 
doubt change over time (ibid.). Accordingly, all we can hope for is to solve our 
problems on an on-going and localised basis. The best thing we can do for 
disadvantaged and problem-struck individuals is to remove all of the impediments to 
their learning, if only along crude cost/benefit lines, about the consequences of the 
different options they face.  
 
It is worth emphasising that this normative case for unimpeded market freedoms – 
and, similarly, the political case for classical liberalism – does not rest upon either a 
first-order intrinsic valuation of liberty or any controversial a priori judgement of 
public institutions. Instead, it rests wholly upon the argument that markets provide 
the most dynamic link between our knowledge of the past and the future. In stark 
contrast to the state‟s inability to evaluate anything more than a few democratically 
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mandated projects and policies at any one time, markets replicate the process of 
genetic evolution by continually subjecting all of the different expectations and plans 
of every market actor to the competitive battle for custom. And since the under-
provision of resources and services to the poorest represent the biggest departures 
from equilibrium, it is here that we would expect the greatest gains from the market-
led process of natural selection. By forcing individuals to choose between different 
claims to provision for their needs or wellbeing, the market would continually 
evaluate and refine the accuracy of the theoretical understandings of social problems 
which ground those claims (Brown, 1987: 290). Clearly, there is nothing 
controversial to this argument, other than the suggestion that every claim to 
knowledge should be always and everywhere refutable. 
 
Conclusion 
 
If classical liberalism is weak to the claim that it provides no argument against 
targeted normative interventions, then it is difficult to see what it offers other than a 
more exhaustive, ideological version of Mill‟s or Rawls‟s arguments. This chapter 
has attempted to refute this claim. It has constructed a classical liberal epistemology 
which suggests that intervention in general is likely to fare poorly because, in sharp 
contrast with the decentralised decision-making of the marketplace, the state‟s 
necessarily centralised planning is simply unable to cope with rapid and 
unpredictable changes in either its normative or real-world problem environment. 
While the market contains mechanisms for error-correction which continuously 
generate new knowledge, state action is more likely than not to spread errors 
throughout the social system. As such, and if only to avoid the effects of these errors, 
there is a prima facie reasonable case that can be made for negative liberty in a 
diverse society. Since individuals are the only possible repository for the kind of 
inarticulable social knowledge which is integral for effective social action, in so far 
as social action is necessary, it is essential that individuals are freely able to act. 
 
This call for negative liberty is radically different from the procedural individualism 
of Rawls or Mill. The aim of this argument has been to show that there is no single 
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solution to any sociological problem, or at least not one that exists in any form 
accessible to humans in an a priori fashion; if there were, we could have no possible 
problem with well-meaning interventions. Accordingly, we cannot rule out 
procedural, substantive, individual or group outcomes as the right solution to any 
particular problem. Classical liberalism does not so much seek to solve the equality 
and ontology dilemmas as illustrate that, in a decentralised society, they need not be 
dilemmas at all. For the adoption of any single position from figure 2.1 would create 
the very „one size fits all‟ problems described in this chapter. Of course, simply 
asserting this is not enough. It is the central task of the next four chapters to prove 
that this is the case, so that we will be in a position to see exactly how the classical 
liberal respect for civil plurality is better placed to deal with the problems of radical 
difference than any innovative theory of democracy. 
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4. Procedural Individualism: The Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing 
 
On the classical liberal account, individuals need to be free from arbitrary constraints 
in order to respond effectively to changes in their socio-economic environments. 
Given the depth of pluralism in society, and our inability to agree on a priori 
solutions, the stability these freedoms provide is essential if society is to use its 
formidable but fragmented stock of knowledge to find a compromise beneficial for 
everyone. Compromises, however, are rarely politically exciting, and with the 
growth of the electorate classical liberals lost their ground to demands that the state 
should help the disadvantaged. Accordingly, the revisionist liberal philosophy which 
developed out of these demands sought instead to realise our „ideal‟ freedoms. As 
this chapter shows, modern liberals argue that individuals should be guided by their 
authentic desires rather than those engendered by their peculiar circumstances. 
Desirable as this may seem, it is argued that this conception of freedom is 
nonetheless unsuitable for the conflicts arising from diversity. However the „ideal‟ 
freedoms are conceptualised, they will inevitably embody a partial and static moral 
perspective. This is problematic, because to be truly free to follow one‟s own 
conception of the good is to be free to adapt that good to as yet unknown challenges. 
It is this freedom, it is concluded, that must lie at the heart of a constructive approach 
to pluralism, but this is the very freedom that is foreclosed by modern liberal 
arguments. 
 
The status quo: liberalism as impartiality 
 
We saw in chapter two that strong democratic theorists depart from modern 
liberalism (qua procedural individualism) because it covertly circumscribes the 
goods pursuable in a plural society. To be sure, neither Mill nor Rawls – the two 
authors surveyed – sought to set out a perfectionist or virtue-based theory of the 
good. Mill‟s consequentialism is underpinned by his rule-utilitarianism, while 
Rawls‟s conception of justice is founded upon the deontological right. But both 
theorists disingenuously foreclose genuine value pluralism by proposing procedural 
and individualistic limits on social action. As a result, they would leave the plurality 
of goods at the mercy of the inevitable cultural and socio-economic inequalities 
which thrive in the absence of active politics. Marginalised groups would suffer 
because they would lack the means to challenge the fairness of their circumstances. 
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To generalise to some degree the critiques offered in chapter two, liberalism appears 
to be simply unsuitable for our modern political circumstances. What we require 
instead is an encompassing political process which can unite plural and divergent 
groups. 
 
Modern liberals would likely claim that this argument says both too little and too 
much. It says too little because all theoretical perspectives must entail a specific and 
to some extent unique set of consequences. These consequences can be either the 
intended goals of the theory or, if it is concerned with means rather than ends, side-
effects of intended goals. The key question is whether the theory provides adequate 
justification for these consequences. Given that liberalism‟s consequences are by-
and-large side-effects of its goal of securing individual freedom, it might be objected 
that it is unfair to criticise these consequences without first rejecting individual 
freedom. Additionally, the multicultural objection says too much, because liberalism 
does not abandon individuals in need of protection. The liberal focus on individuals 
reflects the simple truth that only individuals can act. In order to promote agency, the 
liberal state must therefore uphold individual rights and mitigate economic inequity, 
but it can go no further than this. If it were to look beyond the individual, the state 
would only end up reifying cultural and social inequalities by undermining universal 
freedoms. As such, with the exception of those which undermine these freedoms the 
liberal state should be impartial with respect to the ends which individuals in society 
pursue.  
 
This position, which equates liberalism with impartiality, is based more upon the 
fundamental moral equality of individuals than the simple fact of human agency. As 
such, it avoids any problematic move from facts to values and appeals instead to 
fairness. Given the individual‟s capacity to feel either satisfied or hard done by 
depending on how they are treated by society, and given our proclivity to feel 
sympathetic to these claims (if we perceive them as justified), we can only be content 
that the social order is truly fair if everyone is satisfied. As Brian Barry (1995: 10) 
argues, all those subject to principles of justice „have to be able to feel that they have 
done as well as they could reasonably hope to‟ if they are to be truly just. This says 
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nothing about what individuals might or might not want to embrace as valuable 
during the course of their lives. It simply asks that individuals agree to limit their 
good according to the reasonable claims of others. Since no specific good can be 
known to be objectively true, it cannot reasonably be forced upon adherents of other 
goods (ibid. 168-169). 
 
The strength of this argument depends upon two conditions. First, it depends upon 
how „reasonable‟ the liberal principles of fairness actually are. People would only 
limit their personal aspirations for reasons they agree with. And second, it depends 
upon how far the principles of impartiality actually require individuals to 
circumscribe their goods. If these principles require individuals to abandon their 
goods wholesale, it seems unlikely that they would be widely followed, however 
reasonable they may be. To succeed, liberalism as impartiality thus needs to avoid 
being both sectarian and onerous. On close examination, however, it clearly suffers 
from both of these drawbacks. It is firstly open to the criticism that it carries implicit 
but substantive biases in favour of the majority culture. This, in consequence, leads 
to the second and more serious problem that impartial liberalism is unable to address 
the subjective but nevertheless serious injustices which must arise from strict state 
neutrality. Impartial liberalism might not itself require individuals to relinquish their 
distinctive cultural identities, but it is unable to prevent those forces operative in 
cohesive nation states which apply such pressures. 
 
It is therefore argued in this chapter that liberal impartiality, the dominant, 
procedural individualist perspective in modern political theory, embodies a 
counterproductive approach to the accommodation of pluralism. The main problem is 
that the claim to impartiality is difficult to sustain when the state must decide how to 
intervene. As such, it leaves liberal democracy open to demands to protect minorities 
and marginalised groups (however defined) by providing legal exemptions. 
Obviously, these demands cannot be sustained for long alongside traditional liberal 
concerns. For as soon as the state assumes what must effectively be a plan of the 
correct cultural make-up of society, it must foreclose real, genuine freedom – the 
freedom to adapt to changing circumstances – in order to enforce that plan. Such an 
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outcome may be in the sectional interests of some concrete and identifiable groups, 
but it is definitely not in the general interests of all, which, following Kant, has been 
the essential litmus test of liberal arguments since the Enlightenment. In the context 
of diverse and divided societies, it is contended, any liberal argument which can pass 
this test must limit itself to ensuring only those negative liberties set out by classical 
liberals. The chapter ends by showing that this need not commit us to a depressing 
fatalism, however. The spontaneous processes of civil adjustment hold the potential 
to find a mutually beneficial compromise between moral opinions that must 
necessarily be precluded by more colonial moral positions. 
 
Impartiality’s egalitarian edge 
 
The strongest defence of liberal impartiality is provided by Ronald Dworkin (2002). 
Dworkin‟s account is notable because he seeks to justify a redistributive state while 
simultaneously upholding individualism and impartiality. Following the post-
Rawlsian emphasis on rationality as a justificatory tool, he contends that differences 
in society are acceptable because and only in so far as they are the product of free 
reasoning. We ought, in other words, to work towards instantiating a measure of 
equality in order to ensure that inequalities, such as they may exist, are the product of 
agency rather than contingency. On this account, the attempts by Western liberal 
governments to achieve some measure of material equality and intra-cultural 
cohesion in their populations are not open to classical liberal excoriation, because 
they can be justified by traditional liberal arguments. Dworkin‟s argument is thus 
apposite here because it offers a key analytical advantage. If it succeeds in grounding 
substantive and communal equality in procedural liberal arguments, then it must be 
the case that liberals can solve the multicultural dilemmas after all. If it fails, 
however, it provides us with a strong basis for thinking that the conflation of 
impartiality with the conscious reasoning central to modern liberalism is the reason 
for its failure to deal adequately with modern pluralism. 
 
Impartiality on Dworkin‟s argument consists of allowing individuals to live their 
lives as they see fit, and to bear the consequences of their decisions as responsibility 
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dictates. The role of the state is correspondingly limited to addressing only those 
inequalities which arise between individuals due to luck, as these are the only 
inequalities that could reasonably be objected to. For Dworkin, then, impartiality 
requires a kind of equality of reason. Equality pertains when individuals are free to 
realise their subjective judgements and worldviews. In consequence, the only 
standard of inter-personal comparison that can be available for judgements of 
fairness is that of relative resource wealth, because any standard of welfare must rest 
upon philosophical presuppositions about the determinants of human well-being 
which cannot be sustained alongside a respect for plurality (Dworkin, 2002: ch. 1). 
Contra Rawls, Dworkin thus completely separates justice and well-being. Since the 
nature and range of goods that we perceive to be available in society are determined 
by the challenges and circumstances we face as individuals rather than any objective 
metaphysic, the value of these goods can be judged only by reference to the justness 
of the conditions in which those goods (rather than alternatives) were chosen. As 
such, a society can be both just and pluralistic (qua unequal) so long as it was 
initially just. For Dworkin, such a state of justice requires absolute resource equity. 
 
Dworkin‟s desert island thought experiment, within which a number of washed up 
castaways must decide how to distribute the island‟s irreducible and undividable 
materials fairly, is illustrative here. In a situation of initial equality, Dworkin (ibid. 
ch. 2) argues that for each available item people would bid up to the limits of their 
hypothetical utility curves, which would embody their perceptions of how that item 
would help them realise their life-plans. Ideally, this auction would leave each 
individual with that bundle of items which they would not trade in for anyone else‟s 
bundle (the „envy test‟); if not, the auction would need to be re-run. The logic of this 
argument is that inequalities which arise through pluralism are justifiable because 
they simply reflect opportunity costs. Assuming initial equality, when goods are in 
short supply or high demand, castaways must forgo other goods when they purchase 
them. Similarly, assuming equal talents, whether their life-plans involve long-term 
costs or gains, only they have a responsibility (or a right) to bear them.  
 
In the real world, of course, people most certainly do not have equal talents. Further, 
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even if equal talents did initially pertain, many individuals are during the course of 
their lives affected by accidents or handicaps beyond their control. Given these 
conditions, Dworkin‟s thought experiment justifies a system of insurance markets for 
both health and talent (into which, presumably, all castaways would rationally pay) 
in order to show that a compulsory health and misfortune insurance programme 
would be justifiable. Once a society is equipped with these protections, it need not 
fret about remaining inequalities, because these can be roughly attributed to choice 
and ambition alone. The upshot of this argument is that Western liberal democracies 
of the European mould, with their liberal political institutions and relatively generous 
welfare programmes, embody the best response to modern cultural and moral 
pluralism. 
 
This admirably parsimonious and seemingly compelling argument is not without its 
merits. As well as offering an apparently complete answer to the dilemma between 
procedural and substantive equality, the liberal impartiality argument exemplified by 
Dworkin is intended to transcend the divisive question of positive versus negative 
liberties which underpins the dilemma between autonomy and diversity. Barry (2001: 
118-119) contends that liberal impartiality promises to overcome this divide by 
accommodating elements of both positions within a wider moral framework which 
precludes their less desirable side-effects. Dworkin‟s argument seems to fulfil this 
promise, by incorporating a conception of equality based upon the individual 
freedom to question and reflect upon their beliefs and associations and to abandon 
them as desired without fear of undue cost. Yet this is a tempered autonomy, because 
individuals should be free to willingly belong to associations and communities which 
may, on many views, be undesirable or damaging to the individual, and which may 
subsequently offend substantive conceptions of the ever-questioning autonomous 
being (ibid. 155-162). This freedom is essential, because on this account individuals 
are the final arbiters of value. 
 
Nevertheless, justice as impartiality falters when considered under realistic epistemic 
conditions. A key assumption smuggled into Dworkin‟s argument by way of his 
„envy test‟ of fairness is that individual reasoning is independent from the 
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individual‟s identity. Reason, that is, must itself be understood as a talent which is 
employed in the pursuit of one‟s interests. This has to be the case for the initial 
auction to succeed, since individual bidders must be able to reason effectively on an 
a priori basis about their interests in order to be satisfied with their purchases. And it 
must also be the case for fairness to pertain, since we can only attribute responsibility 
to individuals who reason accurately about the costs and benefits of different courses 
of action in order to achieve their ends. Those who reason poorly are hostages to 
fortune, and deserve state assistance. 
 
Accordingly, it appears as though the real-world presents problems only in so far as 
it lacks a clearly defined starting point from which to distinguish what we have come 
to own through natural ability from that which is due to effort. Following this 
assumption, Dworkin‟s account focuses on the difficulties of distinguishing talents 
from ambition, which are both intimately connected to an individual‟s history and 
endowments (see, in particular, Dworkin, 2002: 90-92). His argument turns to talent 
insurance markets precisely because they would discover and realise for everyone the 
maximal level of income expected from innate ability (ibid. 92-99).
12
 To paraphrase 
Dworkin, each individual would be left with (at least) „the income he would have had 
if, counterfactually, all talents for production had been equal‟ (ibid. 91). 
 
The problems we face in the real world are more troublesome than this, however. As 
it was shown in chapter three, our beliefs, identities and reasons are interimbricated, 
so it is simply not possible to isolate our use of reason from our particular 
understandings of the world and our place within it. This means that it is not possible 
to rigorously distinguish the individual‟s talents (their „brute‟ luck) from their 
choices or ambition in the manner that Dworkin needs in order to offer individuals 
genuine freedom. In practice, for instance, washed-up auctioneers would all be in a 
similar state of ignorance about the future, and they would have as little genuine 
                                                          
12
 One‟s expected income is the monetary income which would be awarded if the talent insured 
against is not found, weighted by the probability of it not being found. Dworkin argues that since 
insurers must make profits from their policies, and since the chances of having a level of talent are 
inversely proportional with its value, the expected income from an insured against talent quickly tends 
towards zero as the value of that talent rises above the mean. Expected incomes, therefore, roughly 
approximate the income from the mean level of talent. 
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control over the results of their purchases as they would over their beliefs. But this 
means that there is no more reason to allow individuals to face the consequences of 
their free acts than there is to allow them to reap differential rewards from their 
different talents. It follows that where differential outcomes are allowed on 
Dworkin‟s account, they are by no means the chosen differences of different 
choosers. Instead, they are simply those arbitrary differences which are consistent 
with the homo economicus reasoning upon which he bases his argument. 
 
Dworkin‟s account can consequently say little to the practical problems posed by 
diversity and difference. By treating reason as an ends-directed tool which is simply 
more or less efficacious, he conflates resource inequalities with the inequality of 
reason embodied by unequal real-world talents. It is on this basis that he injects his 
own counterfactual reasoning – that individuals would want to substantiate the 
uniform resource equality which would pertain from equal natural abilities – in order 
to move the system back towards intended outcomes. This is a completely 
unwarranted step, however, because it treats the cultures and identities which ground 
diverse individual choices as matters of mere luck, which either give us an artificial 
hand up or handicap our progress towards our autonomous goals. Significantly, this 
instrumentalism runs contrary to the thrust of multiculturalism, which is concerned 
not with the problem of how we can better obtain what it is that we want but rather 
how we might solve those disagreements which arise out of having different and 
sometimes opposing wants. 
 
On this basis, it is clear that freedom consists not in the equal ability to reason as 
such, but rather in the ability to adjust our reasons in response to the reasoning of 
others. For, the central problem which is ignored by the impartial conception of 
justice is that the outcomes of even autonomous acts are largely out of our control. 
They depend upon the environments within which we act and, crucially, upon the 
actions of individuals with whom our plans interact. As such, it is not that we should 
be free and equal, but rather than we can only be free equally, so that all individuals 
must assess and update their intentions in the light of the myriad influences and 
obstacles which they encounter. The import of this responsibility should be clear to 
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see, for if anyone is spared of this requirement, they have at their grasp the illiberal 
ability to impose upon others without having to face the consequences of that 
imposition. Yet by distorting the unintended inequalities which are the very 
epistemic mechanism by which we can learn about our actions, Dworkin‟s desire to 
allow only „intended‟ inequalities clearly exemplifies just such an ability. It would 
support a form of tyrannical proceduralism impartial only between choices reflective 
of its own conception of intentionality, and it would consequently disadvantage those 
who do not support that conception. 
 
The cultural critique 
 
It is possible that the modern liberal, committed to abstract impartiality, might brush 
away this critique as irrelevant and poorly aimed. Barry (1995: 77, original italics) 
argues that we need a conception of justice to address the very real question of „how 
are we to live together, given that we have different ideas of how to live?‟. We ought 
to approach this question impartially, for we cannot approach it with our substantive 
goods in mind and still claim to be acting fairly. However, this does not require us to 
view all reasoning through the same impartial lens. To put this differently, the 
principles of justice we agree to must be impartial, in that they support an equitable 
system which allows for equal moral agency for all, but we as individuals need share 
no commitment to impartiality in our personal lives. As Paul Kelly (2005: 120-121) 
argues, liberal egalitarianism 
  
does not propose uniformity of outcomes but merely uniform general laws 
that apply to all in the regulation of social interaction, where the content of 
those laws reflects equal basic rights and liberties. 
  
The only substantial burden entailed by these laws is that, in the pursuit of our own 
good, we respect the rights of others to pursue theirs (ibid.). Barry (1995: 99-111) 
goes so far as to argue that just laws need only determine the constitutions of and 
procedures by which the legislature acts. What the legislature acts upon is a matter 
for democratic politics. Justice, therefore, is consistent with a wide plurality of goods 
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and a variety of non-pecuniary costs and benefits being borne unevenly across 
society. It is neither sectarian in its formulation, nor onerous in its implications. 
 
This objection would be to miss the point of the critique of impartiality offered 
above. The problem is that it is incoherent to understand rationality as an unsituated 
concept. We simply cannot make a priori decisions without first knowing what it is 
we are deciding on. Such knowledge can only come from learning, so we cannot be 
supposed to know and understand all the myriad considerations necessary to derive a 
concept of justice in the abstract. This makes formulating the content of Kelly‟s 
„uniform general laws‟ and Barry‟s constitutional procedures incredibly difficult, 
because they have to embody the limits of reasonability, the limit, that is, of what 
externalities arising from one person‟s actions can be reasonably borne by others. 
Barry (ibid. 87-90), for instance, endorses a „positive harm principle‟ which decries 
as unjust only those acts which directly harm others. Accordingly, he rejects blood 
sports and female genital mutilation while upholding the rights to abortion and 
sexual freedom. Now this is certainly reasonable in the sense that Barry is clearly not 
mad in holding these views. But it is hard to see why it is reasonable in the sense of 
being impartial, because it is hard to see why individuals with no grounding in an 
idea of the good, and thus no way of judging the acceptable from the unacceptable, 
would endorse them. And Barry‟s (ibid. 84) appeal to the centrality of certain 
freedoms to people‟s lives does not work here, because it invites the naturalistic 
fallacy unless he can prove that it is good that they are central in such a way. 
 
On reflection, Barry‟s conception of justice relies on the self-evidence of the 
concepts of harm and responsibility to limit the role of the state in the same way that 
Dworkin relies upon the self-evidence of luck and reason. These assumptions leave 
the modern liberal interventionist state open to all manner of multicultural claims 
because, as it was argued above, individual reasoning is radically situated. According 
to the „liberal culturalist‟ critique (to borrow Will Kymlicka‟s (2007: 31) term), for 
instance, impartial liberals err by misunderstanding our cultural ties. Kymlicka 
(1995: ch. 5) distinguishes what we might call our „common‟ cultures, which 
encompass those specific parts of our lives we regularly make choices on, such as the 
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philosophy we subscribe to or the groups of individuals we associate with, from what 
he terms our „societal cultures‟. Such a culture 
 
provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of 
human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational and 
economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres (ibid. 76). 
 
While the decisions we make in our daily lives concern our common cultures, our 
societal cultures provide the very meanings and understandings with which we 
structure and comprehend the „cultural‟ choices in front of us. It follows that we are 
not pre-programmed to simply „get‟ the world around us. Instead, we need to employ 
both the interpretive tools and institutional practices of our cultures to make sense of 
the situations we face. In this sense, we are essentially dependent on our societal 
cultures to provide us with a „context of choice‟ (Kymlicka, 1995: 82-83). 
 
On this multiculturalist argument, our identities are not the product of choice but are 
instead the basis from which we can make choices about our lives. Whether 
considered in the abstract or not, there is simply no way in which we can coherently 
think of an „equal‟ starting point from which to attribute responsibility. Because of 
our inherited, multifaceted differences, we all relate in different ways both to the 
majority culture and to one another. We interpret the world in different ways and 
give different meanings to our actions. The idea of „equal opportunities‟ is thus 
incoherent, because opportunities can never be equal across people with such 
different understandings of the costs and benefits that accrue from the same choice-
sets. Similarly, we ought also to dispense with the concept of „impartiality‟ once and 
for all. Any centralised attempt to manage the distribution of resources (be they 
cultural, economic or social) in society must entail a systematically uneven 
distribution of opportunities and freedoms (Raz, 1986, ch. 5). 
 
Accordingly, even the abstention from making explicit choices with respect to how 
people use their freedoms must rest upon controversial and sectarian decisions. The 
neutrality of the state, for instance, with regards to the religions individuals choose to 
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follow requires individuals themselves to bear the costs of their religious „decisions‟. 
Thus, a religious worker who needs free time in order to pray at specific points 
during the day must bear the burden of this requirement, because secular workers 
require no such breaks. But this inevitably puts the religious individual at a 
disadvantage if the job market offers the same terms of employment to all. Of course, 
this might simply be an issue of convention. The public and private sectors alike tend 
to settle on standard practices in order to work efficiently, so the costliness of 
departing from convention is a positive fact, rather than a normative problem. Yet it 
is important to bear in mind here the difference between impartiality and 
indifference. The indifferent state would care as little for the systematic costs borne 
by religious individuals departing from convention as they would for those borne by 
disabled people or women. The impartial state might care little about the former, but 
it would presumably have much to say about the latter. 
 
The reason for this concern is that when rules are indifferent between our different 
characteristics, they can easily distribute the costs of seemingly „voluntary‟ action 
unequally. Thus, the practice of allowing only very limited sick leave seems to 
unfairly penalise those who need on-going treatment in the same way that the 
requirement to work long hours, days and weeks disadvantages parents (and 
especially expectant mothers). As a result, egalitarian liberalism requires 
modifications to these rules in order to ensure equal autonomy for all (Chambers, 
2002: 152-153). But by not providing the religious with similar legal protections, the 
impartial liberal state hinders their entry into the workforce as effectively as it would 
have had it intentionally directed the industry conventions to penalise religiosity. 
Like the previously unprotected disabled and women, such individuals can only find 
employment with those firms which explicitly recognise the legitimacy of their 
behaviour. According to liberal culturalism, this is patently unfair. Like gender and 
ability, religion is not chosen in the same way as friends or careers are. As such, the 
impartial liberal state ought to entitle the religious to the same assistance and 
protection that it offers to all other minorities (Kymlicka, 1995: 109). 
 
This argument is of course explicitly rejected by impartial liberalism. Kelly (2005: 
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85-91), for instance, contends that since religious individuals would presumably not 
choose to change their identities if offered the choice, these inequalities do not fail 
the egalitarian „envy test‟. For all intents and purposes, then, these individuals must 
be responsible for the consequences of their identities. This is clearly a problematic 
position to take, however, as it imposes an onerous burden upon the individual. Is it 
„fair‟ to expect individuals to abandon their cultural-belief systems (which often tie 
daily requirements to ideas of the right) in order to circumvent inequalities? And are 
we to conclude that it is just for individuals to bear these inequalities to the point 
where they are intolerable (such as when they lead to poverty and malnourishment) if 
they wish to keep their identities and cultures? To make matters worse, these 
dilemmas are faced disproportionately by minority groups. As Kymlicka (1995: ch. 
6) shows, the laws of the land do not impose such difficult choices on the ethnic-
religious majority, because it is within the culture of this majority that the social 
mores and expectations which underpin liberal laws evolve. It is for this reason he 
contends that the revisionist liberal policy of benign neglect „is not in fact benign‟ 
(ibid. 111).
13
 
 
These arguments against impartiality are perhaps all the more potent because 
Kymlicka‟s liberalism is based, like that of his opponents, on „the freedom and 
equality‟ of all citizens (Kymlicka, 1995: 34). Moreover, he is explicitly concerned 
with the ability to make choices and revisions concerning one‟s life and beliefs (ibid. 
81). Yet for Kymlicka, an autonomous life is one led „from the inside, in accordance 
with our beliefs about what gives value to life‟ (ibid.), a definition that approximates 
Frankfurt‟s (1971) influential definition of autonomy as the realisation of one‟s 
higher-order, authentic will. Accordingly, for the multiculturalist there is indeed a 
moral imperative for the state to facilitate individual freedom and choice. But in so 
far as one‟s authentic will is intimately related to their societal culture and their 
corresponding subjective views and desires, real equality of opportunity requires 
                                                          
13
 Expanding on this argument, elsewhere Kymlicka (2007: 33) calls attention to the project of 
„nation-building‟ modern states are committed to. Even those which come closest to the impartial 
form of liberalism are not „ethnoculturally neutral‟ (ibid. 35), for the simple reason that their public 
policy decisions implicitly – and sometimes explicitly – promote a specific, individual societal culture. 
As Joseph Raz (1998) argues, though, in contemporary multi-nation states, privileging one nationality 
over all others is discriminatory. 
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providing everyone with equally tailored choice sets which include options of value 
specifically for them. 
 
The fatal attraction of acceptability 
 
The upshot of this critique is that, despite its abstract presentation, liberal impartiality 
has significant, non-neutral implications for the real world. Given the collapse of 
abstract impartiality, real world impartiality requires the identification of those 
groups in need of minority exemptions and the implementation of these exemptions. 
The arguments in favour of this approach, provided by Kymlicka and Joseph Raz, 
therefore take liberalism far away from the methodological atomism which it is often 
associated with in order to apply it to our lived experiences as members of distinct 
cultural groups. As an approach that seeks to rectify the drawbacks of the dominant 
liberal approach, rather than abandon it altogether, liberal culturalism promises to 
appeal both to proceduralists, such as Barry, Dworkin and Kelly, and their more 
communitarian opponents (M. Moore, 1991). 
 
Nevertheless, its critique of abstract impartiality notwithstanding, there are few 
reasons to think that liberal culturalism would lead to desirable real-world outcomes, 
for it too disregards the epistemic realities elucidated by Austrian economics. The 
cultural turn distances itself from the naive understanding of impartiality by offering 
a more realistic contextual argument for its support for liberalism. Since individuals 
differ, there is no „one size fits all‟ standard by which to guide the terms of political 
association. Yet liberal culturalism fails to comprehend the full implications of this 
argument, because it sees the alternative to impartiality as a set of bespoke rights 
(qua positive liberties) tailored for groups as they are, as opposed to how we would 
like them to be. If we understand individuals to differ not only across socio-cultural 
space, however, but over time as well, this approach appears completely wrong-
headed. 
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The reason classical liberal arguments reject the interventionist state is that it is 
inevitably reliant upon outdated and incomplete information. It cannot intervene to 
promote different choice-sets according to a bespoke or universal conception of 
justice without simultaneously constraining people according to increasingly 
arbitrary moral beliefs. For it cannot be known in advance what people should and 
should not do; this is precisely the information that we as individuals and indeed as a 
society need to learn as we adapt to ever-changing circumstances. In so far as the 
state attempts to pre-empt our goods, therefore, it must inevitably confront situations 
where its norms conflict with existing beliefs among the populace. In consequence, 
the interventionist liberal cultural state would continually face the dilemma of either 
assuming control of its subjects‟ activities, or else abandoning its goals altogether 
(Hayek, 2007). 
 
Again, it is important to note that as liberals, neither Raz nor Kymlicka have this goal 
in mind. Both are instead concerned only with realising human well-being. Raz 
(1986: 194), for instance, works from the perfectionist claim that the moral value of 
any particular good can only be derived from its „contribution, actual or possible to 
human life and its quality‟. On the basis of this meta-ethic, he proffers an 
individualistic understanding of welfare, whereby our quality of life is dependent 
upon how successful we are in meeting the goals that we set ourselves. As we saw 
above, these goals are not selected out of a vacuum but rather derived using our 
cultural-interpretive framework from the social world around us. It follows that, 
given a concern with well-being, stable cultural diversity is essential, since a world in 
which individuals differ requires a variety of role models and cultural examples if we 
are all to realise our well-being. 
 
On this basis, the state does appear to be justified in regulating social behaviour and 
diversity in order to protect and promote human welfare. Since individuals must be 
able to embrace meaningful goals from their cultural surroundings if they are to 
prosper (Raz, 1986: 300-307), state action is necessary to promote and secure the 
individual autonomy required for leading a valuable life. Before anything else, the 
state should therefore provide the educational, political and social institutions 
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necessary to facilitate the development of that autonomy.
14
 That is, governments 
should simultaneously provide schools and hospitals while monitoring the powerful 
social and economic actors, such as the media, which could endanger the individual‟s 
uptake of goals and values. Yet while autonomy is necessary for the good life, it is 
not sufficient, because an „[a]utonomous life is valuable only if it is spent in the 
pursuit of acceptable and valuable projects and relationships‟ (ibid. 417). As such, 
governments should also monitor the cultural world to ensure that individuals have 
the appropriate socio-cultural building-blocks necessary to construct a worthwhile 
life.  
 
Kymlicka (1995: ch. 2) provides a blueprint for such cultural regulations. He 
contends that governments ought to be able to provide „external protections‟ for the 
linguistic minorities and cultural constellations that face an existential threat from the 
economic and cultural power of the majority, but which are essential to provide a 
stable social and cultural environment for rooted individuals. Depending on the 
problem at hand, possible protections range from self-government rights for national 
minorities to language or uniform concessions in the workplace and educational 
assistance to immigrant groups (ibid. 114-115). Kymlicka is determined to prevent 
these protections from shifting power inequalities from the inter- to the intra-cultural 
realm, though, and he emphasises the dangers of even the most well-intentioned 
impositions of specific cultural practices and beliefs. So, in principle at least, he 
contends that the state should be ready to intervene to protect autonomy and break 
down „internal restrictions‟ on agency within illiberal groups (see ibid. ch. 8). Raz 
(1994: 119) neatly sums up this requirement, arguing that cultural groups must be 
prevented from acting to impair their members‟ autonomy. They should not prevent 
their members from leaving or deny them knowledge of the benefits offered by other 
ways of life, and it should be the aim of policy to „neutralise‟ or „compensate‟ for 
those aspects of cultures which do threaten individual autonomy in this way (ibid. 
184). 
                                                          
14
 Raz‟s conception of autonomy is notoriously vague and under-defined. Wojciech Sadurski (1990) 
and Robert George (1991) point out that while Raz seems to see autonomy as an intrinsically valuable 
component of the good life (which should not be coerced, even for perfectionist reasons), his 
perfectionist account actually seems to justify, if not require such coercion. They both conclude that 
he does not solve this dilemma persuasively. 
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A simple objection to these arguments and interventionist policies is the Rawlsian 
claim that they are based upon a controversial comprehensive moral viewpoint, 
which elevates individual autonomy above all other goods. According to this claim, 
it is unjust to impose autonomy upon a diverse society since it does not claim 
universal moral approval. This objection would not hit home, however, because such 
interventionist policies need not be justified by the intrinsic value of autonomy. 
Liberal culturalism envisages autonomy only as a means, rather than an end. It is 
unobjectionable that the accommodation of multiculturalism must be limited, if only 
by the requirements of sustaining the liberal democratic system. According to 
Kymlicka (1995: 93), „the liberal ideal is a society of free and equal individuals‟, so 
multiculturalism must be nurtured so as to foster rather than damage this ideal. Since 
this ideal requires political self-determination and personal self-sufficiency, this 
requires autonomy, but it is only because of this requirement that autonomy has any 
value (Raz, 1986: 391). Well-being ultimately derives from the aims and goals an 
individual chooses and how they impact upon and enrich her life. As Raz contends, 
we find well-being in „a life of achievement‟, characterised by hard work, 
perseverance, „good judgement‟ and conduct, and „warm and trusting relations with 
family and friends‟ (ibid. 306). 
 
There is little, in short, that can be disputed in terms of liberal culturalism‟s 
reasoning regarding its stated goals of promoting freedom for all within a liberal 
multicultural polity. The problems with this position lie instead with the ability of the 
authorities to actually act on its goals. We can see this by looking at the 
characteristics of the good set out by Raz above. The point of these goods, as a part 
of Raz‟s perfectionist account, is to provide a universal rubric to judge the value of 
action. To some extent, they succeed, for they do indeed accord with what must be 
universal moral intuitions. It cannot be a point of controversy that a good life is one 
of achievement, and that as social creatures, our well-being depends upon having 
fulfilling relationships with others. But these constraints on the good are extremely 
thin, and thus open to radically divergent subjective interpretations. This matters, 
because achievement, good judgement and warm relationships are often likely to be 
incommensurable goods. Undertaking a PhD, for instance, is seen as a valuable 
achievement for some. But its comparative benefits and its cost in terms of close 
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relationships are likely to seem crazy for others. Similarly, if a couple were to give 
up work to educate their children, we might think this brave and somewhat 
admirable, but at the same time given Raz‟s constraints, we might want to question 
the acceptability of this choice (given its externalities) and whether it was well-
judged.  
 
These points matter, because as we have already seen, in deciding the terms of 
political association we cannot simply allow people to pursue their own goods on the 
mere basis that this is desirable. We have to know that the goods are in fact good. For 
it is perfectly plausible that some autonomously chosen courses of action, which 
seem to meet Raz‟s thin requirements for well-being, are in fact completely 
unacceptable. As Richard Boyd (2004) argues, there are many associations, such as 
street gangs or organised crime syndicates which act in ways which, given their 
characteristics alone, we might believe to be desirable (and which could claim to be 
good on Raz‟s criteria). After all, such gangs are often based upon mutual respect 
and solidarity (and even love), they frequently embody a shared commitment to hard 
work, and they demonstrate a good understanding of their milieu and their place 
within and effect upon it. But we cannot call such associations „good‟ on this basis 
alone. And this does not simply mean we have some hard decisions to make at the 
margin. When any choice involves sacrificing one good in order to pursue another, 
we need somehow to know whether that sacrifice is acceptable. That is, we need a 
hierarchy of goods by which to judge the sacrifice. Given our chronic knowledge 
problems, however, such a hierarchy is impossible to come by. 
 
This means that the liberal state would inevitably struggle to simultaneously prevent 
internal restrictions and guarantee external protections without meeting considerable 
resistance. For the key questions here concern what, in practice, constitutes an 
internal restriction, and what constitutes an intolerable external threat. Both concepts 
rely upon there being some way of deciding between acts and outcomes in order to 
decide precisely when the actions of aggressors (either within or without the culture) 
are to be deemed less important than the unimpeded actions of their „victims‟. Take 
the example of a Native American who wishes to sell her land to a commercial 
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property developer, to the wrath of the Native American community. In this case, the 
liberal state must decide whether the sale should go ahead in the face of the 
community‟s anger – in which case it needs to provide protection for the individual – 
or whether the sale should be stopped by giving the cultural hierarchy the power to 
regulate its land and fend off property developers. With no a priori knowledge of 
which freedom is the most valuable, the state can only use its own limited judgement 
to decide who to empower and which goods to promote 
 
Despite its principled basis, in practice liberal culturalism risks devolving into a set 
of arbitrary choices between different groups and freedoms. Kymlicka, for instance, 
seeks to set the boundaries of freedom at the limits of illiberalism. It is not enough, 
he argues, to suspend toleration of a culture only when a crime has been committed, 
because the harms that cultures may commit may be much less appalling, and yet 
equally insidious. Thus, a culture may withhold education or impose a repressive, 
submissive sense of identity upon its members, with the result that few are able to 
lead any life other than that imposed upon them (Kymlicka, 1992: 143). In this case, 
tolerating such cultural practices would be akin to endorsing them. But imploring the 
state to intervene in such unacceptably illiberal practices is tantamount to treating the 
state‟s conception of liberalism as coterminous with the limits of acceptable private 
morality. Those groups already privately equipped to succeed in a liberal, 
individualist society would therefore be given extra, unnecessary protection, whilst 
those disadvantaged by their personal beliefs would be penalised still further. 
 
It is therefore difficult to see how individuals from maligned cultures would be any 
better off in a liberal culturalist polity than one seeking to realise impartiality. For, by 
providing de facto subsidies for the more liberal groups, the former would distort the 
flows of information which arise from our mutually accommodating compromises. 
Instead of learning the costs and benefits associated with different courses of action, 
which would give them the ability to voluntarily adapt their good, individuals would 
have to choose wholesale between staying true to their own morality or following the 
state in order to avoid trouble. Many would probably make the latter choice, which 
would be so much the worse for human freedom and diversity. But some would 
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surely desire to preserve their own identities and goods, putting them in potential 
conflict not only with the authorities, but with all other groups which form the 
majority culture (Kukathas, 1992: 121-122). As a result, the polity would have to 
exert yet more control or else give up altogether. In either case, there would be little 
room for those individuals who genuinely seek to question the basis of liberal 
morality. 
 
The requirements of liberal culturalism thus seem as sectarian and onerous as the 
liberal impartiality it seeks to displace. The latter approach was criticised because it 
is indiscriminate between those ethical viewpoints in society which are advantaged 
by its difference-blind commitments and those that are disadvantaged. The 
disadvantaged would, in this system, be faced with an unfair burden which imposes 
unreasonable costs on their lifestyle. It is difficult, however, to see how liberal 
culturalism rectifies this problem. By substituting „acceptability‟ for „impartiality‟, it 
certainly shifts the burden around somewhat. Yet the burden is no less severe, and it 
would still be arbitrarily distributed. And liberal culturalists cannot avoid this charge 
by appealing to the necessity of curtailing some freedoms to maintain order. For the 
learning process they foreclose is just as able to direct individuals towards mutually 
acceptable outcomes, and this without pre-judging the worth of any particular good. 
If we are to desire a mode of associational life which promotes progress, then, but 
without the sectarian and onerous costs described above, we ought to turn away from 
modern liberal arguments towards their classical antecedents. 
 
The forgotten benefits of foregone freedoms 
 
It is important to resist the temptation to exaggerate the distinction between 
traditional and modern liberal arguments. For the distinctive core of the liberal 
project has effectively remained unchanged since its conception. Liberalism has 
always emphasised what we might describe as the absolute equality that exists 
through irreducible difference. Since people are discrete and unique, we cannot see 
humanity or society as anything more than a collection of individuals. Consequently, 
there is no basis upon which our assessments of well-being can be weighted in 
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favour of some nor balanced out across the many. All moral value must (and can 
only be) derived from the well-being and flourishing of human beings considered 
fundamentally as individuals. As such, and given our capacity for reason, which must 
underpin any rational approach to well-being, it must be the case that every 
individual should have equal freedoms.  
 
This is a well-established and well-accepted commitment that, the problems of these 
accounts notwithstanding, is clear in each of the procedural individualist positions 
considered so far. The difference between more traditional liberal arguments and 
their modern counterparts arises because, as we have seen, the latter construct 
freedom as a desirable ideal which promises specific, knowable ends. On traditional 
arguments, however, these ends cannot be known. Freedom is simply advocated as a 
minimal constraint on political institutions, which is intended only to promote the 
conditions conducive to well-being. Consequently, while modern liberals are wont to 
circumscribe the pluralism entailed by freedom, classical liberalism is ultimately 
agnostic towards humanity‟s diverse ends. 
 
This is significant because the point of departure for liberalism‟s democratic critics 
explored herein is the idealism of modern liberal arguments. This idealism is 
foundational; as this chapter has shown, it is contained within assumptions about 
„reason‟ and „rationality‟ which underpin liberal proposals concerning the terms of 
political association. To liberalism‟s democratic critics, however, it is not enough to 
allow freedom only within these terms, as they are likely to be biased in favour of the 
cultural majority. Individual beliefs, needs and desires are empirical facts which can 
be determined only through political practice. Accordingly, in the same fashion as 
classical liberalism, strong democrats seek to free the citizenry so that individuals 
might decide and legitimate the terms of association themselves. Before examining 
the latter in greater detail, it is thus apposite here to finish by showing that classical 
liberalism does provide a practical alternative to modern liberalism‟s controversial 
idealism. 
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As chapter three argued, the main contribution of liberals such as Smith and 
Ferguson was to show that much of the social order upon which we rely in our 
everyday lives is maintained unconsciously and unintentionally by individuals going 
about their private business. Self-regarding individuals who interact over extended 
periods of time will tend to co-ordinate their behaviour according to (generally) 
implicit rules which will, in turn, structure social interactions.
15
 As Smith (1981) 
shows, the rules of civil trade and exchange arose largely in this fashion and only 
later became regulated by governments and states eager to tax traders to raise funds. 
What is significant here is that moral and cultural behaviour is largely the product of 
the same unstructured process (see McCloskey, 2006 for a comprehensive 
exploration of this argument). As individuals communicate and co-ordinate their 
behaviour in order to further their personal ends, they must also co-ordinate at least 
some facets of their moral behaviour in order to facilitate peaceful and trouble-free 
communication. Moreover, as societies and associations grow, these cultural and 
moral mores are taught and spread through personal communications to individuals 
who are born into them or join later in life, either peacefully because of the benefits 
of membership,
16
 or through forced assimilation.
17
 Even in the latter case, where 
individuals are coerced into new forms of behaviour, the constantly shifting moral 
order that results is the unintended product of the myriad different and often 
incompatible actions and reactions of those individuals who form and interact with 
that order. 
 
On the classical liberal argument, the moral order should be allowed to continue 
developing in this spontaneous and undirected fashion. For, where our morals evolve 
by a process of mutual adjustment, they will approximate and distribute the very 
                                                          
15
 This argument has received considerable recent support in the Economics literature. Michihiro 
Kandori (1992), for instance, argues that as long as information is sufficiently decentralised, even in a 
large population where people are likely to meet different people in successive interactions, people are 
likely to converge on the social norm of punishing deviance. Indeed, Glenn Ellison (1994) shows that 
decentralised information structures may not even be necessary for the transmission of such norms. 
Instead, they may be transmitted „contagiously‟ to achieve a near-efficient equilibrium. 
16
 The mass immigration into the United States in the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries is a good example 
of this phenomenon. Individuals, who often fled disastrous circumstances in their home countries, 
travelled to the US in the hope of a better future. While many died or (after 1892) were rejected, those 
who successfully began their new lives both took from and added to their new regional and national 
cultures.  
17
 The regrettable flip-side of the (mostly white) voluntary immigration was the assimilation the 
United States forced upon non-white Native Americans and African slaves. 
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equality of moral respect sought by modern liberals. Now, this is not to say that there 
are no inequalities of power at play in society, and neither is it to suggest that 
everyone‟s good is good. Furthermore, it is not to say that we should tolerate the 
abhorrent, as modern liberals fear. It is, however, to claim that true liberal equality 
requires refraining from imposing arbitrary and exclusive a priori limits on toleration 
(Kukathas, 2003: 127-131). It is a simply a fact that people use their reason in 
different ways in order to pursue different goods. Some pursue decidedly honourable 
goods, to be sure, whilst others appear to lack a sensible good altogether. But no 
individual or good can have an apodictic claim to virtue, so they must all be treated 
with the same moral respect. 
 
This might be seen as a flawed and incoherent form of relativism, which brings us 
back to the troublesome commitment to the right to perform wrongful acts, such as 
child abuse or infanticide (see, for instance, Barry, 2001: 144-145).
18
 In fact, 
classical liberalism steers us around the quagmire of these issues. As Kukathas 
(2002) argues in response to Barry‟s criticisms, it is simply the case that liberals must 
choose between following either their own well-meaning but intuitive and 
ungrounded personal goods, or the more systematic and agnostic but genuinely 
impartial classical good. If they choose the former – perhaps, like Barry, in order to 
be able to enunciate a „principled‟ rejection of child abuse – it is difficult to see why 
this would result in „liberalism‟, however. As Kukathas (ibid. 194-199) asks, why 
would such liberals be able to stop at merely preventing physical abuse? Why not 
follow Richard Dawkins (2006: 354) and treat religious education as abusive, too? 
Indeed, if liberal egalitarianism is the principle good, it is not clear why we shouldn't 
intervene in order to ensure that all children are brought up in a stable liberal 
egalitarian context. Self-described „liberals‟ such as Clare Chambers (2002) advocate 
just this level of „protection‟, so why wouldn‟t Barry, Dworkin or even Raz or 
Kymlicka? Presumably the problem is that this approach completely belies a genuine 
respect for diversity. 
                                                          
18
 It will be recalled that Sandel (1984) criticises classical liberalism on these grounds. Since classical 
liberals are unwilling to say what is right, they have no grounds to criticise anything for being wrong. 
In this sense, he argues, liberalism is a non-theory: it is like a politician who promises all things to all 
people, but is able in fact to deliver nothing. 
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This fearful hyper-activism is not only dangerous and illiberal, it is also unnecessary. 
The appeal of classical liberalism is that it demonstrates how modern liberal 
societies can accommodate all individuals in the pursuit of the shared goals of peace 
and prosperity. For it does not demand the celebration of intolerable acts, but rather 
promotes the conditions under which our influence over these acts can be tempered 
by the moral value of the person. Thus, while free individuals can follow their own 
goods without fear of intrusion, they have no protections against being scorned or 
rejected by others (Kukathas, 2002: 196). Such freedoms are valuable precisely 
because they force people to get to know one another as they really are. For it is only 
on the basis of this knowledge that we might genuinely decide how it is we want to 
live together. Where people do intolerable things, a society in which the government 
is prevented from acting as the moral arbiter is thus likely to see more rather than 
less moralistic civil action, as outraged people have no other choice than to exert 
their own authority. Such a society would probably see more civil advocacy groups 
offering avenues of escape for the oppressed and raising awareness of troubling 
behaviour, as well as more individuals willing come to the aid of others. But it would 
also allow those convinced that the majority are wrong to disassociate themselves, 
however costly it might appear to be. 
 
This is a theoretical promise, to be sure. But it is supported by empirical examples. 
Erin Pizzey, for instance, organised Britain‟s first Women‟s Refuge in 1971, thus 
bringing to national attention the problem of marital battery and rape which had been 
ignored until that point. Such crimes are all but marginalised now, and there are 
various private escape routes for their victims. Looking further back, the voluntary 
philanthropic efforts of Jeremy Bentham and Elizabeth Fry were instrumental in 
challenging public attitudes to the treatment of prisoners and prison conditions, even 
if the eventual reforms did not hinge on their prescriptions (see Cooper, 1981). And 
there are examples, too, of situations where the state crowds out badly needed civil 
moral action. The effective British abdication of its responsibility to its homeless, 
mentally ill and elderly, who are supposedly in the care of the state, is but one potent 
example. It is an open question, of course, whether or not the democratic process can 
usefully allocate public funds towards these groups once they reach the attention of 
the public. But the point being emphasised here is that a liberal society can realise 
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substantive goods without central direction. Accordingly, if we want to solve the 
problems created by modern liberalism, we could do much worse than return to 
liberalism simpliciter. 
 
Conclusion 
 
It goes without saying that the full implications of these „foregone freedoms‟ have 
yet to be explored. Nevertheless, this chapter has shown that the classical critique of 
revisionist liberalism has much in common with the democratic arguments set out in 
chapter two. By analysing both the post-Rawlsian contributions of Barry and 
Dworkin and their multicultural opponents Kymlicka and Raz, it has been shown that 
modern liberalism – even multicultural liberalism, indeed – presumes too much, in so 
far as it deems some things to be so important that they must be taken out of the 
realm of individual choice. As the deliberative democrats argue, this must inevitably 
weight the political system against the most maligned in society, to the detriment of 
those who would gain the most from a more tolerant approach to social organisation. 
Yet we should not despair. Despite this gloomy picture, it was shown that classical 
liberalism can accommodate the substantive goods sought by revisionists even as it 
allows the freedom of choice sought by radical democrats. As this is a counter-
intuitive suggestion, it awaits a fuller explanation. Before this can be offered, 
however, it is first necessary to examine the democratic positions in more detail, in 
order to show why they too are unsuitable solutions to multiculturalism in their 
current forms. 
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5. Substantive Individualism and the Social Capital Zeitgeist 
 
The basic democratic claim against liberalism is that in its essential form it supports 
inequalities of power between different groups. On this critique, the inferior positions 
held by minorities in relation to well-educated white males create the very prejudices 
and suspicions which sustain inequality. Substantive individualism seeks to break 
this cycle by drawing people together in participative processes designed to foster 
mutual understanding and respect. To use the well-known phrase, it seeks to improve 
society‟s stock of „social capital‟. In this chapter, it is shown that the emphasis the 
concept of social capital places upon the individual is well-judged, given our 
grounded but unique identities. For this reason, deliberative interactions promise 
significant benefits for society. It is doubtful, however, whether democratic 
deliberations can deliver on these promises. When all individuals must take part in 
democratic processes, these processes must be re-located in the associations of civil 
society. Yet outsourcing democracy in this way vitiates the possible benefits of 
deliberative interaction. The information created in an associational democracy 
would be too fragmented and inconsistent to either engender positive change or 
contribute to social harmony. Quite to the contrary, it is concluded that true social 
stability relies instead upon our fostering the tendencies towards automatic and 
unforced mutual adjustments. 
 
The need for social capital 
 
In chapter two it was shown that the substantive individualism of Benhabib and 
Dryzek seeks to thoroughly politicise the individual relations across and between 
social groups. The distinctive feature of this approach is that it prioritises the citizen 
over all other conceptions of the individual. Liberalism errs because it sees 
politicisation as the solution of last resort, for use only after the escalation of conflict. 
For substantive individualism, this provides insufficient protection, because the 
fundamental dynamics which motivate conflicts – the incompatibility between 
different approaches to the same issue – are continuously operative within cultural 
constellations and even within individuals themselves. Private action, to put it 
simply, is just one rather limited facet of human agency. The encultured individual 
also requires opportunities to engage in collective and even submissive action in 
order to lead a fulfilling life. It makes little sense, therefore, to focus on conflict only 
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once it has escalated, as less visible conflicts can be just as damaging and divisive. In 
order to uphold moral equality and facilitate well-being, society must uphold 
political and social agency so that individuals can retain control over the conditions 
necessary for their own prosperity. 
 
For deliberative democrats this politicisation requires radically changing democratic 
institutions to actively involve individuals in the daily decisions which affect their 
lives. As we have seen, the inter-personal debates and discussions these decisions 
entail do not differ significantly between substantive individualists and the 
procedural communitarians discussed in the next chapter. What is significant about 
the former, however, is that it prioritises the interactions involved in deliberative 
decision-making over and above their results. While deliberation can indeed improve 
decision-making, the real value of public deliberation is that it realises the 
„requirements of justice‟ – the „equal consideration of interests‟ and the redistribution 
necessary to maintain this equality – which retain their foundational moral status 
even in the face of radical disagreement (Christiano, 1997: 258-262). Accordingly, 
substantive individualism requires nothing more than the routine democratisation of 
people‟s everyday lives. Accepting the permanence of difference, it seeks only to 
promote inter-cultural learning and mutual understanding through community-level 
political action. 
 
This position thus relies critically upon the strength and depth of interactions 
between social actors. If citizens are to become routinely involved in genuinely open 
and reciprocal political decisions, these decisions must be taken within a civil society 
secure against factionalist tendencies. In the tradition of Tocqueville, an active, 
associational civil society is seen as the social precondition for a healthy, functional 
democracy (Sabl, 2002). Besides protecting the individual from the tyrannical rule of 
the state, as Tocqueville emphasised, civil society provides the primary „public 
sphere‟ within which individuals can come together through co-operative ventures 
and public fora to communicate and challenge one another (Habermas, 1974). Yet to 
offer these benefits, civil society needs to be grounded within resilient institutions 
and constituted by highly motivated individuals. A vibrant civil society, in other 
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words, requires a high stock of „social capital‟, the primary measure of inter-personal 
trust, co-operation and positive feeling between individuals (Paxton, 1999). It is this 
notion of social capital that provides the central basis to this particular deliberative 
solution to the tensions and anxieties in multicultural polities.  
 
It is contended in this chapter that this strategy places an unreasonable burden on 
democratic interactions. As it is argued first of all, deliberative democracy requires 
significant changes to existing socio-political institutions. It is not enough that people 
interact as such; a process-orientated deliberative democracy instead requires 
generalised interactions between individuals who would otherwise not cross paths or 
have any means of communication. Such interactions, it is subsequently shown, can 
only be fully inclusive while still offering opportunities for learning in a democratic 
system specifically based upon civil associations. A deliberative state, therefore, 
must be able to facilitate and regulate the formation and interaction of these 
associations if it is to achieve its goals. It must guide associations, that is, so that they 
promote empathy rather than antagonism, and genuine understanding, rather than 
confusion. These are indeed noble aims, but it is difficult to see why they embody 
guidance rather than simply control. For a start, the state must decide what form civil 
associations must take to promote these goods. And even if it gets this right, as the 
fourth section argues, there are few reasons to believe that it would be able to 
accurately or coherently interpret the results of civil deliberations anyway. 
 
In this chapter we therefore begin to see the inherent limitations of the deliberative 
system. Ultimately, the reliance on the state to regulate the individualism in a 
Habermasian deliberative society cannot help but result in the state directing that 
society according to its own plans. This need not be ruinous, to be sure. But it offers 
little chance of realising any of the epistemic potentialities of a deliberative system. 
More to the point, neither would it be able to claim the legitimacy promised by the 
deliberative method. Thankfully, deliberative democracy does not provide the only 
approach to associations and civil society. In the final section, it is shown that the 
philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment convincingly argued that social order can 
only be genuinely achieved when individuals are given access to a truly free civil 
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sphere. Indeed, the Scottish philosophers suggested that individuals would use these 
freedoms to engage in the very kinds of shared governance activities desired by 
individualistic deliberative democrats. By way of conclusion, it is thus suggested 
finally that substantive individualists could learn much by considering the 
deliberative benefits of spontaneous action. 
 
Deliberation, social capital and civil society 
 
The central aim for an individualist deliberative democracy is to promote learning 
within society by forcing individuals to account for their actions and beliefs to those 
who take exception. This learning would have both personal benefits, in that it would 
allow the individual to negotiate a coherent path through the multiple facets of their 
identities, and public benefits, in that it would secure and institutionalise substantive 
goods and freedoms which could not otherwise be democratically attained. To 
achieve this deliberative aim, Benhabib (2004: ch. 5) argues that the processes of 
democratic engagement must be „iterative‟. „Democratic iterations‟, she (ibid. 179) 
writes, entail 
 
complex processes of public argument, deliberation and exchange through 
which universalist rights claims and principles are contested and 
contextualised, invoked and revoked, posited and positioned, throughout legal 
and political institutions, as well as in the associations of civil society. These 
can take place in the “strong” public bodies of legislatives, the judiciary, and 
the executive, as well as in the informal and “weak” publics of civil society 
associations and the media. 
 
Democratic iterations therefore require the democratic process to be both universally 
encompassing and deliberative, so that those affected by different political and legal 
norms can at any moment mount a public challenge, demand to hear their purposes 
and suggest alternatives. It would be up to society‟s various public and private bodies 
to offer reasonable explanations for their actions, or else they would be expected to 
change their behaviour to meet social requirements. As such, the rules governing 
society and conduct in an iterative democracy would be constantly re-legitimised and 
updated according to the evolving beliefs and experiences of political actors. 
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On this argument, the empirical blends curiously into the normative. Assuming that 
inequality offends the requirements of justice, Benhabib (2007: 455) argues that 
empirical claims about the potential of deliberative iterations to erode inequalities 
entail the political imperative to make democratic processes more iterative. At the 
same time, the efficacy of the iterative process itself requires political action to 
promote universal autonomy and give individuals the power they need to challenge 
injustices (Benhabib, 2004: 209). Thus, where equality of autonomy is compromised 
by social divisions, as a society we have a moral duty to come together as individuals 
in an impartial mediating process, in order to both explain ourselves in mutually 
understandable terms and learn what it takes to fit our identities peaceably together 
(ibid. 192-193). It follows, then, that democracies should foster and incorporate 
deliberation by both facilitating discursive political engagement in the citizenry and 
removing the barriers which limit political legitimation to formal and exclusive 
institutions and traditions. Interactions and deliberations that take place at every level 
of society and at all times should be taken seriously as democratic dialogue 
(Benhabib, 1996a: 73-74). The boundaries of the political, in short, should be limited 
only by the boundaries of communicative interaction. 
 
Ensuring that deliberation meets the standards of fairness and justice requires more 
than simply extending the political across the range of institutions and multiple levels 
of the polity, however. It is also necessary to pay attention to the effect the structural 
constraints on social interaction may have on the efficacy, or what Jürgen Habermas 
calls the „rationality‟ of communication. In particular, communication in the context 
of liberal, capitalist institutions is likely to be fundamentally distorted by the 
influence of money and the desire for prestige (Habermas, 1996a). If our interactions 
are to be open and uncorrupted they must therefore be freed from the material 
constraints of capitalism. According to Habermas (1987: ch. 6), they must take place 
within an autonomous „lifeworld‟, wherein individuals would seek not efficiency and 
control, but rather understanding and rational agreement. 
 
Habermas‟s conception of the lifeworld is significant because it manifests the ethics 
implicit in all practical discursive interactions. While commanding, mocking and 
129 
 
other such non-interactive uses of discourse exemplify an attempt to dominate, 
conversation embodies a shared commitment to reach understanding and truth. 
Participants to a conversation treat one another as equals, so they interact with the 
expectation that the results of their discursive engagement will be determined wholly 
by „the force of the better argument‟ (Giddens, 1985: 131). Accordingly, the 
lifeworld suggests that the benefits of deliberation are dependent upon the quality as 
well as the quantity of deliberation. It is not enough that people retain the simple 
freedom of self-affirmation or the ability to challenge others, for these freedoms are 
inward-looking and are often used for self-interested purposes (Habermas, 1996b: 
25). Instead, the vibrancy of the life-world depends upon the inclusivity of the terms 
of communication between different groups. 
 
Habermas thus calls attention to the significance of individual motivations in 
discursive interactions. It is not enough for deliberative participants to be self-
selecting, because this would bias the political process in favour of the most fervent 
and sectarian. Instead, deliberations need to be generally inclusive, so that political 
institutions have no choice but to acknowledge them (Habermas, 1996a: Appendix 
1). In the first instance, therefore, individuals should be consistently willing to 
engage in political activities on an on-going basis, rather than only when they have a 
particular grievance. As Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba‟s (1963) study of „civic 
culture‟ suggests, this means that individuals need to be aware of the depth of 
heterogeneity extant in society, so that they can identify their own possible 
contributions and feel confident that their involvement would be worthwhile. Being 
willing to engage with different groups, however, is not sufficient for deliberative 
success. Individuals must also be confident in the collective, shared benefits of 
political institutions. That is, they must be able to trust these institutions to be fair 
and even-handed, and they must trust other groups to be equally concerned with the 
collective good. As Robert Putnam (2000) argues, society must have a high level of 
generalised trust in order to support successful participative democratic institutions. 
Participation requires strong ties between society‟s various groups and communities, 
so that individuals are not tempted to „defect‟ from the political process by either 
free-riding or following their own personal interests (Dasgupta, 2005).  
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Deliberative democracy, in short, requires a high level of „bridging social capital‟ in 
society. Pierre Bourdieu (1986) and James Coleman (1988), who are usually credited 
with formulating the concept, conceived of social capital as the connections between 
individuals outside of the formal institutions of the market economy and the nation 
state which offer information or opportunities exclusively to those individuals. The 
concept took on a wider significance, however, when Putnam called attention to the 
public benefits of such private connections. By comparing the political and social 
conditions in the north and south of Italy in the early 1990s, Putnam (1993) 
demonstrated that different levels of social capital were correlated with different 
levels of institutional performance and citizen satisfaction. What is perhaps most 
notable in his study is that he attributes the north‟s comparative success to its 
relatively weak but numerous „horizontal‟ connections between citizens and political 
institutions (ibid. 109-115). In the terms Putnam (2000: 22) introduces later, these 
connections „bridged‟ the differences between diverse individuals and allowed for 
greater trust and co-operation, which led individuals to invest more time and faith in 
their local governing institutions. In sharp contrast, the strong „bonded‟ relations 
which held southern individuals tightly together in exclusive kinship groups 
sustained more insular and selfish behaviour.
19
 
 
Thus, according to Putnam (1995: 66), the „quality of public life and the performance 
of social institutions‟ depend upon the strength of the weak ties underpinning civil 
society relative to the more intensive relationships occurring inside. This is an 
intuitive argument, but it does seem to be supported by experience. Lindsay Paterson 
(2000), for instance, shows that the modern Scottish norms of self-sufficiency and 
moral unity grew out of the extensive civic culture created in the 18
th
 century. After 
Scotland‟s original political institutions were removed to England, its citizens lost 
their political autonomy. During successive economic upheavals they had to learn 
                                                          
19
 It is important here to acknowledge the controversial nature of Putnam‟s arguments. As Ellis 
Goldberg (1996) argues, Putnam‟s exclusive focus on social capital obscures as much as it illuminates 
about the real differences in historical and institutional development between Northern and Southern 
Italy. The arguments presented here do not rely wholeheartedly on Putnam‟s empirical claims, 
however. Instead, it is enough to show here that the nature of social capital and individual relations in 
the north and south led to very different types of participation between the two. And it is indeed the 
case, as Putnam‟s argument suggests, that the active and multifarious forms of participation found in 
the North of Italy would be more conducive to the requirements of a deliberative – rather than simply 
a representative – democracy. 
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instead to rely upon one another for support. Various voluntary organisations and 
local committees emerged to provide welfare services, which brought the Scottish 
population loosely together as a national community. As Putnam‟s argument 
suggests, these interactions militated against factionalism and gave rise to the 
peculiar Scottish national identity, which the Scottish authorities have nurtured ever 
since (ibid. 45). 
 
The connections which bridged the regional and social differences within Scotland 
grew out of a sense of common purpose. Where this sense of common purpose has 
been undermined, such as in post-Thatcherite England, individuals have tended to 
turn away from common outcomes towards private interests (Szreter, 2000: 75-76). 
Simon Szreter blames this privatism on the general sense of insecurity and inequality 
which has become pervasive amongst the citizenry. As the English population has 
struggled to cope with economic and political changes, there has been an increase in 
factionalism and group conflict. This has undermined the capacity and commitment 
of citizens to even communicate with or understand one another, which has, in turn, 
only exacerbated the inequalities which undermined civic ties in the first place (ibid. 
65-69). Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, whilst Scottish nationalism is associated with 
the left, English nationalism has been embraced by the xenophobic far right. 
 
It follows from this argument that the strength of society‟s social capital, and 
consequently the likelihood of deliberative success, rests ultimately upon the 
commitment of the state to facilitating a vibrant, multi-faceted civil society. Indeed, 
as Michael Walzer (1995) shows, the freedoms and capacities of individuals to 
sustain genuinely diverse forms of life in society at all are fundamentally dependent 
upon the actions and philosophies of political institutions. If individuals are to be 
liberated from traditional and inherited power structures, they need to actively 
participate in those civil and democratic activities which unite individuals in 
common goals and teach them the skills necessary for democratic competence. On 
this account, civil society ought to be realised as a „project of projects‟, wherein 
individuals learn how to realise their goods in harmony with others through the 
interplay of associations built upon different values and for different purposes (ibid. 
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27). Accordingly, it is up to public institutions to genuinely enliven civil society, by 
enabling the public reasoning which arises out of the sometimes confrontational, 
other times co-operational interplay of social groups and actors. The practice of 
democracy, in short, must be re-located as far as possible to the associations which 
bridge the gap between the state and the individual.  
 
Associational democracy 
 
In order to privilege the discursive and associational intercourse of civil society as 
the principle democratic „mechanism‟ operative in society, it is of course necessary 
that the social „system‟ of civil associations be suitable for the burden of decision-
making (Perczynski, 2001: 72-73). As Mark Warren (2000: 10) asserts, there are „no 
obvious generalisable ways in which associations enhance democracy‟. While some 
groups do have the potential of enhancing democratic institutions and activities, 
others are potentially harmful. The various benefits associations may bring, 
moreover, are not necessarily mutually compatible. Groups which enhance the public 
sphere may very well undermine the social and communal cohesion necessary to 
form stable or orderly coalitions on public debates, for instance (see ibid. ch. 4). The 
promise of freeing democracy from the confines of liberal state institutions and their 
attendant problems of path-dependency notwithstanding, allowing the everyday 
interactions of citizens and established interests to assume a formative role in 
democratic decision-making makes no appreciable difference to either the centrality 
or size of the state‟s role. It is still necessary for a strong centralised state to structure 
society in such a way as to tease out the desired mix of democratic behaviours. It 
therefore remains an open question as to precisely how such an „associational 
democracy‟ would be implemented. 
 
The key division amongst associationalists concerns the relative merits of a „top-
down‟ approach to associations, which views them as the mechanisms by which 
decentralised information is formalised into formal policy blueprints, and the 
„bottom-up view‟, which sees civil organisations as the mechanism by which 
decentralised information can autonomously inform and drive the provision of public 
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goods (Perczynski, 2001). These two options sit either side of a trade-off between 
systemic manageability and democratic inclusivity, and it is not at all obvious that 
they can be coherently combined. Yet they are both intuitively necessary if 
Benhabib‟s vision of a deliberative democracy is ever to be realised. The deliberative 
turn towards civil society as the practical answer to the difficulties of diversity thus 
simply shifts the epistemological problem a level higher, from the question of what 
policies to enact to the question of how we should choose the policies which should 
be enacted. Associational democracy, in short, still relies upon the political 
authorities presupposing a unitary, controversial set of social ends which is 
unsustainable alongside genuine moral pluralism. 
 
That this is the case may at first be surprising. After all, the intention of the 
individualistic form of deliberative democracy is to allow all citizens to publicise 
their differences and identities in a way not allowed by impartial liberal institutions. 
Being able to freely associate with others allows individuals just the kind of self-
expression necessary here, as well as the intrinsic benefits which come with a feeling 
of „belonging‟ to a self-defined group which, Archon Fung (2003: 518-519) argues, 
should appeal to liberals and democrats of all stripes independently of its effects. 
Pamela Paxton‟s (2002) widely lauded empirical study, furthermore, shows that „a 
vibrant associational life‟ does indeed help to „maintain‟ and strengthen democratic 
values and institutions (these terms are used throughout her article; see Paxton, 2002: 
272-273 for a summary of her results). And Fung and Erik Wright (2001) use several 
examples to show the power of citizen participation and association in both 
politicising social problems and invigorating nepotistic and faltering institutions in 
the developing world. Granting civil associations a grander place in political practice, 
in short, does seem to offer real democratic benefits. To overcome the twin dilemmas 
posed by societal heterogeny, however, an associational democracy must offer more 
than this; it must be able to both secure fundamental liberties and empower 
individuals to pursue shared substantive goals which may threaten those liberties. 
Neither the top-down nor the bottom-up approach to associations looks able (or 
willing) to combine these goals. 
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This is despite a number of formidable claims made on behalf of associations. Fung 
(2003: 518-529) sets out five apposite possible contributions (next to the intrinsic 
good of association) which associations can make to democracy. For our purposes, it 
is useful to divide these contributions according to their relevance to the equality and 
ontology dilemmas. Firstly, then, the potentials to help us learn about one another, 
both within and without our associations, and to publicise and resist injustices and 
inequities pertain generally to the equality dilemma. It is likely that when the balance 
between the substantive goods and protections a society provides and its commitment 
to procedural and negative liberties is skewed too far in either direction, the main 
mechanism of correction must be to call attention to the injustices which arise and 
mobilise social forces to enact change. Associations are a seemingly ideal vehicle for 
these efforts, because they can unite disparate individuals in order to amplify their 
often unheard voices.  
 
Similarly, the potentials of associations to represent interest groups and to enable 
direct governance are directly relevant to the need to balance the protection of 
communal agency with individual freedoms. If individuals are to be free to pursue 
private ends whilst acting within a cultural environment stable and cohesive enough 
to allow collective action, individuals must be free to institutionalise their 
relationships in order to pool resources in a reliable and predictable fashion. 
Associations thus allow individuals to act upon the common causes they follow (or 
indeed those they do not) and to promote (criticise) these causes both by example 
and through public advocacy. The fundamental mechanism underpinning each of 
these potentialities is Fung‟s fifth potential benefit, the deliberation and persuasion 
by which individuals both construct and reproduce their associational identities 
within groups and legitimate these identities outside of the group. 
 
Cohen and Joel Rogers‟s state-centred approach to associational democracy aims 
broadly to capture each of these democratic benefits. They contextualise their project 
by critiquing the extant „neoliberal‟ apprehension towards associations (Cohen and 
Rogers, 1995: 14-21). The assumption that associations inevitably lead to 
factionalism and rent-seeking is both sloppy and fails to appreciate those associations 
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which form autonomously in reaction to the „injustice of purely market-based 
resource distributions‟ (ibid. 19). Contra republicanism and even what they call 
„egalitarian pluralism‟ (ibid. 27) groups differ significantly, both in their make-up 
and their possible effects on public attitudes and democratic processes. Civil groups 
and associations „reflect structural features of the political economy in which they 
form‟, even as they act themselves as the influential structural conditions within 
which individuals act (ibid. 46). The key task for the deliberative democratic polity is 
therefore to guide and influence its civil associations towards compatibility with and 
ultimately support for „the norms of democratic governance‟ (ibid. 9; this argument 
is expanded in Cohen and Sabel, 1997, to include less formal and apolitical civil 
organisations). 
 
This top-down approach to associations is complicated from the start by the 
continuing relevance and centrality it accords to existing representative institutions. 
According to Cohen and Rogers (1995: 69-73), so that associations contribute to 
rather than detract from democratic processes, their role must itself be subject to 
representative democratic oversight. This is seemingly understandable; according to 
the Habermasian logic set out above, if associations are to contribute to just 
outcomes, they ought to be concerned with the common good, rather than private 
interests. Representative institutions and their democratically mandated 
„conventional policy tools‟ are necessary to regulate associational behaviour, both by 
rewarding generally beneficial, other-regarding activities and by providing a means 
for individuals to identify and sanction the self-service and free-riding which would 
otherwise undermine the public good (ibid. 44; Mansbridge, 1995). 
 
The superficial effect of this oversight is to make associations accountable for their 
internal openness and accountability, their accessibility to those they affect, and their 
engagement with external critics and opponents (Cohen and Rogers, 1995: 48-49). 
According to Cohen and Rogers, these conditions should make civil associations the 
site of constructive deliberative democratic action, where rival interests can 
scrutinise and challenge one another, and where individuals are empowered to 
confront the externalities of more powerful groups. The deeper effects of this 
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politicisation of civil life, however, are likely to manifest in opponents across 
associational boundaries becoming less likely to engage with one another and more 
likely to resort to central democratic institutions in order to „veto‟ and frustrate their 
opponents (Immergut, 1995). As long as people disagree about what precisely the 
common good consists of, drawing associations into the political realm is as likely to 
encourage individuals to make use of the new destructive political tools at their 
disposal as it is to encourage co-operation. 
 
This is not to denigrate the Madisonian strengths of this proposal. By subjecting their 
disparate positions to wide and critical scrutiny, democratic deliberations would 
force associations to change and adapt rather than simply amalgamate and represent 
entrenched interests (Mansbridge, 1995: 140). Moreover, as Cohen and Charles 
Sabel (1997) argue, formalising the deliberations within and between civil 
associations would legitimise their role in the political and democratic process. 
Regulated associations would be less like self-interested lobby groups, which arouse 
suspicion and resentment, and more like genuine co-operatives seeking only to 
publicise otherwise invisible information and viewpoints. They could be „matched‟ 
to specific policy problems, in order to increase and improve the flow of information 
towards the political centre, and to deliver services and implement policies where 
appropriate. In this way the top-down approach to associational democracy therefore 
fulfils the deliberative aim of publicising apparent injustices and preventing the 
artificial divisions between citizens from creating and enforcing inequalities at any 
level. It does this, however, by disallowing any real or meaningful group solidarity or 
cohesion. 
 
The rigidity that Cohen and Rogers‟s system would impose on associational life 
seems ultimately self-defeating. As Young (1995) contends, they see groups as too 
directly oriented towards political advocacy and policy formation. Conceiving of 
groups as rationally constituted in this way, and indeed directing their internal 
structures so that they approximate this form is likely to marginalise what Young 
(ibid. 210) calls the „natural‟, non-rational affinities which exist in society between 
those who share a culture or way of life. In a democratic environment where 
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associational discourses must be openly and institutionally legitimated and cloaked 
in politically correct terms, there can be little space for the nascent and unpolished 
conversations through which individuals can become aware of underlying injustices 
in society. As a result, the ability of individuals to call attention to general patterns of 
exclusion embodied in everyday life is likely to suffer. As Andrew Levine (1995) 
similarly argues, the problem with drawing groups into neo-corporatist arrangements 
is that it blunts their ability to emancipate themselves. They become a part of the 
very structural system they need to reject. Where this has happened in recent British 
political practice (albeit in a far less consciously deliberative fashion), and pressure 
groups have become „too close‟ to government, their inevitable compromises have 
undermined their radical social appeal (T. Wright, 2000: 138-141).  
 
Paul Hirst (1995) rejects as implausibly hopeful the vision of the state underpinning 
Cohen and Rogers‟s neo-corporatism. It is too much to ask, he argues, for states to be 
able to „craft‟ civil associations coherently or without distorting and undermining 
their formative purpose or goals. Associations regulated from above would in fact be 
subject to fleeting, inconsistent political attention and would be hampered by 
bureaucratic inefficiency and failures of implementation. Where associations do 
support democratic processes, Hirst contends, this is likely to be the result of their 
members‟ aims and resources rather than their design. As such, the state in an 
associational democracy should at most facilitate the voluntary formation and 
running of associations and civil institutions (Hirst, 1994: 200-202). Their conduct 
should be left to their members and the free choices of the citizenry. This means, on 
the one hand, that individuals should have a strong right of exit. On the other, it 
requires the availability of public funds, which should be assigned to associations 
according how many members they have or how many people solicit their assistance. 
Indeed, where an association serves a particular community or provides a public 
service, it should be free to effectively compete for custom (and the attendant public 
funds) (Hirst, 1994: 128-135; see also Schmitter, 1995 for an analogous „voucher‟ 
system for funding associations). But it must be free to do this on its own terms. 
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This framework is ostensibly more suitable to a diverse and pluralistic society for 
three reasons. It firstly requires a far thinner consensus around political norms than 
the top-down approach. In a Rawlsian fashion, Hirst (2002: 418-419) argues that 
there is a general, far-reaching consensus around the basic tenets of pluralism, 
democracy and the „primacy‟ of markets which underpin the bottom-up vision of 
associational democracy. Secondly, Hirst (1994: ch. 3) gives much attention to ethnic 
and moral communities in his system. While recognising the importance of such 
communities to their members, he contends that they should nevertheless be 
responsive to social needs and choices. Associational democractism thus offers both 
the public support for cultural groups and their constituents whilst providing 
alternatives to those with itchy feet. Both group life and individual choice would, in 
consequence, have formal legitimacy. Thirdly, then, Hirst‟s system promises to 
provide the social capital necessary for deliberative gains. For Hirst (2002: 414-417) 
the trust and solidarity captured by social capital relies upon individuals having 
security and being able to make stable expectations. Decentralising the mechanisms 
of governance provides this security by mitigating political caprice (ibid. 419). 
Hirst‟s system would therefore provide the generalised trust and openness to engage 
necessary for deliberations over public issues by removing the zero-sum conflicts 
over universal rules.  
 
While the bottom-up vision of associations offers a convincing account of how direct 
governance can chart a route between the Scylla of group cohesion and the 
Charybdis of individual freedoms, it is less obvious what agency it gives to those 
who seek to root out wider injustices and inequalities. Allowing groups agency and 
autonomy logically compromises strict oversight of the deliberative dynamics of 
group life (Bader, 2001: 190-191). This is not necessarily a point about finding a 
balance between the norm of deliberative justification and group agency, as Veit 
Bader implies, but rather that the very norms which regulate Habermasian discursive 
interactions need not always and everywhere apply when groups are left to their own 
devices. While civil groups may well rely heavily on discursive means both for 
internal purposes and to locate themselves within the associational milieu, these 
means may not always embody the norms of equality and reciprocity. It is just as 
likely that they will be based upon hierarchical, exclusive or elitist norms which 
139 
 
circumscribe discursive topics for the sake of wider goals. As Nancy Rosenblum 
(1998) argues, such exclusive or illiberal discursive groups play an important part in 
democratic societies, so they cannot be written off. They give people a space and the 
confidence to voice their grievances, feel a sense of belonging, and give dangerous 
beliefs a public airing. Yet they do little to strengthen norms of equality or to bring 
people together, and they may very well promulgate explicitly inegalitarian norms 
and behaviours. 
 
When these criticisms are considered in the context of social diversity, they become 
especially troubling. Hirst‟s argument relies upon Hirschman‟s (1970) logic that, 
when combined with „voice‟, „exit‟ provides an irresistible spur to organisational 
change. The trouble with groups and associations which do not seek to consistently 
enforce norms of equality and autonomy is that they may very well undermine the 
ability of individuals to leave in search of betterment. Religious schools, for 
example, pose a particular worry, because they risk creating an „ethnic underclass‟ 
by neglecting the skills necessary to build associations or prosper in an associational 
setting (Bader, 2001: 192-198). Elsewhere, Hirst (1993: 63, quoted in Wenman, 
2007: 814) perhaps shows why he never considered this as a problem, when he 
argues that pluralism must be limited if „society as a whole is not to be torn apart by 
the consequences of certain beliefs‟. Hirst‟s solution is thus for the state to guide 
associations towards common public goals, such as the efficiency and economic 
prosperity which all groups require to pursue their particular ends (see, for instance, 
Hirst, 1994: ch. 4).  
 
This attempt at unification, however, is completely unwarranted. Of course, 
imposing a common set of ends upon different associations may indeed mitigate their 
exclusionary tendencies. Where schools have to follow a national curriculum, for 
instance, it is likely that they will all produce citizens with at least a basic grasp of 
social norms and duties. Relying on the centre to set out these norms and duties a 
priori, however, would be to „presuppos[e] a unified social purpose‟ (Wenman, 
2007: 810-812). This would undermine our general plurality of ends in favour of the 
majority culture, and it could possibly inflame social, ethnic and religious relations. 
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More to the point, it would run counter to the intended decentralisation of Hirst‟s 
project. Nevertheless, given the deliberative aims of associational democratism, it 
seems irresistible. Hirst‟s bottom-up system, then, is as reliant as Cohen and 
Rogers‟s top-down alternative on an implicit set of common ends regulating society. 
As such, it is just as unsuitable for general, systemic democratic deliberations. 
 
The epistemic problems with decentralised deliberation 
 
The general problem facing individualistically minded deliberative democrats is that 
a deliberative society requires the very social capital it seeks to build in order to 
function in the first place. In the absence of this capital, both the generalised mutual 
obligation to engage and compromise and the social avenues through which such 
engagements can take place are too weak. In diverse societies especially, it is all too 
easy for groups who diverge over central moral and ethical issues to self-segregate 
rather than invest the time and effort in potentially costly concessions to opponents. 
 
As Mark Wenman (2007: 813) contends, the problem posed by „agonistic‟ pluralism 
is that when individuals and groups do diverge over basic principles of political co-
operation, such as the ends such co-operation is supposed to further, any political 
settlement must be found at a higher level. It was this reasoning, Wenman argues, 
which led Carl Schmitt to advocate a strong form of nationalism in order to unite the 
citizenry and undermine more parochial connections. Perhaps unwittingly, this is the 
route Habermasian deliberative democrats also seek to travel down in order to 
institutionalise their deliberative politics. For obvious reasons, they are unwilling to 
embrace Schmitt‟s logic and declare war on pluralism. Nevertheless, by glossing 
over radical divergences, they follow his approach by using the state as a kind of 
intellectual broom-cupboard, where the considerable burden of organising and 
constructing a harmonic society can be hidden away. 
 
Choosing between a top-down and bottom-up approach to associations is thus part of 
a far wider problem for the deliberative state. To succeed it does of course need to 
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find a way of combining the benefits of self-definition and self-governance with the 
top-down guidance necessary to ensure that diverse groups interact with one another. 
Even if they could be coherently combined, however, central democratic institutions 
must still forge and sustain a sense of unity around its policy programme, in order to 
maintain the public commitment to the deliberative system. While the deliberative 
process might be important, participants will lose confidence unless they can discern 
tangible results. Thus, the effects of public deliberations would have to be seen to be 
fair, even if society itself remains unfair. But in order to formulate inclusive but 
fundamentally coherent public policies, the state would have to be able to „read‟ the 
tenor of public conversations and interactions, in order to aggregate and convert the 
multifaceted and dynamic discursive contributions thrown up by civil society into a 
common denominational language. Neither the types of datum offered by mass 
deliberations nor the ability of the state to understand these data seem even remotely 
suitable for this task. 
 
The first obstacle facing the institutions governing a deliberative society is the raw 
form in which data would arise from the various iterative interactions. This data 
would not originate as a set of clear or easily comprehensible policy prescriptions but 
would instead comprise in the first instance a complex mix of opinions, reactions, 
beliefs, speculations and rebuttals. Undoubtedly, in some cases it would clearly 
indicate a preference for a specific policy or substantive goal, such as when 
individuals clash explicitly over existing policies or their externalities. But since a 
large proportion of the interactions occurring between citizens and groups would 
effectively be individuals merely learning about and considering one another, it 
follows that their results would mostly manifest simply in changed opinions or a new 
openness (or indeed revulsion) towards different ideas. Such variegated epistemic 
developments are not easily deciphered into the language of policy. Traditional 
representative democracies, of course, circumvent these problems by voting, and this 
is often mooted as the final mechanism by which deliberative decisions are made 
(see, for instance, Cohen, 1989: 25, Knight and Johnson, 1994: 286 and Habermas, 
1996a: 178-179). Yet it is hard to see how voting would do anything other than 
obscure the outcomes of deliberations, because it relies upon an appeal to individual 
preferences rather than reason (Richardson, 1997: 352-357). The deliberative state 
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would thus be stuck with an unwieldy mass of information offering multiple 
interpretations and policy implications. 
 
The pattern of beliefs that arises from generalised deliberations, moreover, cannot be 
simply accepted as the result of free deliberation and thorough consideration. In any 
associational system, the substantial outcomes arising from communication and 
learning would be to all intents and purposes random. Even a strict set of guidelines 
governing discourse would not be able to regulate the precise aspects of deliberations 
seen as significant by participants. For example, in a confrontation between ethnic 
groups (qua opposed interests), individuals may look variously towards the 
plausibility and persuasiveness of the opposing group‟s arguments, their behaviour 
and openness to compromise or even their image and credibility. Deliberative 
participants, furthermore, might either end up simply following the crowd (see 
Tindale et al., 2001, for evidence of this effect), or else they might automatically 
polarise as they simply become more aware of the gulf of the differences between 
them (Sunstein, 2002). Since the executive would be unable to discount any of these 
possibilities, it would be unable to take deliberative outcomes at face value. It would 
instead have to weight contributions according to their sincerity, a task that would 
itself require the ability to judge between how considered and subjectively important 
viewpoints are. 
 
Supposing this information can be weighted and policy prescriptions derived, policy 
planners would face a further problem when they come to aggregate this information, 
because it would almost certainly be internally inconsistent and incompatible. This is 
because the associational setting of a deliberative civil society would effectively seek 
to remove individuals from the resource constraints their decisions ultimately face, 
locating them instead within an environment governed by the dictates of „fairness‟. 
This would diminish rather than enhance the inter-associational capacity for 
communication, because it would deprive group members of prices, the only 
universal, impersonal and consistent measure of value we have available to us. As a 
result, individual actors would inevitably act upon differing, incompatible and in 
most cases incorrect suppositions about the consequences of their actions. Because 
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they would not face painful trade-offs themselves, they would demand goods and 
outcomes which, in the aggregate, would turn out to be simply unreasonable and 
unaffordable. 
 
It will be recalled that it is precisely because of this kind of ignorance that classical 
liberalism advocates market freedoms. Kirzner (1987: 13) suggests that the Austrian 
free market argument is simply a realistic form of welfare economics, because it 
demonstrates that the best way we can eliminate those errors which lead to 
suboptimal outcomes – such as our incompatible wants – is to empower the market‟s 
capacity for discovery. Yet this can only happen if localised individuals are forced to 
divulge the marginal value they place on different courses of action, so that profit-
driven actors at the national level can step in whenever those actions can be 
performed more cheaply or in a manner more compatible with the desires and actions 
of others (ibid. 15). Without prices, these entrepreneurs simply cannot divulge this 
knowledge, so in a „fair‟ deliberative system such as that discussed above, there 
would be no way of moving effectively or fairly beyond our myriad of localised and 
incompatible demands. State actors would thus not simply be forced to select 
arbitrary ends for society, but like the hypothetical planners at the forefront of the 
economic debates of the 1930s and 40s, they would be bereft of any mechanism by 
which to direct society towards their desired ends at all. 
 
That this would occur in an associational setting is perhaps not obvious. Information 
could well flow from the top-down about real-world public fiscal constraints, and 
associations could be asked or required to budget their activities and demands. A 
bottom-up system, moreover, could be organised to capture the benefits of markets, 
so that individual choice could automatically allocate public funds, as in Hirst‟s 
system, or so that individuals themselves could be given control of how to allocate 
those funds as in Philippe Schmitter‟s (1995: 180) „voucher‟ system. Yet neither of 
these systems carry the necessary data to the decision-making citizenry. As shown in 
chapter three, prices work only when they are the result of the interplay of producers 
interacting with individuals subject to their own resource scarcities. It is because 
individuals themselves have to choose how to allocate scarce resources that in a free 
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society they are forced to divulge valuable information – by no means all of it market 
related – which goes on to inform the decisions of others. 
 
Confronting individuals and associations with a complex set of data on the public 
finances therefore does nothing to mobilise this information; it is likely to simply 
increase demands on the state to swell its coffers. Similarly, when choosers do not 
pay, but instead bring funds with them, the scarcity which provokes individuals to 
learn what they will and will not trade-off at the margin is not operative. A voucher-
based system does indeed alter the distribution of public funds in a welfare system 
and this would likely provide the incentives for improvement and greater equity (Le 
Grand, 2006). Yet, under associo-democratic conditions, such a system cannot 
replicate the equalisation of supply and demand. Since the size and, crucially, the 
purpose of the voucher are centrally or democratically decided, it does not and 
cannot reflect individual judgements about comparative value, so individual choices 
cannot act so as to require others to effectively adjust their behaviour to meet those 
demands. Further, since democratically governed associations cannot set prices, 
make profits or go bankrupt, the scant information provided by individual choices 
can neither transmit through society nor mediate the incompatibilities of associo-
deliberative demands on the state. A voucher system can at most guarantee full 
access to a service. It cannot inform that service of how to change to fit in with wider 
social needs. 
 
The upshot of these problems is that fitting society‟s numerous and incompatible 
demands into a single, mutually satisfactory policy framework would be an 
implausibly difficult task. It is perhaps worth emphasising that it would need to be a 
unitary framework. Providing contradictory and competing policies would provide 
opportunities for rent-seeking amongst groups each pursuant of resources for their 
own ends. Consequently, the central state would have to make an essentially 
arbitrary choice between competing moral frameworks in order to interpret its 
deliberative data. It could run the risk of inflaming and marginalising anti-liberals, 
for instance, by choosing a Rawlsian political compromise. It could choose 
egalitarianism, and pursue Fraser‟s aims of ultimately guiding everyone towards a set 
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of practices which realise material equality. Or it could choose to pursue 
utilitarianism, and formulate policies according to what deliberations suggest would 
maximise overall well-being. In the final analysis, then, it would matter little how 
efficacious the deliberative democratic process is, because the final outcome of the 
deliberative process would inevitably reflect the state‟s interests, rather than 
society‟s. 
 
The continuing resonance of civil society 
 
Deliberative democrats in the style of Benhabib and Habermas offer a valuable 
observation when they show that the universal inclusion of all interests, minorities 
and groups of disparate individuals in determining the future of society relies on the 
contours of civil society. They also present a strong case when they suggest that 
these contours rely heavily on the commitment of the state to upholding a stable and 
open public sphere independent of government interference. Their principal error is 
to idealise the relations within this sphere, assuming on the one hand that a vibrant 
civil society is one that in a quasi-republican fashion parallels the sphere of 
government and politics, and on the other that this vibrancy is the principal measure 
of society‟s well-being. These assumptions valorise explicitly political behaviour 
whilst simultaneously undermining the legitimacy and scale of achievement possible 
through other types of co-operation. As we have seen in this chapter, if society must 
manifest deliberative iterations in order to be seen as fair and legitimate, then it is 
unclear how the public sphere can be „independent‟ from the state in any real sense. 
Since the state is required to play such a large role in guiding and mediating civil 
relations, a deliberative civil society is nothing more than an extension of the state 
itself. It is ultimately a realm of compulsion, rather than freedom. 
 
Needless to say, civil society need not be construed or constructed in this way. The 
state must of course play a role in regulating civil society, but it need not be a 
tyrannical role. John Locke, for instance, saw the role of politics and the state as 
simply providing an orderly alternative to the chaotic state of nature within which 
individuals would be fully entitled to make conflicting and mutually incompatible 
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though sincere judgements about one another‟s actions (Dunn, 2001). To provide a 
legitimate improvement to that environment, he asserted, the state must offer the 
security and opportunity „to resolve in a relatively impartial manner the endless 
conflict between their irretrievably partial personal judgements‟ (ibid. 57). 
 
With the beginnings of capitalism, this argument was expanded by the Scottish 
tradition beginning with Thomas Reid and continuing with Smith and David Hume. 
On the Scottish Enlightenment argument, capitalism could result only in an ever-
growing and ever-diversifying set of needs and desires. A civil and ordered but 
otherwise free society was essential, it was argued, to allow individuals to precisely 
co-ordinate these needs and desires (Oz-Salzberger, 2001: 63-64). As Smith (1984) 
in particular shows, the interdependencies created by this co-ordination would 
stimulate the growth of an inter-subjective public morality, where individuals act 
always with an eye to the possible reactions of others. Political governance could 
therefore hope only to aid this process by providing stability. It could not seek to 
construct the public morality itself. 
 
What follows from this train of thought is that the legitimacy of civil society does not 
rest upon the state. The legitimacy of the state is instead determined by the 
conditions in civil society. When these are conditions of diversity, the legitimacy of 
the state must be wholly separated from the question of the „justice‟ of its institutions 
or outcomes (Kukathas, 2003: 5-6). For in a diverse society, the very question of 
justice itself is contentious. Accordingly, if the state is to provide that legitimate 
alternative to the war of all against all advocated by Locke and his followers, then it 
cannot seek to impose any values, norms or participative institutions upon its 
population. The state, on this argument, would concern itself only with securing 
public order.
20
 It would not seek to fulfil any explicit norms of impartiality (cf. 
                                                          
20
 On the classical argument, „order‟ includes the provision of public goods, policing and justice, and 
possibly education too (see Hayek, 1960, pt. 1, for a thorough explanation of the public conditions 
which must be provided for the publicly beneficial mechanisms of civil society to work). These 
requirements, especially that concerning education, are likely to raise eyebrows amongst democrats. 
Do these requirements themselves not require democratic oversight, and thus state meddling in the 
free society? According to Smith (1981, bk. 5), this does not have to be the case. Whilst the state must 
fund these services, they need not be publicly provided. Familiar arguments about education and 
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Barry) or fairness (cf. Kymlicka), and neither would it seek to spread the burden of 
order fairly across groups. It would seek instead only to institutionalise tolerance and 
the freedoms of conscience and association by keeping the overall tenor of public 
society independent of the power of any individual, interest or group. 
 
Crucially, leaving civil society to develop in this undirected fashion would probably 
realise the very benefits Habermasian deliberative democrats seek. A society which 
upholds a truly free civil society embodies the very process of public reasoning they 
so admire (see Kukathas, 2003: ch. 4). When people disagree about the good life they 
have no objective standards of truth to which they can appeal. They can only try to 
persuade others of the value of their positions in a free and open process of 
justification. Accordingly, moral reasoning and ethical judgements are accepted as 
meaningful only when they are universally seen as correct with respect to their 
strongest alternatives. On the one hand, this leads Kukathas (2003: 85-86) to argue 
that individuals must be free to hold and propagate their own positions for the simple 
reason that until we have a consensus, we have no justification for doing anything 
else. But on the other, it suggests that an undemocratic public sphere would not 
realise the factionalism and marginalisation so feared by democrats such as Cohen 
and Benhabib. Since force would not be open to the mutually interdependent citizens 
in the public sphere, individuals would have to reason with one another where 
externalities exist and individual goods overlap or conflict. This reasoning process 
would require mutual adjustment, and would help to construct the very social capital 
sought by those who reject liberalism (Meadowcroft and Pennington, 2007). If only 
for this reason, then, democrats and associationalists should take notice of the merits 
of traditional liberalism. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
health markets allow individual choice while still leaving a space for the provision of public funds. To 
be sure, the amounts taxed and spent on different services require some form of regulation, but this 
need not be by centralised democratic institutions. A strong constitution and overlapping centres of 
political power could be just as effective. 
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Conclusion 
 
This argument is of course explored more fully and in the context of the twin 
dilemmas faced by diverse societies in chapter eight. The point here has been simply 
to show the myopia of modern deliberative arguments. Certainly, in following the 
Hegelian tradition of viewing civil society and its associations as the „source‟ of 
institutional vitality in the state, which can be traced through Kant to Hume and 
Locke (Kaviraj, 2001: 23-24), they offer a plausible argument about the kinds of 
relations which ought to obtain within civil society in order to ensure a benevolent 
state. Because they ultimately seek to use the state to regulate these relations, 
however, they catch themselves in a rather circular argument. This chapter has 
shown that this argument breaks down as soon as a society is posited which is either 
governed by a less than omniscient elite, or which lacks the required autonomous 
deliberative interaction in civil society. They fall, in other words, into a familiar 
problem with the republican vision, which has to posit individuals as naturally 
sociable and other-regarding before it can work. As liberals have consistently sought 
to show, however, individuals cannot be counted upon to exhibit either of these 
traits. Basing a whole system of social and political organisation on their 
presumption would, therefore, appear to be a misguided and ultimately dangerous 
project. 
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6. Procedural Communitarianism and the Philosopher’s 
Stone 
 
Procedural communitarianism distances itself from the conception of deliberation as 
an end in itself by conceiving it instead as a tool which can be used to discover what 
is substantially valuable. As such, procedural communitarians concentrate on 
improving the epistemic quality rather than the sheer quantity of political 
deliberations. On their argument, a deliberative democracy can be realised by simply 
improving existing representative political institutions. In contrast to substantive 
individualists, procedural communitarians present a seemingly workable deliberative 
argument, which builds upon the liberal democratic norm that the quality of a 
decision depends upon its legitimacy. Where a position commands legitimate 
support, it must, in some sense, be right. Yet this standard is problematic; a decision 
can only be legitimate when everyone affected has in some sense consented to it. 
Rather short-sightedly, procedural communitarians treat this problem mainly as one 
of inclusivity. But the problem of legitimacy goes much deeper. The tallest obstacle 
to the deliberative ideal is the inexorable influence of dissipated and hidden 
structures of power. Accordingly, the chapter finishes by arguing that the only way 
the promise of deliberative reasoning can be kept in practice is to either scale down 
our epistemic requirements for success, or else to simply abandon the deliberative 
project altogether in favour of a more liberal route to legitimate outcomes. 
 
A realistic deliberative democracy 
 
In contrast with substantive individualism, the main characteristic of procedural 
communitarianism is its unwillingness to treat deliberation as an end in and of itself. 
In doing so, it avoids the tricky task of justifying why the outcomes of deliberations 
should be treated as sacrosanct simply by virtue of being deliberative. For, as David 
Estlund (1997: 190-194) shows, if deliberation is favoured merely because it is fair, 
there is no reason why its advocates should not go further and support decision-
making according to the even fairer flip of a coin. If, on the other hand, deliberation 
is desirable because it embodies and institutionalises the norms of solidarity, 
empathy and cohesion, then it is unclear why deliberative theorists do not fully 
follow Schmitt‟s example and openly advocate statist nationalism. Since neither of 
these alternatives would appeal to deliberative democrats, it follows that they must 
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move beyond the instinctive valorisation of deliberation to provide a „procedure-
independent‟ justification, which demonstrates why deliberative institutions lead to 
better outcomes than their alternatives (ibid. 180). 
 
It is this appeal to independent norms which provides procedural communitarianism 
with its seemingly contradictory name. The form of deliberative democracy 
advocated by Gutmann and Thompson and explored in chapter two, for instance, 
works from a similar critique of „procedure-oriented‟ democratic theories to Estlund 
(see also GT, 2003). Such theories, they argue, must assume a set of overarching, 
free-floating norms by which to judge political practice and democratic outcomes. As 
Gutmann and Thompson see it, however, the very point of democratic theory is to 
show that the requirements of justice can only be discovered and realised 
democratically. Because we cannot know in advance either the precise content of 
these requirements or how to achieve them, we must rely upon generalised 
democratic deliberations, guided by the procedural norm of reciprocity, to discover 
those public ends which because required by justice apply and ought to be realised 
across the community (ibid. 33-37).  
 
By locating their theory within the context of the twin problems of legitimacy and 
knowledge, Gutmann and Thompson point to what is perhaps both deliberative 
democracy‟s greatest strength and its greatest weakness: its circumvention of the 
metaphysical problem of „truth‟ by appealing to common agreement. As the second 
section of this chapter shows, this epistemic approach provides the best possible 
defence of the deliberative ideal. While it is undeniably the case that there are no 
definite political or moral „truths‟ to which we can point to guide us, we can still act 
as if something is true if we all agree with it. Deliberation is thus valuable because, 
with no objective facts about morality or ethics, it allows humans to come as close as 
possible to the discovery of such truths by seeking legitimate agreement through the 
free interplay of human reasoning. The fatal problem for deliberative democrats, 
however, is that it is by no means clear that such interaction needs to be democratic 
in order to fulfil this promise. Indeed, as it is subsequently shown, there are reasons 
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for thinking that the institutions of democracy are likely to hinder rather than 
enhance deliberative reasoning. 
 
The key question for deliberative democrats concerns how the benefits of free and 
effective reasoning could be realised in practice. The fullest answer to this question 
is provided by the various suggestions for and studies of „deliberative polling‟ and 
„Deliberation Day‟, provided largely by James Fishkin. While the question of 
institutions is largely neglected by other deliberative theorists, Fishkin‟s work is 
significant because it offers a realistic analysis of what it would take to involve the 
citizenry of a large liberal democracy in a coherent national conversation. 
Accordingly, the third section explores the strengths and weaknesses of Fishkin‟s 
arguments. On the one hand, these arguments are instructive, illustrating precisely 
what is necessary to prioritise deliberative learning so that it can inform political 
practice. On the other hand, however, they demonstrate that this achievement comes 
only at the cost of inclusivity. If deliberations are to be detailed enough to matter, 
then the number of participants must be limited. But, crucially, such limited 
decisions cannot attain legitimacy. As such, the deliberative ideal entails trading the 
conditions for meaningful interaction for ever grander yet ever more meaningless 
discussions. 
 
Further institutional innovation, of course, could well solve this problem, and as 
Fishkin (with Ackerman, 2003: 30) suggests, his arguments are intended as much to 
pose the question of realism than to answer it. It is significant, therefore, that 
Fishkin‟s work uncovers another, less obvious problem, which arises from relying on 
the institutions of the state. Regardless of how democratic, legitimate and effective 
the policy-making process may be, if the policy is altered without democratic consent 
before it becomes a reality, then its effects will be neither right nor legitimate. The 
fourth section shows that the problem here arises from the discretionary and largely 
un-manageable power of the bureaucracy. And as Henry Richardson convincingly 
argues, the only solution to this problem from a deliberative point of view is to bring 
the bureaucracy into the deliberative process, in order to democratise the bargains 
and trade-offs which ultimately shape policies. This moves us away from Fishkin‟s 
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detailed institutional blueprints, to be sure. But it provides the most advanced 
explanation of how the effects of deliberative reasoning can be spread throughout the 
political system. 
 
Nevertheless, it is shown that Richardson is too sanguine about the epistemic 
potential of his system. Given the complexity and incompatibility of our desired 
ends, a genuinely thorough consideration of the various substantive decisions which 
must underlie any government action would likely gridlock the political system. In 
practical terms, the most we could expect from deliberative democracy would be its 
circumscription of the autonomy of political elites. Curiously, this is precisely the 
role reserved for democratic institutions by classical liberalism. Accordingly, the 
final section returns to these arguments. If it is indeed important that we pursue 
legitimate courses of action, then the fact that we cannot discover these through 
democratic discussions means that we need to rely instead on institutions which 
allow us to use our practical reason. As it is concluded, the patterns of behaviour that 
arise out of free choices provide us with the best data we could possibly have on how 
to live our lives, so it is to these choices we should turn in order to mobilise the 
epistemic benefits of human reasoning. 
 
Legitimacy as truth 
 
It is instructive to view the instrumental claims for deliberative democracy in the 
context of what Levine (2002: 11-12) sees as the post-Hobbesian aims of modern 
political philosophy. Hobbes‟s most important legacy, Levine argues, was to re-cast 
politics and the state as the antidote to human failings, rather than the epitome of 
human society. On Hobbes‟s pessimistic view of human nature, an omnipotent 
sovereign is necessary to facilitate peace. As such, by its very nature the state 
appears to be legitimate because it is fundamentally intertwined with the public good 
(ibid. 53-54). Yet this account leaves the question of what this good actually is open, 
and Hobbes‟s tendency to relegate all divisive normative judgements to the sovereign 
neglected the possibility that the sovereign‟s good might be a public bad (Edwards, 
2002: 54-55).  
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As such, Rousseau took up the task of legitimising the active state, by equating the 
common good with public sovereignty (Levine, 2002: ch. 2). The state acts 
legitimately, Rousseau asserted, in so far as it acts upon the will of the people, and 
the individual acts legitimately in so far as she works with others to uncover and 
realise this will. Rousseau thus demonstrated that legitimacy is contingent on the 
democratic inclusivity and efficacy of the political process; it is not intrinsic. 
Nevertheless, and despite this assertion, it is difficult to see any real difference 
between Rousseau and Hobbes. When there is but one common good, and when that 
good results from the proper process, then anyone who ends up disagreeing must be 
wrong. Such individuals must submit to the sovereign, defying Rousseau‟s own 
imperative that the individual must not be subjugated to any other, and undermining 
the very aspect of democracy that gives it legitimacy (Estlund, 1997: 184-185). 
Rousseau‟s arguments were therefore rejected by philosophers as different as 
Constant, Burke and Hume, who turned instead to various forms of representative 
democracy to solve the problem of legitimacy. To be sure, their theories continued to 
view the demos, however narrowly construed, as sovereign. But their movement 
towards majoritarian, constitutional liberalism was more a result of their suspicion of 
this sovereign than their desire to emancipate it.  
 
For Dryzek (2000: 27), this struggle with Hobbes‟s long shadow has damaged the 
democratic ideal by interlinking it with the aims and fortunes of liberalism. In 
particular, its protracted emphasis on rights and liberties has served only to attenuate 
the links between theory and reality. This is clear as much in the work of liberalism‟s 
erstwhile critics such as Habermas, who have lost touch with the limits of real-world 
democratic practice, as it is in that of its post-Rawlsian defenders, who neglect all 
sites and avenues of political power other than the state (ibid. ch. 1). And this is to 
say nothing to the numerous problems which plague majoritarian liberal 
democratism. As Dryzek shows, social choice theory and the inability of voting to 
tackle issues of cultural inequality undermine any case that can be made for the kinds 
of liberal democracy that saw out the 20
th
 century in the west. Liberal democratism, 
in short, has taken us no further towards the goal of democratic legitimacy than 
Rousseau did. 
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The epistemic, „deliberative turn‟ (as termed by Goodin and Dryzek, 2006: 219) 
seeks to address this theoretical stagnation by abandoning the central Hobbesian 
assumption driving liberal thought. For procedural communitarians, politics is not a 
solution for the problems of human nature and conduct but is rather a means to the 
ends of co-operation and community. In a quasi-Hobbesian fashion, epistemic 
deliberative democrats therefore leave the exact nature of these ends undetermined. 
But unlike Hobbes‟s pessimistic view that whatever is in an orderly society is good, 
they look optimistically to the demos itself to realise its true potential. It is in this 
vein, for instance, that Fishkin (1992) critiques the logically complete „systematic‟ 
theories of justice which we have seen proffered by theorists such as Rawls and 
Dworkin. Such theories, he argues, cannot legitimately impose their essentially 
arbitrary political and moral obligations because they make no appeal to actual 
democratic discussions (ibid. 5-19). In sharp contrast, the messy and at times 
incoherent set of political obligations knowingly, freely, and willingly chosen in a 
rational process of „self-reflective‟ collective deliberation are legitimate precisely 
because they are based upon our conscious reasoning (see ibid. 129-144). 
  
A deliberative democracy would thus be immune to the voting paradoxes and 
arbitrary outcomes which afflict modern democracies. Since it expects individuals to 
devote time to the consideration and discussion of their decisions, rather than simply 
express raw snapshots of their subjective „consumer‟ preferences, a deliberative 
democracy would likely uncover and utilise information which would otherwise stay 
hidden (Elster, 1997). As David Miller (2003: 191-193) demonstrates, this allows 
deliberation to effectively solve the problems presented by social choice theorists. 
When individuals collectively display intransitive preferences, they are likely to 
disagree not only over the choice at hand, but also over the best way of thinking 
about that choice. Such conflicts of secondary-order interests will often be the result 
of erroneous beliefs, in which cases collective discussions would be likely to 
mobilise more accurate information. Moreover, even in the case of genuine 
differences, moving the debate to higher levels would render it more manageable by 
restricting the „domains‟ across which disagreements occur (Dryzek, 2000: 42-47). 
In such manageable discussions, individual positions would be less likely to be 
intransitive and more amenable to compromise (ibid). And compromises would not 
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be unlikely; extending the debate would help to elucidate precisely how an 
agreement might be reached, given what is at stake and the type of decision that 
would need to be made (Miller, 2003: 193-196). 
 
In any case, a transformative debate is likely to have less at stake than a competition 
between preferences. In contrast to the „win or lose‟ dynamic of the latter, 
democratic deliberations promise to offer inclusive and mutually beneficial 
outcomes. Cohen (1996: 102) exemplifies this viewpoint when he contends that 
deliberation brings people together as a community: 
 
All who are governed by collective decisions–who are expected to govern 
their own conduct by those decisions–must find the bases of those decisions 
acceptable. And in this assurance of political autonomy, deliberative 
democracy achieves one important element of the ideal of community. 
 
For Cohen, this „element‟ is the „equal membership of all‟ (ibid.). When the 
decision-making process is universally inclusive, the participants to a discussion will 
be those who regard the issue as important. The key element of the deliberative 
system is thus the equal standing between individuals, which is guaranteed by the 
liberty of expression and the requirement that decisions are made collectively (ibid. 
103-104). Under such requirements, individuals would have to give reasons that 
others regard as reasonable in order to be taken seriously. They would have to 
„launder‟ the raw self-interest out of their reasons in order to couch them in terms 
which can persuade others (Goodin, 1986). As such, and regardless of participant 
motivations, deliberative discussions would be directed towards communal ends, 
since no one would be able to achieve overall control. Of course, this is not to say 
that participants could not use rhetorical flourishes or the other subjective forms of 
expression emphasised by Young (2000: ch. 2) as essential for democratic inclusion. 
Indeed, as Dryzek (2000: 70-71) contends, such modes of reasoning can help guard 
against the coercive use of argument. But, similarly, they will also be subject to and 
controlled by argumentation themselves. Where they do not convince others on their 
own terms, these types of reasoning would be rightly inconsequential. 
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The outcomes of such a public reasoning process would therefore have the 
legitimacy which modern democratic decisions lack. Since everyone is able to „have 
their say‟, and/or object to those reasons which do not show the requisite respect for 
what they see as the common good, deliberative outcomes would embody the 
fairness, openness and inclusivity required to legitimately distribute political 
obligations (Cohen, 1989). Yet these outcomes would not be legitimate simply 
because fair, open and inclusive. Instead, they would be legitimate because they 
would, effectively, be „right‟ and based upon „truths‟. This is not, as Cohen (2009: 
23-28) asserts, to assume a controversial or metaphysical position on truth. Instead it 
is to embrace a „political‟ conception of truth, which recognises both that people hold 
claims they see as important because they are true, and that it is important that these 
claims are debated with the background assumption that it is their truth or untruth 
that is being assessed. Indeed, it is precisely this assumption which leads individuals 
to take deliberation seriously, and it is because deliberation is taken seriously that it 
should be used as an accurate gauge of the common will (Cohen, 1986: 34).  
 
To put this somewhat differently, where we can be confident that the deliberative 
process approximates that which would be ideally necessary to discover truth, its 
real-life operation would enable us to approximate truth. Thus, so long as 
participants are truly confident in the fairness and openness of the deliberative 
process, they would be confident in its efficacy too. They would, in other words, be 
prepared to rationally revise their views according to the Bayesian decision rule that 
the probability of p increases with the number of people who believe p. In the face of 
majority support for p, then, those deliberative participants who initially believed not 
p would nevertheless accept p as true and legitimate (Goodin, 2003: ch. 5), even if 
they reserve some doubt in their minds that not p might still be the case (Estlund, 
1997: 187). 
 
This epistemic argument for deliberative democracy usefully illustrates precisely 
what deliberations would need to do to overcome the problems set out against 
substantive individualism, vis. that the state would find it difficult to interpret and 
realise the implications of deliberative interactions. As long as the deliberative 
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process is both open and inclusive, and, crucially, designed to cover the key policy 
decisions, then efficacious deliberations can inject the suitably developed public will 
directly into the policy-making process. These requirements, however, raise more 
questions than they answer. Perhaps the most obvious, and certainly that which is 
most often posed against deliberative democrats, is whether deliberations could 
really be open and inclusive in real-world, large-scale democracies (see, for instance, 
Walzer, 1999, Parkinson, 2003 and W. Friedman, 2006). As Robert Goodin (2003: 
170) concisely contends, even in small political districts, „it is simply infeasible to 
arrange face-to-face discussions across the entire community‟. The principal 
challenge for deliberative democrats, it would seem, is thus institutional rather than 
theoretical, to discover how to realise deliberative decision-making without limiting 
the number of participants involved or topics covered (ibid. 172-178). Yet even this 
is to miss the point. As it is shown below, the various institutional innovations 
suggested to transform deliberative democracy into a realistic possibility simply 
serve to illustrate how difficult it would be to make deliberations relevant to political 
practice, regardless of their impressive inclusivity. The real question for deliberative 
democracy, in short, is one of relevance. 
 
The battle against scale 
 
The size and scale of modern democracies is perhaps seen as the principle obstacle to 
the realisation of deliberative democracy because, as Raymond Pingree (2006: 201-
202) puts it, the very aim of deliberative democracy is one of „full reception‟. If 
political decisions are to be truly deliberative and inclusive, each citizen must be 
equally able to both make themselves heard to all others and to receive and consider 
each and every contribution given in return. Yet even within small groups, the sheer 
amount of information this would entail each individual absorbing would put them 
under immense cognitive strain (see ibid. 203-206). Participants in such discussions 
tend to have trouble following and remembering complex arguments and causalities, 
and they usually simplify what they hear into key judgements or heuristics, the 
reasoning behind which they quickly forget. On top of this (and probably largely 
because of it), small groups presented with problems do not tend to use their time 
very effectively. Despite struggling to reach any significant agreements – especially 
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with regards to issues of judgement – they tenaciously and laboriously try to solve 
each stage of the problem as a group (ibid.). Accordingly, and since the difficulty of 
reaching agreement would only increase as group size increases, it seems to follow 
that democratic deliberations would struggle to deliver on their promises in real-
world settings.  
 
Nevertheless, the assumption seems to go, if these problems can be overcome, 
democratic deliberations can realise real-world epistemic gains. Pingree‟s (ibid. 209-
214) own solution is instructive here. He argues that collective deliberations could 
only work if individuals can divide their mental labour. Individuals, that is, need to 
be able to access and search the individual problem- and solution-claims that make 
up each topic of discussion. They would then be free to add new claims where it 
appears to be necessary, and, given the requisite facility, to evaluate and „rank‟ 
existing claims according to their persuasiveness. Participants would thus be able to 
use their time and attention efficiently by focusing only on those topics they can 
actually contribute to. In so doing, they would add clarity to the debate by 
elucidating and evaluating ostensible chains of causality. Significantly, it would not 
be necessary to reach a society-wide consensus in order to construct a legitimate set 
of aims in this system. Instead, it would be sufficient to pay heed to the rankings 
which stabilise out of the more targeted deliberations, since these would effectively 
demonstrate society‟s totality of reflexive knowledge and opinions – that which we 
denoted above as the political „truth‟ (see ibid. 211). 
 
In this context, Fishkin‟s „deliberative polling‟ project, a tried-and-tested forerunner 
to his more thorough and idealistic „Deliberation Day‟ is especially relevant. Fishkin 
(1991) grounds his project in a rejection of liberal democratic attempts to bring the 
benefits of small-scale decision-making to large-scale electorates through direct 
democratic means such as elections, opinion polls and referenda. Such tools, he 
contends, do little more than subject various minority groups to the tyranny of 
mindless majority whims. In contrast, deliberative polling would provide a way of 
modelling „what the public would think, had it a better opportunity to consider the 
questions at issue‟ (Fishkin, 1995: 162; original italics). The idea is to take a random 
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sample of citizens and give them an opportunity to discuss pertinent political 
problems and their possible solutions, both amongst themselves and with state 
representatives, civil servants, and other policy entrepreneurs. A standard opinion 
poll is taken both at the beginning and at the end of the process to measure changes 
amongst the samples viewpoints, and the results are presented publicly, so that the 
government and citizenry alike might use them to inform their future decisions 
(Luskin et al. 2002: 484). 
 
Deliberative polls thus allow liberal democracies to combine the epistemic and 
emancipatory benefits promised by in-depth, small-scale discussions with the 
equality intended by the universal franchise (Fishkin, 1991: ch. 1). By working with 
a random sample, the deliberating group could be both big enough to accurately 
mirror the wider society, and small enough to ensure that every participant would 
have the time to ask questions and proffer viewpoints. Moreover, the structure 
provided by the polls would guide the discussion past many of the problems with 
small-group discussions whilst still allowing the freedoms necessary for epistemic 
efficacy. Thus, since the clear aim of the process would be to achieve only a more 
enlightened position, rather than consensus, it would be possible to both time-limit 
each topic and to keep simple records of opinions, suggestions and disagreements as 
the discussions progressed. Yet the format would still be flexible, so the group would 
be able to add new topics and perhaps call upon new witnesses if necessary. 
Participants and witnesses alike would therefore be able to introduce or question 
existing problem- or solution-claims according to their expertise. Whilst these claims 
would lack the „peer review‟ suggested by Pingree‟s ideal, their plausibility and 
authority would nevertheless receive judgement by the rest of the group in the poll 
results. 
 
The obvious question that arises here concerns the vast majority of the population 
who are not polled. Deliberative polls would contribute little if they cannot disrupt 
the mechanisms through which the population subjects (and submits) itself to 
majoritarian caprice. Fishkin‟s answer to this question, quite simply, is that the 
population would have a responsibility to take note of the polling results (ibid.). If it 
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were to do this, it is plausible to claim that deliberative polling would offer tangible 
epistemic benefits. For, if the results were broken down according to their constituent 
claims, they could help fill in the gaps of public knowledge. Where individuals are 
informed on an issue, the debates would likely provide prompts for reflection and 
judgement (judgements which could be further sampled and recorded in an „Any 
Answers‟ style forum).21 Where they are ignorant, the polling results would offer a 
clear set of suggestions as to what they would probably think and why, if they were 
informed. If all such individuals were to absorb the results, the overall movement of 
individuals towards their hypothetical fully informed position would likely far 
outweigh any movements away (Fishkin and Luskin, 2005: 187-188). And in any 
case, whether or not individuals agree with the outcomes of the deliberative polls, 
they would provide a rough but generally accurate picture of the legitimacy of 
government policy. 
 
It is not clear, however, whether the public has any such responsibility. Regardless of 
how edifying their opinions might be, other people cannot deliberate as us or even 
for us (Ryfe, 2005: 52-53). Fishkin‟s reliance on statistical representation belies the 
fact that „representativeness‟ is not an objective concept. One has to choose the 
characteristics they want represented, and this choice cannot be neutral. As an 
example, consider a randomly chosen sample which broadly reflects the distribution 
of age, religion, skin colour and political views in society. Suppose this group were 
to discuss arranged marriages and, after consideration, come down hard against 
them. It would seem to follow to the rest of the population and the government that it 
is indeed the case that arranged marriages are wrong and that it is right to ban them. 
To the significant number of supporters of such marriages in the population, 
however, this decision would seem at worst like disenfranchisement, and at best like 
the very tyranny of the majority Fishkin seeks to banish. For when results are 
seemingly conclusive, and when the whole political establishment – including 
opposition parties – accept them, then such individuals will have very few 
opportunities to actually make themselves heard. From the minority‟s point of view, 
                                                          
21
 „Any Answers‟ is a BBC radio show which allows listeners to respond to the contributions and 
opinions of political, media and academic panellists on the companion current affairs panel show 
„Any Questions‟. 
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the only thing a random sample might represent is its own marginalisation. If this is 
indeed undesirable, it follows that a representative discussion must give time to a 
minimum number of individuals from each minority position (though what this 
would mean in practice is an open question). But this would be to contradict the very 
epistemic basis of deliberative polling. 
 
It is perhaps understandable, therefore, that Fishkin‟s ideal form of deliberative 
democracy goes beyond mere representative sampling. „Deliberation Day‟, which 
Fishkin proffers with Bruce Ackerman (2004; summarised in Ackerman and Fishkin, 
2003), is a two-day national holiday designed to take place shortly before each 
election. In a similar fashion to its polling counterpart, Deliberation Day seeks to 
overcome the problems of scale by having people debate in small groups. Unlike the 
former, however, the latter does not intend for these to be exclusive. Instead, 
everyone would be encouraged to take part by attending their local event, wherein 
they would be randomly allocated to small groups. On the basis of a pre-deliberation 
briefing, these groups would be invited to decide, via a series of discussions and 
ultimately a vote, on the content of the main issues facing the electorate. These issues 
would then be fed back initially to the group and, ultimately, through media reports 
to the wider population. As such, Deliberation Day would give all marginalised 
groups an equal opportunity to make themselves heard, and none would have fair 
reason to bear a grudge against the system if their case was not accepted. 
 
Yet this accomplishment requires us to abandon the epistemic aims which motivated 
deliberative polling in the first place. Because of the sheer number of participants, all 
Deliberation Day can realistically offer is an opportunity for each meeting to pose a 
small number of its vote-winning issues as questions to local political representatives 
at the end of the process (Ackerman and Fishkin, 2004: 26). There is no sustained 
engagement, nor any ability to question the responses of these representatives. As 
such, Ackerman and Fishkin (ibid. 29-30) point primarily to the communal 
advantages which would arise out of participants coming face to face with members 
of other social groups and neighbourhoods. By pushing the boundaries of the 
exclusive groups which govern most of our social interactions, Deliberation Day 
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would confront individuals with perspectives and problems radically different to 
their own. As a result, the citizenry would likely develop a greater sense of the 
common good, and this would be reflected in deliberations and conversations carried 
on after Deliberation Day. Ackerman and Fishkin thus return us to Cohen‟s ideal, 
whereby it appears to be the community which thinks and deliberates, rather than the 
individual. But we are given no detailed mechanisms through which these 
deliberations take place. The polling structure which allows for the division of 
mental labour in deliberative polls is absent, and yet the question and answer session 
assumed in their place is assumed to do little more than motivate political parties to 
engage more at the local level (ibid.). It is unclear, therefore, why voters would make 
better political decisions after a Deliberation Day than after any other political 
campaign. 
 
In any case, it is difficult to see what a better voting decision could mean. The all-
consuming quest for inclusive deliberative decision-making – illustrated so well by 
Fishkin‟s ultimate desire to replace a workable (if flawed) system of deliberation 
with an unworkable but more inclusive alternative – belies the fact that in a 
democratic polity system, it is the institutions of the state, rather than the voters, that 
ultimately make all of the political decisions. In the UK, for instance, 160 separate 
pieces of legislation came before the 2008-2009 Parliament, ranging from an attempt 
to re-define the Union Jack to a decision to classify „gamma-butyrolactone‟ as an 
illegal substance (UK Parliament, 2009). The content of these bills was decided by 
the government even before they went to Parliament. And how they are eventually 
implemented will depend upon the future decisions of thousands of civil servants. 
Clearly, it is simply unfeasible that such a range and wealth of decisions could be 
judged in any detail by a pre-election deliberation. This might of course be a good 
thing; as Ian Shapiro (2003) and Philip Pettit (2003) argue respectively, a 
representative government has the advantage of concentrated knowledge, and it can 
ensure consistency over successive acts. But it cannot be a good thing for 
deliberative democrats. If a government can shirk responsibility when bucking public 
opinion by claiming that it is better informed, then there seem to be few grounds on 
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which the public could ever judge its legitimacy.
22
 If, however, the state ought to be 
held to account, and if deliberation is the best way of doing this, then deliberative 
democrats like Fishkin must look beyond the mere goal of inclusion, In order to 
show how they can actually hold the various quasi-autonomous institutions of the 
state to account.  
 
Public choice and the problem of implementation 
 
Epistemic deliberative democrats err by treating policy-making as if it mirrors David 
Easton‟s (1953) „black box‟ model of the policy process. On this simplified model, 
democratic deliberations serve principally to feed legitimate, truth-tracking political 
aims into the black box of the state which, seemingly automatically, turns these aims 
into concrete policy programmes. The results of these policies and their effects on 
public opinion thus go on to spur further democratic deliberations, and so the process 
repeats itself, ad infinitum. On this reasoning, it is indeed important to have an 
inclusive deliberative process, so that the citizenry can have as much control as 
possible over the actions of the state. It seems rash, however, to assume that 
inclusivity is equivalent to control. The „black box‟ (or, perhaps more accurately, the 
black hole) of government is not made up of neutral super-computers but rather of 
large and complex state bureaucracies which, as Weber and Foucault so assiduously 
observed, possess and exert considerable power simply by virtue of their rational and 
legalistic structures. As such, before deliberative democrats can assert the conditions 
under which their systems lead to legitimate and epistemically ideal outcomes, they 
must first provide an account as to how deliberative democracies can exert control 
over bureaucracies. Yet moving deliberative democracy in such a direction, as we 
shall see, must be to abandon any pretence to truth-tracking, epistemically virtuous 
results. 
 
                                                          
22
 The drawn-out public row about the legitimacy of the UK to join forces with the US and invade Iraq 
is illustrative of this dilemma. According to the UK government‟s specialised knowledge, Britain was 
right to invade because of the threat posed by Iraq to Western Europe. Yet the UK government turned 
out to be wrong, and successive rows have erupted over whether it should have trusted its monopoly 
of knowledge and indeed whether its ownership of this monopoly makes any difference to the 
legitimacy of the action at all. 
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Consider the internal dynamics of the „black box‟ of the state. When we conceive of 
public servants not as impartial altruists, but rather more realistically as individuals 
acting according to a bounded rationality and competing motivations, it is clear that 
government policy will be largely affected by the structural incentives provided by 
the bureaucracy. As such, the complexity of the state‟s various administrative 
bureaucracies and their relations with one another pose a significant problem for 
democratic idealism. Since government action relies upon bargaining and co-
operation between and across different levels and departments, state officials and 
public servants have numerous opportunities to pursue their own personal and 
political goals. While some seek to expand or protect departmental structures in order 
to enhance their status and power, others seek simply to adapt and shape their 
missions to further their careers or political agendas (Dunleavy, 1991). Such 
behaviours need not be cynical or self-interested, of course. As Anthony Downs 
(1967) argues, many bureaucrats simply develop a personal and emotional 
commitment to their existing programmes and clients. Such individuals nevertheless 
contribute to bureaucratic inertia, and prove as resistant to change as those who 
simply want to cling to their prestigious salaries and titles. 
 
The key problem for deliberative democrats is that these institutional dynamics 
cannot be easily changed, such as by simply tinkering with structural incentives (as 
the „New Public Management‟ revolution attempted to do with public service 
delivery; see Hood, 1991). It is implausible that the precise details regarding the 
implementation of a public policy could ever be formulated at the same time as its 
aims. These details can only be worked out as the policy moves back and forth 
between the various agencies involved in its realisation. Yet as it moves back and 
forth between these agencies and stages, the likelihood of ambiguity and conflict is 
such that its final form will inevitably reflect its institutional background as much as 
its original parent aim (Matland, 1995). State actors, in short, will always have de 
facto discretionary power over the final shape of a public policy. And, in so far as 
state actors are human, their use of discretion will always reflect their personal 
attributes and interests, which may or may not overlap with their commitment to the 
democratic process. 
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It is thus surprising that normative democratic theory has largely neglected the threat 
of „bureaucratic domination‟ (Richardson, 2002: 8-9). After all, the deliberative bar 
for this form of repression is remarkably low. Since the deliberative conception of 
legitimacy requires that democratic action be based upon the free interchange of 
reasons, legitimate policy must be such that it can be clearly traced back to and 
justified on the basis of these discussions and the „deep compromises‟ that 
participants must be party to (ibid. ch. 11). Where policies cannot be traced back to 
these compromises, their restrictions on individual freedoms will inevitably appear 
arbitrary and will lack legitimacy. 
 
To paraphrase Thomas Christiano (2005: 213-214), one might nonetheless argue that 
the standard of legitimacy can be usefully used to judge democratic institutions, even 
if those institutions can never meet those requirements completely. For, as Christiano 
seems to assume, there are no other institutions capable of meeting these 
requirements. Following this logic, Richardson (2002: 30-31) rejects as „crude‟ 
negative, market based ideas of liberty. Such institutions presuppose an untouchable 
set of norms which, because not born of or mediated by democratic reasoning, must 
leave people open to capricious interference and domination. Public, democratic 
institutions, in contrast, can at least be called to account by the demos. In this way, it 
is always possible that a process of public deliberation might exert influence over 
public institutional outcomes (ibid. ch. 4). 
 
How this might work in practice is usefully illustrated once again by the black box 
policy model, which we might usefully use as a model of the division of policy-
making labour in a deliberative system. For Richardson (2002: 222), it is 
„debilitatingly naive‟ to suggest that a democracy could achieve its aims without 
relying to a large extent on the discretionary powers of the bureaucracy. The kinds of 
reasoning which the public and the legislature could be reasonably expected to 
employ would never incorporate the kinds of contextual knowledge which 
bureaucrats have. This is right and proper, of course; as citizens we want to be able 
to see the wood through the trees. As such, and as the very people who have to live 
with the conditions created for us by the bureaucracy, it is up to the citizenry instead 
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to set general aims, much as a taxi passenger might declare a destination, on the 
expectation that the driver will choose his own route (this simile is borrowed from 
Richardson, 2005: 227). Significantly, the content of these aims will determine the 
kinds of reasoning and justifications bureaucracies must employ in their 
identification and formulation of specific subsidiary policy ends (Richardson, 2002: 
227-228). Thus, if one‟s destination is the Accident and Emergency Department, the 
taxi driver ought to choose the quickest route, not the most picturesque. So long as 
these ends and their justificatory reasons are publicised and left open to further 
deliberative and legislative revision, the citizenry will ultimately be in a strong 
position to either change their aims in response to changing circumstances, or else 
demand that the bureaucracy revise its reasoning, which would generate new policy 
ends (Richardson, 2005: 227-228).  
 
Deliberative democracy, in short, can hold the state to a measure of legitimacy. But it 
does this at a considerable cost. By limiting acceptable bureaucratic forms of 
reasoning, Richardson‟s deliberative system would effectively translate the 
decisions, trade-offs and deals made by and between public servants into, for want of 
a better term, „plain English‟. By and large, this means that individuals would not 
face insurmountable barriers to understanding the bureaucracy and holding it to 
account. And it ensures that individuals would always be able to bring the results of 
their deliberations to bear upon the policy process (compare this with Fishkin‟s 
proposals, which would leave individuals open to bamboozlement and would likely 
see the citizenry and the state talking at cross-purposes). Yet the price of this clarity 
is that all of the heuristics and technical tools which allow bureaucracies to make 
decisions, such as cost/benefit analyses (which Richardson (2002: ch. 9) decries as 
„stupid‟) must be banished. All decisions, in short, become matters of moral 
judgement. Now, it is one thing to treat the general aims of government policy as 
matters of judgement, which should therefore be evaluated according to strict 
deliberative standards. It is quite another, however, to consider every sub-decision 
taken in the realisation of these policies in the same fashion. 
 
When decisions must be taken in prosaic terms, and when they are all open to moral 
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objections, it is an open question as to whether anything would ever get done. On the 
one hand, this is a technical point. There are many policy decisions – ranging from 
those the health authorities must make regarding which drugs to administer through 
the NHS to the tricky balance the central bank must strike between inflation and 
unemployment – which must make use of some technical modelling, data or 
research. Such technical reasoning not only renders these decisions easier and 
quicker to make, but it also allows the use of some information which would be 
difficult to use in a reasoned argument. Consider a health and safety decision, such as 
that made by airline regulators, as discussed by Richardson (ibid. 240-241). For 
Richardson, specifying how much aeroplane seats should retard flame is a simple 
matter of balancing values (the need to protect individuals versus the need to allow 
airlines to cut costs). But how could such a trade-off be made if not mathematically? 
There is no form of verbal reasoning here which is not essentially meaningless 
(imagine if the requirement was to provide „a lot of‟, „sufficient‟ or „reasonable‟ 
protection). Yet any numerical reasoning not based upon technical modelling would 
be arbitrary (imagine: „enough to save 95% of the passengers in a fire‟). Cost/benefit 
modelling, in contrast, would allow the authorities to estimate how individuals would 
trade freedom against safety in practice, thus providing a precise and non-arbitrary 
policy solution (see Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
 
The question of efficacy notwithstanding, problematising each aspect of the policy 
process poses a further, more considerable problem. Richardson‟s system depends on 
the reasoning process being oriented fully towards ends. For, in holding the 
legislature and bureaucracy to account, the only way to judge whether policies 
represent a desirable movement from less specific to more specific aims is to discuss 
what those aims should be (this argument is developed at length in Richardson, 
1995). Treating everything in terms of ends, however, can only multiply the sites of 
possible conflict. While an ambiguous means might find supporters of many 
different stripes, a concrete end will appeal to far narrower field of beliefs. Take, for 
example, the proposals to increase the school leaving age in Britain to 18. There are 
many reasons to support such a policy; we might want to keep young adults in a 
supportive environment for longer, to keep troublemakers off of the streets, to 
increase the number of poorer students in universities, et cetera. As such, individuals 
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with various political views may count themselves as supporters. Now consider a 
plausible policy end, to decrease unemployment amongst young adults by increasing 
the length of compulsory schooling. Such an end might of course be seen as a useful 
means to further ends by a variety of people. But its specification means that it will 
alienate other erstwhile supporters of the original proposal. In societies characterised 
by extensive disagreement over moral and political ends, the deliberative aim to have 
everyone discussing ends in this way would be very likely to result in political 
gridlock. 
 
This analysis might appear alarmist. Individuals have neither the time nor the 
inclination to go to such lengths to challenge policy development. Moreover, and in 
any event, Richardson (2002: ch. 14-15) grounds this deliberative process as merely 
an essential aspect of the current representative, majoritarian democratic system. As 
such, deliberative decision-making need not be endless nor arbitrary because, after 
everyone has had their say, it can be settled quite conclusively through the electoral 
system. Thus, as long as the political system represents a wide cross-section of 
genuine public sentiments, the policy process can both gain the benefit of having its 
actions scrutinised (Richardson, 2005: 225), and can lead to legitimate outcomes 
(Richardson, 2002: 212-213). If this is the case, however, it is difficult to see 
precisely what democratic deliberations really achieve. Undoubtedly, they provide an 
efficacious way of subjecting state institutions to scrutiny, and of politicising the 
otherwise hidden bureaucratic dynamics which can distort the policy process. Yet the 
epistemic virtues of this process are doubtful. When the final ends of public policy 
result from a vote, there can be no synthesis of knowledge or aims. Despite 
Richardson‟s contestations to the contrary, it seems to follow that such a deliberative 
system would be no more likely to produce legitimate outcomes than existing forms 
of liberal democracy. 
 
The epistemic appeal of classical liberalism 
 
As chapter three demonstrated, the classical argument for the minimal state can be 
constructed on an epistemological basis which should prove attractive to epistemic 
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deliberative democrats. Traditional liberals favour the institutions of free agency, it 
was argued, because they embody a process of social experimentation. On the 
Austrian view, voluntary acts – be they contractual, charitable or civil – effectively 
constitute hypotheses about future effects. Just as Richardson‟s deliberators proffer 
general political aims on the expectations that these aims will lead to certain 
outcomes, we plan and execute our private acts as means towards our intended ends. 
As such, the interaction of actors in voluntary institutions is analogous to the 
deliberative interactions of citizens in a democratic forum. In both situations, 
individuals reason collectively about what to do. But while the latter have to 
consciously construct a legitimate social policy function out of their conflicting 
reasons and preferences, this function emerges independently out of the private 
choices people make within voluntary institutions. For when individuals can act 
without the fear of arbitrary interference, the results and implications of their actions 
will automatically feed into one another‟s successive decisions. Significantly, the 
pattern of ends that arises within a free society will therefore effectively resemble 
that set of interconnected ends which would otherwise be democratically chosen, if 
the demos possessed the requisite information and cognitive power.
23
 
 
In so far as we rely upon public institutions to deliver our ends, this argument 
suggests that they ought to be guided and regulated by our practical, rather than 
deliberative reason. And the simplest way of doing this would be to subject them to 
market competition. In the marketplace, when we consume a good or a service, we 
do so on the expectation that its provider is fit to produce and provide the 
consumable to the required standard. Our choices, in other words, embody 
judgements about the philosophies, structures and leadership of the different 
producers in the market, whether or not we know anything about them. Indeed, it is 
only because most of the work involved in these judgements has already been carried 
out through the price system that we are not more conscious of this process. 
Nevertheless, this ignorance notwithstanding, every choice we make is as much a 
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 This should not be interpreted as a naturalistic fallacy. It is by no means certain that a social 
preference function arising out of a fully inclusive and efficacious social reasoning process would be, 
from any one point of view, desirable. Politics in practice is a matter of compromise, rather than 
ideals, and the compromises our national politicians agree to often seem less desirable than the 
original alternatives. As such, this liberal argument simply says that market institutions are more 
likely to derive those compromises which accurately track our beliefs than political forums. 
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„vote‟ for an organisation as it is a purchase of a good. Those organisational types 
which realise our desired ends amass our „votes‟ and flourish, while those that are 
too inefficient or ineffective wither and fail. Given how successful this process of 
competitive selection has been in providing us with the means of survival and 
comfort, it follows that we would do well to apply it to our public ends as well, and 
approach them more as active consumers than captive subjects. 
 
One way of promoting such behaviour is to create markets in public services by 
providing individuals with „vouchers‟ and leaving them to choose, as consumers, 
from autonomous providers (see M. Friedman, 1962: ch. 6). In areas such as 
education, healthcare, housing and legal aid, this would allow private and charitable 
organisations to form and compete on fair terms with their public counterparts, which 
would otherwise have monopoly power. As a result, the terms of our collective 
reasoning about the public services would be left open. Anyone with a new idea 
about how to organise and provide for the populations various preferences would be 
able to enter the market and offer it for evaluation, and in so far as that idea offers a 
more efficient and effective way of satisfying our political and moral demands, it 
would be successful. So long as such organisations were free to succeed, expand and 
make profits and fail, contract and make losses, the implications of their ideas would 
therefore be transmitted throughout the polity. And so long as individuals could „top-
up‟ their vouchers, so that the value of the organisational choices made by the 
different providers could be reflected in price differences, every citizen would 
therefore have the opportunities both to contribute to and learn from the on-going 
collective deliberation about public service delivery.
24
 
 
Vouchers cannot cover all of the public services however, and, as it was emphasised 
in the last chapter, the public services are only one aspect of wider political debate. 
We also need to choose our public goals, and we need to agree on their sources of 
funding. These issues are also a matter for public reasoning and legitimation, so they 
                                                          
24
 Sweden provides an example of a state which has sought to use vouchers to improve the quality of 
schooling. Unlike Britain‟s more rhetorical policy of school choice, Swedish parents were given the 
ability in the 1990s to choose between competing private and state schools. As Paula Blomqvist 
(2004) shows, this led to a marked improvement in the performance of Sweden‟s education system. 
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too could benefit from competitive evaluation. The most effective way of doing this 
would be to devolve the ability to decide on domestic issues to local authorities and 
regions. Though problems of scale would still exist, the creation of local legislatures 
would allow far more relevant and far more detailed deliberations than a national 
Parliament. Furthermore, in such a system, individuals and businesses would be able 
to „vote with their feet‟ and choose that locality which best satisfies their moral, 
political and economic ends. This is not to say that individuals should be able to pick 
and choose between the different taxes and regulations on offer, of course, as this 
would be to invite collective action problems in the funding of public goods. Instead, 
as Shearmur (1996: 217) argues, it is to say that there should be competition between 
different public bodies with distinct constitutions and governing philosophies. For 
this is the only system which would promote competition both between substantive 
political commitments and the procedures used to construct those commitments, both 
of which epistemic democrats from Gutmann and Thompson to Richardson seek to 
legitimise. 
 
There is much more to be said about this argument, but it is worth finishing by 
simply noting that, regardless of its merits, the undesirable consequences that would 
arise out of this competitive process cannot be held as reasons against it. Any 
competitive process is bound to create winners and losers, and, in so far as the losers 
are cities, local authorities or public service providers, the costs of these losses could 
be high. Moreover, the inequalities created by devolution, regional differences and 
competition are unfailingly politically explosive. To a large extent, however, these 
inequalities and losses would be an inevitable consequence of any movement 
towards legitimate government. For the equality (such as it is) that exists within 
unified political systems is largely a consequence of the lack of legitimacy possessed 
by those systems. The fact that, for example, the NHS is an opaque government 
monopoly forecloses choice and means that most British citizens simply never have 
an opportunity to consider any alternative arrangement, while those who do desire an 
alternative have few options to choose from. If individuals were prompted to choose 
their priorities themselves, they would inevitably make different choices, and those 
choices would inevitably have different costs and benefits. Indeed, this is absolutely 
essential if we are to have an effective reasoning process. It is only when individuals 
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are able to see the real-world effects of their different ideas that they can make an 
informed choice about the kind of polity they want. And it is only when they can 
make this choice that we will be able to accept the true legitimacy of our political 
and social environment. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The common attraction of democracy over the free market economy is that it seeks to 
select ends and goals on the basis of legitimacy, fairness and, in some sense, 
correctness, rather than because they appeal to our unconsidered desires. This 
compelling argument forms the basis of procedural communitarianism, which 
promises to overcome our political and moral conflicts by simply discovering their 
correct solutions. As we have seen, however, a practical deliberative democracy – 
even one tailored to maximise epistemic benefits – would struggle to discover either 
the grounds that diverse individuals share or the agreements they would need to forge 
in order to circumvent their differences. Moreover, even if technology were to 
develop in such a way as to render these discoveries possible, deliberative democrats 
ultimately offer no solution to the distortive effects of bureaucratic discretion on 
political action. Of course, if it were the case that the only alternative would be to fall 
back on the unconstrained pursuit of our base desires, we would nevertheless have 
reason to favour epistemic deliberative democratism. But it was shown above that the 
competitive, free market environment does require us to constantly consider our ends 
in response to the reasoning of others. Ironically, it is only because we do this 
automatically and successfully that more people are not cognisant of this fact. As 
such, and if they can countenance the imperfect nature of what would really be 
considered „legitimate‟ in society, it is contended here that procedural 
communitarians would strongly benefit by spurning deliberative democratism for 
traditional liberalism. 
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7. Substantive Communitarianism and the Movement to 
Markets 
 
Substantive communitarians depart from liberal and deliberative democrats alike by 
calling attention to the inequalities of power and freedom created by rule-bound, 
morally hubristic and exclusive democratic practices. On their critique, the most 
political institutions can hope to provide is an inclusive forum in which individuals 
have the ability to challenge political practice. As long as there are plural, 
antagonistic claims on the terms of social co-operation, the quest for morally 
authoritative principles to guide behaviour must give way to a pragmatic search for 
compromise on specific issues as and when they arise. Substantive communitarians 
thus advocate radical forms of democratic participation, in order to foster tolerance 
for diversity and difference. Yet it is shown in this chapter that their arguments rest 
perilously on the assumption that harmonising motivations is enough to solve social 
problems and reduce cultural frictions. They ignore the intractable problems posed 
by public ignorance and unintentional consequences. Because information is 
culturally mediated and unequally dispersed, the most that could be hoped for in a 
radical democracy would be an ultimately unfair political settlement based solely 
upon the distribution of power. To avoid this self-defeating outcome, it is shown that 
agonistic democrats ought to look beyond nominal freedoms towards the realisation 
of genuine liberties. For, it is concluded, we will only be able to achieve a just and 
desirable society when all of our acts and plans are given the same influence over 
social outcomes. 
 
The agonistic anti-solution 
 
The point of departure for substantive communitarianism is a rejection of the quasi-
Cartesian appeal to impersonal reason inherent in modern understandings of 
democracy. In contrast to liberal and deliberative democrats alike, substantive 
communitarians reject the supercilious belief that democracy in itself can form or 
contribute to the „good‟ or the „right‟. For, since their emergence in Ancient Greece, 
democratic institutions have systematically excluded and undermined different 
groups even as they have claimed moral and political authority (Trend, 1996). And 
these claims have only strengthened since the Enlightenment. After Hobbes and 
Locke, and latterly Rawls, Dworkin and Habermas, our democratic thinking has 
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focused so heavily on the philosophical derivation of impartial democratic principles 
and justifications that we have blinded ourselves to the lived and varied experiences 
of radically diverse peoples. Indeed, for Mouffe (1996b), this contemporary 
obsession with theoretical elegance is so unhelpful that we must indeed return to 
Schmitt‟s abhorrent, anti-liberal thought before we can think usefully about the 
messy trade-offs between liberty and unity that confront us at every step of the 
democratic process. 
 
In place of liberalism‟s abstract reasoning, and the attempt to outsource this 
reasoning to the demos by deliberative democrats, substantive communitarians 
advocate an agonistic understanding of democratic politics as a space in which latent 
confrontations can be publicised (Gursozlu, 2009: 366). This radical vision of 
democracy spurns the „monist‟ goals of legitimacy and rationality in order to respect 
what Isaiah Berlin saw as the essential pluralism of human values. Since the various 
objects and goals which undergird and give substance to our competing visions of the 
good life are fundamentally incompatible and often mutually contradictory, 
democratic institutions cannot reasonably pursue or effectively realise any one 
system of values. Such an approach would be to „den[y] the political‟, to attempt to 
construct and reify a unitary political identity by marginalising and rendering 
delinquent any contesting claim to our loyalties (Mouffe, 1996b: 21-24). For reasons 
of prudence, therefore, as well as fairness and mutual respect, agonism seeks to 
„embed' and extend the realm of democratic choice to include the principles of 
democracy themselves (Bader, 1995: 230). 
 
Substantive communitarianism thus offers a form of pragmatism based upon an 
appreciation of the non-ideal claims which motivate really-existing politics and lead 
to pervasive conflict. As the next section of this chapter shows, the foundations of 
this pragmatism lie in a normative appreciation of the value of disagreement and 
difference to human life. Following Hannah Arendt and Friedrich Nietzsche, 
agonism treats adversarial political interaction as the substantive basis of all 
contingent and derivative human value. Since contested morals and reasons are 
insufficient to ground and unite a political community, the substantive 
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communitarian project aims instead to construct this community out of the practice 
of politics itself (Bader, 1995: 232-235). Rather than originating in an antecedent, 
transcendent reality, the agonistic „right‟ can only be elucidated and extended 
through a democratic politics which resists completion. In this way, substantive 
communitarianism seeks to offer an ever fairer and more inclusive approach to moral 
questions without committing the fallacies of moral relativism.  
 
The obvious implication of the commitment to an open-ended and inclusive 
democracy is that such a process must allow the populace to directly participate in 
the democratic process. This is necessary on the one hand to avoid the abstractional 
tendencies of representation, whereby individuals are subsumed by „interest‟ groups 
and socio-demographic characteristics. And on the other, it is necessary to avoid 
representation‟s reliance upon aggregation, which effectively disenfranchises any 
given individual (Simons, 2005: 152-153). Radical democratism thus points to the 
need for a „strong‟ form of direct democracy which, as the third section illustrates, 
seeks to manifest a thick conception of citizenship, whereby all aspects of our 
identities are brought into the public realm. After such a thorough politicisation of 
identity, the populace would be united not by abstract, legalistic ideas, but rather 
through the concrete social dynamics which would arise out of the confluence of our 
various characteristics. As the section goes on to show, these dynamics promise to 
instantiate a truly respectful and stable form of pluralism, rooted in and sustained by 
the basic social commitment to the democratic process. 
 
The problem for radical democrats is that this commitment need not necessarily 
translate into democratic success. In the first instance, the nature of a truly diverse 
and plural society means that the most we could expect individuals to agree on is 
what is unacceptable in society, rather than what that society should look like. As 
such, the further the reach of democratic institutions into the private sphere, the more 
democratic agreements would need to resemble a modus vivendi, which simply 
charts the compromises necessary to avoid conflict. Yet such an extension of 
democracy would likely undermine the very ability of the citizenry to make those 
compromises. The scope of agonistic politics would be so vast that nobody would be 
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able to follow anything more than a modicum of political discourse and action. 
Individuals would therefore be reliant for their well-being upon the efficacy of 
democratic institutions and processes. As the fourth section shows, however, the 
meagre information channels and extensive principal/agent problems created by an 
agonistic democracy could only increase the vulnerability of the individual. 
 
An agonistic democracy would thus require more than substantive communitarians 
are willing to equip it with; it requires a set of institutions and forms which are able 
to both accommodate deep diversity and guide individual behaviour. As the final 
section of this chapter shows, classical liberal, free market institutions offer just these 
possibilities. By promoting automatic mutual adjustment on each pertinent issue 
arising between competing groups sharing overlapping goals, markets would come 
far closer to the terms of an ideal modus vivendi than any democracy could. And at 
the same time, it is argued, they would ensure the very universal respect and 
freedoms which are required by a thoroughgoing commitment to pluralism. As such, 
it is concluded that, like their liberal and deliberative counterparts, agonistic 
democrats would do well to recognise the fundamental contribution that could be 
made by the institutions of a free society to their vision of the good society. 
 
Politics as an open system 
 
Substantive communitarians find the inspiration for their agonistic politics in the 
contrarianism of Nietzsche and Arendt. Like these writers, their theories at once 
attempt to both elucidate and radically change real-world politics, by pointing to the 
hidden dynamics which constrain political agency and suppress conflict. Indeed, on 
the agonistic argument, political conflict lies at the very heart of political community. 
Since we are all distinct, with unique characteristics and outlooks, we must 
continually thrash out and revitalise both a common political language and a 
common set of goals in order to communicate and co-operate. These foundations are 
constructed largely in secret, however, so they tend to coerce and direct us without 
our ever knowing. The normative task for political theorists, therefore, is to shine 
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light on these latent conflicts in order to democratise the demos and empower 
marginalised constituencies. 
 
This democratic project, however, is complicated by the paradoxical nature of 
politics. In order to cohere in an organised and orderly fashion, political communities 
require precisely those norms and institutions which are supposed to result from 
organised political activity (Honig, 2007). As such, democrats can offer no abstract 
explanation or constitutive ethic for the origins of our communal obligations. They 
must instead accept that modern democracies are the result of an elaborate, peculiarly 
European struggle for power, the legacy of which still threatens to undermine the just 
and fair distribution of political opportunities.  
 
It follows that the deliberative democratic emphasis on legitimacy is completely 
wrong-headed (ibid. 3-6). As we have seen, deliberative democrats follow Rousseau 
to assume that the only requirement for a stable democracy is to find within the 
chaotic mass of individual wills a common good. Since the discovery of this good 
must limit future individual freedoms, deliberative democrats inevitably turn in one 
way or another to the deontological Kantian norms of mutual reciprocity and the 
categorical imperative to legitimise their approach. Yet the way in which Kant 
philosophically derived his deontology from human history can be argued to rest 
upon a partial and partisan understanding of historical events (ibid. 8-13). Thus, as 
Nietzsche powerfully showed, the Kantian ideal of transcendental reason does 
nothing more than turn individuals into a means towards a spurious metaphysical end 
(Honig, 1993a: ch. 3). People are inherently conflicted and imperfect, and holding 
them to saintly deliberative standards can only lead to guilt and self-hate or else 
rebellion and delinquency. 
 
The principal task for democrats is thus to free the citizenry from the tyranny of 
morality, to supplant the quest for transcendental „virtue‟ by embracing our 
existential „virtu‟. As Nietzsche demonstrated, this can only be done by rejecting the 
burdensome notion of the „subject‟ from the centre of our identities (A. Moore, 2006: 
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325-326). For it is the coherency required by this „subject‟ that makes the senseless 
lack of truth in the world seem so problematic and dangerous. After the death of God 
there can be no higher purpose or afterlife, so value can only exist in those moments 
and events that we find valuable. In place of the idea of a coherent „life‟, in other 
words, it is necessary to see the human experience as instead disjointed or „eternally 
recurrent‟ (ibid.). Having no metaphysical end, human lives are contingent upon our 
lived acts, which themselves delineate the ends of time and determine our 
(alternative) existence(s). Values, therefore, can only be chosen, never given (Nolt, 
2008). 
 
On this account, personal and political freedoms are inseparable. Indeed, in an 
Arendtian fashion, radical democrats see public, political action as constitutive of the 
individual (Honig, 1993a: ch. 4). For Arendt, in contrast to the closed world of the 
private, wherein all aspects of identity and behaviour are physiologically and 
environmentally determined, when we enter public spaces we enter a realm of 
unprecedented, agonistic possibility. In public we have an audience of unique others, 
whose actions and reactions cannot be known in advance, and whose co-operation 
can provide opportunities to realise new social forms and produce new ideas. As 
such, it is only in public that the individual can create and renew an identity that has 
meaning to others. And it is only through this creation and renewal that the 
individual acts freely, unburdened by the determinism of the private (d‟Entrèves, 
1992: 154-157). Accordingly, unlike liberal, communitarian and deliberative 
conceptions of democracy, Arendtian agonism requires that the public, political 
sphere be completely cleansed of unchallengeable interests and pre-ordained „truths‟, 
so that the individual might have maximum access and freedom.
25
 
 
Because these freedoms have no metaphysical status, however, agonism avoids 
                                                          
25
 This last point refers to a notable disagreement between interpretations of Arendt. Bonnie Honig 
(1993a: 116-125) contends that Arendt‟s vision of the public/private distinction allows for more 
politicisation of private aspects, such as race and gender, than Arendt conceived of. Yet, as Monique 
Deveaux (1999: 15-16) suggests, this reading may have more to do with Honig‟s own desire to allow 
the politicisation of group identities than Arendt‟s wish to emancipate all individuals, regardless of 
race or gender. It rather displaces the public subject at the centre of Arendt‟s arguments, and for this 
reason, should be abandoned. 
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descending into an anarchic form of unbridled individualism. Like Nietzsche‟s, 
Arendt‟s philosophy is simply a philosophy of „natality‟, of endless new beginnings, 
whereby a „something‟ is created out of a „nothing‟ (Arendt, 1958: 247). In both 
cases, it is the individual who creates this „something‟ by carving out a unique space 
and identity for herself in the world (Honig, 1993a: 67-68). Accordingly, virtuosic 
action should be seen as analogous to a public performance. While individuals may 
be proud of their presentations, like works of art the „true‟ value of these 
presentations can only be judged after they have been subjected to public scrutiny. 
Now, as Dana Villa (1992: 282-283) contends, this does indeed commit Arendt and 
Nietzsche to an „aesthetic‟ vision of action, whereby value inheres in appearances. 
But it is important not to treat this aestheticism as baseless (qua relativist), as Villa 
goes on to do. On the agonistic view, the Nietzschean-Arendtian account of virtu is 
one of excellence rather than arbitrariness (see Honig, 1993b). In a similar fashion to 
Machiavelli‟s conception, it simply asserts that we must be challenged by the 
vagaries of the world before we can fully demonstrate and fulfil our potentials. 
 
Nevertheless, the brave new agonistic world offers opportunity and danger in equal 
measures. The radically unsituated individual is simultaneously defined by both a 
constitutive „lack‟ of coherence and an „abundance‟ of potentiality (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 1985: ch. 3). Individuals are thus inherently ambivalent; they aspire to 
„fullness‟, an undivided commitment towards a harmonious and fulfilling set of 
beliefs even as they are continually horrified and destabilised by the presence and 
temptations of the „other‟. Nietzsche‟s individuals might choose moments of value 
by which to understand and live their lives, for instance, but they will always 
entertain a suspicion that another set of values might contribute to a more rewarding 
life. As such, any moment of peace and social harmony contains the possibility of an 
outburst of destructive and divisive social conflicts, as different discursive 
formations, such as ideologies and political movements, compete, often violently, to 
provide the most compelling account of the world and our place within it (Mouffe, 
2000: ch. 4). 
 
The promise of agonistic democracy therefore depends upon its ability to 
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domesticate and democratise the individual‟s constitutive „lack‟ (Simons, 2005). 
According to William Connolly (2005: 125-126), a free and diverse society can only 
remain stable and tolerant if it embodies the „civic virtue[s]‟ of „agonistic respect‟ 
and „critical responsiveness‟. These virtues require individuals to recognise the 
immanence of their own identities in the institutional and behavioural patterns of 
society. Since our senses of self are contingent upon our interactions with and the 
reactions of different others, our identities are necessarily emotionally and ethically 
interimbricated. We automatically internalise our differences and the self-doubt they 
cause, in other words, so conflict is inevitable unless we can learn to appreciate and 
enjoy rather than resent the constitutive role different others have in our lives 
(Connolly, 1991: 164-181). This means that we cannot take the claims of culture – 
either sectarian or liberal – at face value. The agonistic virtues instead require us all 
to view discourses of order and unity with suspicion, and to foster the emergence of 
new cultural forms as opportunities to learn and develop by subjecting one another‟s 
beliefs and identities to critical scrutiny (Connolly, 2005: 46-49). 
 
As David Owen (2008: 221-222) notes, Connolly‟s argument here owes much to 
Nietzsche‟s claim that the distance between the nobility and the slaving masses is 
instrumental in fostering the former‟s autonomy. For obvious reasons, Connolly 
cannot embrace this argument wholeheartedly, but his suggestion that pluralism 
provides the space necessary for reflexive growth reproduces the observation that we 
can only become aware of our own capacity for agency by observing human agency 
in the external world. Thus, whilst Nietzsche‟s noblemen grasp their autonomy only 
after enjoying their superiority over others, Connolly‟s agonists grasp their inner 
autonomy after observing the breadth and scale of different inner choices in their 
diverse millieux. Yet this argument relies upon the implicit assumption that when 
individuals look around, they see people like them, a condition which is not 
guaranteed in societies divided by disagreements over acceptable freedoms. 
 
The key requirement – and, indeed, achievement – of an agonistic polity is therefore 
to radically extend the boundaries of democratic inclusion so that the antagonistic 
and bitter disputes between „enemies‟ can be subsumed into simple, good-natured 
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differences between „adversaries‟ (Mouffe, 2000: 1-17). In such a polity, 
disagreements would be publicised and normalised in order to wholly remove them 
from the private sphere. All citizens would need to be free to enter into or instigate 
any political process, so long as they obey the basic institutional and democratic 
rules, and everyone would be encouraged to offer their own viewpoint (see Mouffe, 
1993: ch. 1 and 69-73). No issue would be immune from politics, and no 
disagreement or dispute would ever be allowed closure. In this way, the power which 
inheres within large-scale, totalising narratives and which has the ability to mobilise 
otherwise disparate groups against each other would be broken up. It would attach 
instead to smaller, personal discourses, so that the potential for alienating coalitions 
would be dissipated by the inevitable and obvious differences which both divide and, 
counter-intuitively, unite everyone. In this way, an agonistic democracy would 
militate against the reification of any differences between an „us‟ and a „them‟. 
Citizens would come to see one another‟s ethical standpoints as broadly equal in 
status, and the differences which threaten to undermine cohesion would instead 
become a source of communal energy and motivation.  
 
This is an alluring position, but it poses a number of institutional questions. The most 
obvious concerns the form which agonistic democratic institutions would take. While 
Ernesto Laclau and Mouffe (1985: ch. 4, see also Mouffe, 2000) clearly favour a 
form of liberal democracy, for instance, Honig‟s (1993a) Arendtian account looks 
rather more republican. In practice, an agonistic democracy would have to try and 
walk the fine line between these two positions, in order to combine the openness to 
plurality with the normative commitment to participation. As we will see in the next 
section, however, in seeking to solve one set of problems, this precarious agnostic 
strategy creates another. For the deeper a democracy becomes, the more difficult it is 
for individuals to make sense of the mass of information presented to them. 
Accordingly, unless their accounts are to rest upon an unsustainable confusion 
between intentions and outcomes, radical democrats need also to provide an account 
as to exactly what form of political control individuals could have in an agnostic 
system. 
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Agonism and direct democracy 
 
The agonistic project to re-locate the practice of democracy in the demos must entail 
some form of collective outcome, even if it is only provisional, if democratic 
participation is not to become a form of tyranny in and of itself. Individuals, that is, 
must collectively define at least a limited set of interests and identities so that they 
can lead their everyday lives. It is thus apposite here to consider Steven Wall‟s 
(2000) discussion of the various radical democratic arguments linking freedom and 
collective self-rule in order to see what kinds of freedoms could be reasonably 
expected in a radical democracy. Broadly speaking, Wall (2000: 228) separates the 
weaker contention that self-government in general is instrumentally valuable to the 
individual from the stronger claim that successful self-rule is intrinsic to human 
freedom. Notwithstanding these latter assertions, which will be discussed 
momentarily, the weaker contention is notable because it is the most plausible and 
least demanding of all those advocated by radical democrats (ibid. 250). It is thus 
worth beginning by exploring this modest approach. 
 
Carol Gould (1990) offers a good example of a radical democratic argument based 
on the goal of enhancing autonomy. For Gould, neither liberal nor socialist forms of 
democracy can meet the basic democratic goals of equality and self-development. As 
the capacities to learn and to form autonomous opinions and identities are 
fundamental to being human, we have a collective responsibility for their promotion 
(ibid. ch. 1). To this end, Gould (ibid. 71-72) argues that we ought to realise an 
extensive form of reciprocity, which goes beyond the mere mutual respect of reasons 
to include tangible opportunities for growth and advance. To respect one another‟s 
humanity, that is, we must each actively contribute to our collective self-
development. On this account, therefore, a genuine act of democratic emancipation 
would require a complete overhaul of existing social relations in order to give 
everyone the ability to actively participate in the democratic control of all those 
institutions which have a bearing on their personal autonomy. 
 
The most significant aspect of this overhaul would be the abolition of labour market 
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competition, in order to equalise power between workers within capitalist 
organisations (ibid. 142-147). This would render all economic institutions voluntary, 
co-operative ventures. There would be no arbitrary division of labour which would 
leave many devoid of any opportunity to influence their economic futures, because 
everyone would have equal ownership and agency over the direction and relative 
success of their organisation. Similarly, individuals would not be artificially divided, 
but would be free to build meaningful and useful relationships in the absence of 
competitive tensions. Furthermore, major social and cultural institutions such as 
universities and churches would be brought into the political process and required to 
give their users an effective input. This would involve more than a simple airing of 
views, since users would have the right to question organisational and policy 
decisions, and would be offered direct representation in these decisions (ibid. 256-
257). And this would all take place within a participative, local democratic setting, 
whereby the citizenry would have a strong say in all aspects of policy-making, 
including the economic, social and cultural investment of public funds (ibid. ch.9). 
 
At first sight, and on its own terms, this extension of democratic norms is 
commendable. If nothing else, it would make people much more aware of the value 
conflicts and resource limitations which necessitate compromise in all aspects of 
social, political and economic life. By learning about the sheer complexity of the 
social world, and the implications of that complexity for collective human action, 
individuals under Gould‟s system would become more autonomous, in so far as their 
ideals and behaviour would likely adapt to better reflect and fit their non-ideal 
circumstances. Nevertheless, there is clearly nothing to say that this adaptive 
behaviour would improve chances for individual self-development. For Gould‟s 
politics say nothing to the divisions which undermine the coherence of political 
communities and which would surely only be exacerbated by her changes to the size 
and role of the state. 
 
Gould‟s approach thus illustrates the limitations of any weak form of communitarian 
agonism. By aiming at the institutional level, it does too little to address the 
constitutive „lack‟ at the heart of our identities and too little to motivate our 
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potentiality for a respectful pluralistic community. Individuals would not be truly 
agonistically autonomous (in Connolly‟s sense of understanding their relations to 
different others) because the ideological conflicts which would now overlap the 
public/private distinction would still be able to exercise unchecked influence over 
their identities and positions. Indeed, the sheer number of routine decisions that 
would be politicised would surely only energise these conflicts. At best, Gould‟s 
system would therefore be paralysed by gridlock, while at its worst, it could provoke 
violent and revolutionary cleavages. Gould‟s extensive political autonomy would 
thus erode freedoms since, in a reversal of the usual collective action problem, 
individuals would probably realise that their withdrawal from politics would hand 
power to their opponents. Thus cursed by their nascent acumen, the citizenry would 
therefore quite rationally sustain unwinnable political conflicts out of a simple fear of 
defeat. 
 
Since greater access to decision-making is alone insufficient to ensure civility and 
respect between autonomous individuals, radical democrats must therefore provide 
an explanation as to how an agonistic democracy can lead directly to political 
harmony. Returning to Wall‟s distinction, that is, they must rely on the more rather 
than less stringent link between freedom and self-government. On this strong 
interpretation of political autonomy, freedom requires not only the collective 
administration of political power, but that the citizenry personally identify with this 
administration and its outcomes (Wall, 2000: 232). It is not enough to empower 
individuals, in other words, simply to foster agonistic respect. It is also necessary to 
consciously incorporate and legitimise the plurality of moral views within 
democratic institutions, in order to encourage citizens to internalise the intimate 
connections between their plural identities (Owen, 2008: 223-225). 
 
This is broadly what Benjamin Barber (2004) seeks to do by embedding democratic 
politics as a „way of life‟. For Barber, the strength of a democracy rests upon the 
strength and depth of the bonds between the citizenry. Since pluralism will always 
tend to pull people in different directions, it is never guaranteed that, collectively, the 
citizenry will act as a „community‟. Thus, in contrast to what Barber (ibid. ch. 9) 
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characterises as neglectful, „thin‟ approaches to will the community into existence, 
through hypothetical liberal devices such as the social contract, and tyrannical, 
„unitarian‟ attempts to force it, through nationalistic mythical foundations, an 
effective, strong democracy would simply strengthen the civic bonds between the 
citizenry. Citizenship, in other words, cannot rest upon mere rights or a shared 
history. To be truly autonomous, the demos must instead learn and seek to come 
together as neighbours – rather than flounder apart as strangers – in order to 
collectively identify and address their common concerns (ibid. 200). 
 
Thus, by turning to participatory democratic politics, Barber returns us to Honig‟s 
political paradox. Like Honig, he sees the problem and solution as cyclical; the desire 
to understand and engage with one another is itself the product of efficacious 
democratic engagement (Barber, 2004: 198, 223). Yet as he is keen to point out 
elsewhere, the demos must always recognise its freedom from artificial foundational 
constraints (Barber, 1996: 352). As such, politics, understood as „a necessity for 
public action, and thus for reasonable public choice, in the presence of conflict‟ is an 
inevitable consequence of communal living (even if we do not recognise this) as 
much as it is the intentional outcome of other-regarding behaviour (Barber, 2004: 
120-121). The key to an effective democracy, then, is to recognise every collective 
activity as an opportunity for democratic politics and communal self-governance, in 
order to develop individual identities as citizens, concerned with „the common 
ordering of individual needs and wants into a single vision of the future‟ (ibid. 224).  
 
Accordingly, Barber‟s proposals (set out in ibid. ch. 10) are mainly intended to 
strengthen the personal bonds between the citizenry by creating and strengthening 
various communities and sub-communities. Through such mechanisms as the 
decentralisation of both legislative and judicial powers to local assemblies, and the 
extension of civic duties to include service on these assemblies, his proposals seek 
first of all to force people to take collective, communal ownership of their immediate 
affairs. To avoid parochialism, however, a second, wider layer of community would 
be fostered, by bringing separate localities together through long-distance town-hall 
style meetings. In these meetings, different communities would be encouraged to 
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both work together on shared problems and to assess and challenge one another‟s 
practices. These processes would be aided by a still wider, third layer of community, 
which would be created through compulsory forms of civil and military service and 
volunteer programs. Such programs would serve to create random but strong 
connections between individuals from different communities in order to channel 
information from the national to the local levels. And at that national level, the 
various layers and communities would all help to regulate one another through direct 
representation in parliamentary institutions and participation in regional and national 
referenda. 
 
In Barber‟s thoroughly democratised society, there would therefore be little room for 
people to privatise their ethical and normative commitments. Yet there would be 
little room for endless conflict, either. Individuals would be so interimbricated in one 
another‟s affairs that they would simply have to come to practical agreements. To put 
this more positively, a strong democracy would offer almost endless opportunities to 
encounter and learn from differences, and to experience autonomous agency by 
forming working agreements. Indeed, this seems to be the very point of the exercise 
for Barber, who sees the aim of strong democracy as forging a „creative consensus‟, 
a dynamic, collective agreement arising from „citizens‟ active and perennial 
participation in the transformation of conflict through the creation of common 
consciousness and political judgement‟ (ibid. 224).  
 
To paraphrase Wall (2000: 237-238), it is nevertheless important not to confuse the 
equanimity that might be gained by tying people so closely together with the affable 
civility required for agnostic pluralism to be itself a source of personal fulfilment and 
satisfaction. Indeed, successfully strengthening democracy might come at the cost of 
actually weakening the long-term commitments individuals have to society. As 
Gray‟s (2000a: 6) more pessimistic arguments demonstrate, all that can be 
reasonably expected from the kind of agonistic politics offered by Barber is a „modus 
vivendi‟, a set of „terms on which different ways of life can live well together‟ under 
„common institutions‟. For, our plural values are incommensurable, in that they are 
often mutually contradictory, and indeterminate, in that they cannot be rationally 
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ordered or contained within a coherent set of values (ibid. 6-10). As such, once our 
beliefs and lifestyles are all politicised, it is not enough for political institutions to 
merely show neutrality between the different moral doctrines which would arise, 
because this neutrality would itself have to presuppose a specific and controversial 
moral vision. They must instead abandon their hubristic appeals to reason and accept 
that political settlements will always be situated and provisional (ibid. ch. 4). 
 
To embrace this agnostic agonism, however, is effectively to return the citizenry to a 
kind of ethical „state of nature‟, whereby people must conduct politics with little or 
no reference to the „right‟ (Gray, 2000b: 15). The collective judgements that will be 
made in any one setting, that is, can only reflect the contingent trade-offs and 
concessions deemed necessary by the parties involved. Political actors would 
therefore be less principled and more maximising, progressively sacrificing their 
marginally least valuable goal for reciprocal benefits until the value of the sacrifice 
equates to the value of the benefit. As such, the only dimension along which a modus 
vivendi could be evaluated would be its rationality, the Pareto efficiency with which 
it attends to the interests of its various parties. Yet such a shift in public perceptions 
would put a tremendous amount of pressure on the democratic process. Whilst 
efficient outcomes could be expected to maintain public harmony and retain public 
support, it seems likely that systematic inefficiencies would lead to anomie, 
disillusionment or even rejection and extremism. To fully understand the possible 
fate of an agnostic system it is thus important to turn ultimately to the question of 
how effectively it could actually satisfy its citizens. 
 
The weakness of strong democracy 
 
The key problem for any democracy is that, by and large, the intentions of political 
actors make little difference to democratic outcomes (J. Friedman, 2005: xiii-xv). 
This is, first of all, simply a problem of knowledge. As it was argued in chapter 
three, societies and their problems are simply too large and complex for any one 
individual to fully understand. Social dynamics, individual actions and the myriad 
past and present government policies are intertwined in such a way that it is 
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effectively impossible to decipher and outline the chain of causality which led to any 
particular social phenomenon. And, to make matters worse, social phenomena 
always occur to us as largely historical events, so the only way we can theorise about 
them is through difficult counterfactual reasoning (ibid. xii). For all intents and 
purposes, therefore, the social world is not a world of individual (or even 
governmental) intentions and results, but rather a world of pervasive and cross-
cutting unintended consequences, in which no one can really be held responsible for 
anything more than a fragment of the overall pattern of social outcomes. 
 
Since we cannot understand our impacts upon the social world, it follows that, 
secondly, we cannot exercise control over it. For one thing, we are ourselves a 
product of numerous inputs and events which we cannot fully understand, so our 
actions will themselves channel social dynamics independently of our intentions 
(ibid. xiii). Even if we were completely autonomous, however, it would still not be 
possible to exert effective control because we can simply never know what the 
effects of our actions will be. Moreover, this problem is only compounded by 
democratic politics. As citizens, we are required to make decisions not only on those 
aspects of society which affect us, but on the whole social agenda. And we do not 
decide directly, but by either voting for or lobbying to change the direction of 
government. As voters, we therefore need to know not only what it is that needs to be 
done to exert desirable change, but also how and where exactly we need to exert 
influence in the complex institutional structure of government to enact those changes 
(Somin, 1998: 418). Evidence shows, however, that very few voters even understand 
what different branches of government exist, let alone how they work (ibid. 415-
419). 
 
Remarkably, the agonistic argument nevertheless suggests that a radical democracy 
would not impose particularly demanding constraints on political activity. As a 
pragmatic search for a universally acceptable polity, rather than any particular ideal, 
the parties to a modus vivendi would merely be required to compromise and negotiate 
so as to head off possible incendiary issues (Gray, 2000a: 105). On Rawls‟s (1993) 
famous argument, of course, this movement away from pure, abstract reasoning 
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would be a descent into amoral bargaining. Yet, on a closer reading of the agonistic 
argument, it does not even demand this much. The whole point of Barber‟s strong 
democracy, for instance, is for the multi-layered forms of democratic interaction to 
be self-regulating. They would mobilise practical and decentralised „experiential‟ 
reasoning, whereby the limits to collective judgements would simply reflect that 
which the demos deems acceptable to allow (qua concede) its various groups at the 
margin in order to sustain communal ties (Barber, 2004: 164-167). Since this 
acceptability will have limits, it is thus plausible to claim, as Horton (2006: 164-165) 
does, that a modus vivendi will always be „in some sense “acceptable” to the parties 
to it‟, without their having to know in advance what the limits to this acceptability 
are. 
 
While it seems to be the case that an agonistic democracy solves some of the 
problems of liberal democratism described by Friedman, however, in fact it simply 
commits them on a grander scale. For it relies perhaps more than any other form of 
democracy on the assumption that intentions are synonymous with outcomes. So 
long as people are immersed in democratic institutions, and so long as they get into 
the democratic spirit, it‟ll all work out in the end. Yet this optimism belies the fact 
that a radical democracy would still have to solve the same range of problems which 
confront and confound contemporary liberal democracies. To name but a few recent 
British examples, they would still have to deal with issues ranging from demographic 
change and immigration to standards and fees in higher education, and from the 
liquidity requirements of recession-hit banks to the problems posed by powerful civil 
servants discussed in chapter six. Indeed, these problems would surely only be 
exacerbated, as even more aspects of private life would be politicised and 
problematised as issues of fairness and equity within ever more complex democratic 
institutions.  
 
At first sight, this increased politicisation is perhaps indicative of the value of a 
radical polity. The only way in which an issue would reach the agenda would be that 
it does constitute a problem between a set of citizens or groups. Accordingly, 
allowing individuals ever greater agency to instantiate political interaction does seem 
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to be an important step towards ending the marginalisation of minorities. In so far as 
individuals are unfree in liberal democracies, however, it is not because they cannot 
get involved in the political process as such, but rather because they are not able to 
make those choices which directly affect their quality of life. It is when these choices 
are made on our behalf in the interests of others that we are oppressed, because this 
leaves us unable to achieve the well-being and prosperity that we could otherwise 
achieve. 
 
In a radical democracy, we would be similarly unable to make these choices. Bereft 
of the common, monetary medium of exchange, we would have no way of 
understanding the true costs and benefits of the choices in front of us, because there 
would be no way for others to communicate to us their likely reactions in the event 
of each of our choices. That is, since we would all harbour different expectations 
about the consequences of the options we face, we would inevitably make 
agreements based upon a misunderstanding of one another‟s beliefs – agreements 
which, if we had accurate knowledge about their consequences, we would not have 
chosen. As a result, a radical polity would quickly become chaotic, as our 
preferences would reverberate through society only in a chronically distorted fashion. 
The remote individuals we rely upon for our quality of life would have no idea (and 
no incentive to find out) how their actions could better incorporate our interests, and 
we would constantly be left dissatisfied. Participative democratic processes would 
leave us impotent here, as they would prevent us from learning precisely where our 
decisions led to unacceptable costs. Instead of encouraging manageable and mutually 
beneficial adjustments, the promise of radical democracy would leave individuals 
trapped by their own ideals, lacking any reason to face the unromantic reality that not 
all of these ideals can be realised at once. 
 
Consider the nature of decision-making in a direct democracy. The institutional 
structure therein would largely direct the attentions of the citizenry towards local 
decisions in order to ease and encourage their practical engagement with the political 
life of their society. After all, the most plausible epistemic claims for agnostic 
democratism are that it allows those with the most relevant knowledge to make 
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decisions on any given issue. On the specific questions of what it is an individual 
wants or does not want, this is indeed a plausible claim. But as the issue widens to 
include how to combine those preferences with other individuals‟ preferences, as it 
must agonistically, it becomes more tenuous. It is not enough for a direct democracy 
to simply mobilise reactive preferences regarding other peoples‟ choices, because the 
key requirement for the decision is for these preferences and choices to dovetail. 
Unless the issue is purely local (qua trivial) – regarding, say, where to place a 
memorial – local issues cannot be decided purely at the local level, because they 
have unavoidable fiscal and moral implications for others. It is this, surely, which 
motivates both Gould and Barber to embed their local politics within regional and 
national systems. Once this is accepted, however, it follows that local political issues 
are just subsidiaries of wider, national politics. If a local decision is to be minimally 
acceptable to all, it must tap into national streams of information. 
 
The attempt to mobilise information from our daily, localised lives thus relies upon 
the implicit assumption that one‟s daily life is representative of the polity as a whole. 
But because it is rarely representative in this way, it is largely unhelpful. As Ilya 
Somin (1998: 420-421) shows, most people interact with no more than a tiny number 
of the issues which fuel politics in their day-to-day activities. And when they do, it is 
still necessary to have a very good knowledge of what their experiences really show, 
and what course of action they correspondingly suggest. Yet possessing this 
knowledge would tend to render one‟s daily experiences largely irrelevant. Those 
who do rely upon their daily lives as a source of information are thus probably the 
least able to make good use of it. Ominously, such individuals are likely to fall into 
the destructive trap of seeing their own viewpoint as the only reasonable viewpoint, 
and to consequentially believe that social problems are a result of bad intentions on 
the part of evil others (J. Friedman, 2005: xvi-xxi). An agonistic turn towards 
localism, therefore, might serve only to reinforce these attitudes, or else to turn 
whole communities against one another. 
 
An agonistic democracy would thus have no alternative but to rely more explicitly on 
heuristic devices to streamline and stylise information for easy public interpretation 
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and consumption. Such accessible information in an agonistic polity can come, 
broadly, from two sources: elites and opinion leaders, and „issue publics‟, experts 
who concentrate on publicising specific, otherwise impenetrable problem areas 
(Somin, 1998: 424-431). Notably, both Barber‟s and Gould‟s systems seem to 
mobilise these heuristics. Barber, it will be recalled, seeks to create cross-cutting 
communities of well-informed civil volunteers and civil champions engaged closely 
with national politics. Gould, alternatively, argues for the democratisation of cultural 
and social institutions by empowering and bringing into wider political processes 
those specifically affected by them. In both cases, and with both heuristics, the 
agonistic polity can rely upon its primary epistemic advantage, allowing the best-
placed to select and transmit the most relevant information for use in wider 
democratic decision-making. 
 
Notwithstanding the question of how well they could be expected to disseminate 
information to the demos, the efficacy of these heuristics depends upon the quality of 
the information elites provide. As Pareto (1935) demonstrated, however, the trouble 
with elites is that they tend to have their own agendas. Not least, their very position 
gives them a special set of interests, which are tied to gaining and maintaining power 
and status. As such, agonists cannot rely upon ordinary citizens performing this role 
because, over time, they would be changed by the pleasures and privileges of their 
position. Moreover, since their modus operandi is largely tied to justifying their own 
position, they would tend quite rationally to overstate their cases and place too much 
emphasis on the issues they are concerned with (Somin, 1998: 425). And these points 
are all independent of the question of how well informed elites actually are. When 
the relevant knowledge concerns how to dovetail different preferences and beliefs, 
specialised professionals and experts are subject to the same drastic cognitive 
limitations in the face of the same mass of information as their lay publics. What 
they can perhaps offer is in-depth knowledge about what a specific problem or 
position requires. But if this is the case, they will only be useful in concert, so the 
individual would be left with the same problems concerning the selection and co-
ordination of information as in the first instance. 
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Given their faults, experts and commentators are likely to leave the citizenry in an 
even worse position than this, however. Because of the prominence given to value 
pluralism in an agnostic democracy, the key danger is that individuals will look to 
information leaders who share either their ethnic, national or religious background or 
their particular moral or political commitments, on the assumption that they will 
share the same interests. If there is a general tendency in this direction, it will 
privilege those who seek to unify their communities by exaggerating and prolonging 
ethnic and moral divisions (ibid.). Regardless of agonistic intentions, this would 
contribute to ethnic and economic segregation and turn politics into an irremediable 
power game, whereby each group simply tries to pursue its own artificially exclusive 
interests to the detriment of others (ibid. 429). And in such a situation, ultimate 
outcomes would depend upon the relative cultural and economic capital of the 
various groups, rather than any equalising or equilibrating tendencies inherent within 
the democratic process. 
 
The upshot of these observations is that an agonistic democracy would not dovetail 
individual intentions, regardless of how altruistic and well-meaning those intentions 
are. Agonism, in short, is simply too burdensome for the democratic forum. 
Confronted with an incomprehensible mass of information, individuals would have 
no choice but to submit to institutions with a tendency to confuse and divide, rather 
than clarify and unite. Agonistic democracies would thus be as irrational in Pareto 
terms as their liberal counterparts, because they would lead to sacrifices on the part 
of some which far outweigh the benefits to others. And such tendencies towards 
disequilibrium and inequality could only be politically destabilising. For however 
ignorant the citizenry is, it is likely to be able to discern systematic inequities clearly 
enough, even if it cannot rectify them. It follows that if a radical democracy is to 
better deliver on its agonistic promises to both include and integrate disparate groups 
and to evince human excellence through diversity, it needs to go far beyond 
democratic processes limited in both scope and ambition. It needs to turn instead to 
the more capable decentralised institutions which evolved for this very purpose. 
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Agonistic capitalism 
 
Perhaps surprisingly, given its strong association with the political left, we can see 
that agonistic democratism lends itself strongly to traditional liberal arguments 
before we even begin to consider the implications of its failures. The argument from 
Nietzsche, Arendt, Mouffe and Connolly might support extending democratic 
freedoms but it also points heavily in the direction of economic freedoms as well. 
Indeed, with their considerably lighter historical baggage, it is plausible to argue, 
prima facie, that markets would be far more capable of realising agonistic goals than 
any possible democratic institution. While democracies must struggle with the 
contradiction between giving individuals freedom and allowing others to forcefully 
object to that freedom, market institutions allow people to choose for themselves 
which aspects of their ethical and personal lives to bring into the public sphere. 
Unlike democratic citizens, therefore, market actors can negotiate public agreements 
where possible and swiftly withdraw to the private when scrutiny is too oppressive. 
And it is not enough to object here that this presupposes a controversial morality of 
privatism, because this privacy is aimed at nothing more than allowing individuals as 
much freedom as possible within the constraints of human community – precisely the 
goal of agonism. 
 
Markets also surpass democratic institutions by effectively constitutionalising 
agonistic respect. Indeed, that we cannot everywhere find this in modern 
democracies is itself an indicator of the failures of democratic institutions, which 
have proven poorly able to educate people of the clear and strong interconnections 
and interdependencies in modern societies. Democratic citizens, as a result, are too 
disposed to see themselves as individual in what Hayek (1980a) saw as the „false‟ 
sense of the term. In concentrating on their self-sufficiencies and independence, they 
ignore how important other individuals‟ choices and actions are in creating their 
prosperity and in giving them the freedom to be individual in the first place. Market 
actors, of course, would not necessarily be any more enlightened. But they would 
nevertheless act as if they were. Since all economic actions are fundamentally co-
operative agreements, market participants must treat others with at least minimal 
levels of courtesy, tolerance and open-mindedness simply to avoid isolation and 
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economic failure. By bringing disparate groups together in this amicable fashion, a 
market would thus prompt individuals to learn about one another and to forge truly 
respectful, agonistic relationships where they are warranted. 
 
This is not to say that market actors are all themselves open-minded liberals. With 
Gray, traditional liberalism is agonistic on moral and ethical questions. Market actors 
are required to do nothing more than uphold those basic conditions necessary for the 
continuance of the market society (more of which in chapter eight) and to respect the 
terms of voluntary contracts. They are therefore free to hold any particular moral 
doctrine and to realise that doctrine as their relations with other allow. Accordingly, 
the results of market activity themselves constitute a modus vivendi. Unlike 
democracies, however, market actors construct and adapt their modi vivendi 
unknowingly and unintentionally. Since market institutions automatically select and 
transmit the information relevant to any given individual decision-maker via price 
signals and profits, free market actors can make the best possible personal decisions 
with no reference or thought to how others will be affected (J. Friedman, 2005: xxix-
xxx). In this way, individual market decisions tend to dovetail even between the most 
implacably opposed groups. 
 
According to Hayek (1980b), this tendency towards dovetailing is as close as we can 
get to an actual equilibrium qua modus vivendi. Equilibrium pertains, Hayek (ibid. 
39-40) argues, when our plans are based upon correct beliefs concerning the plans of 
all others‟ so that, ex post, we would find that our subjective ideas exactly matched 
the objective facts. Of course, since this concept allows no room for changes in the 
social and economic environment, the point of equilibrium can only ever be 
hypothetical, an ever-moving target which shifts before it can be known that change 
has occurred. Nonetheless, the information transmitted by market institutions is itself 
dynamic, because it is constantly modified by successive decisions. As such, the 
market decision is generally optimal to its time and place, because based on the best 
available information in that time and place (ibid. 50-52). Applied to the modus 
vivendi, this means that even though there could always conceivably be a better 
196 
 
agreement, as the agonistic account emphasises, markets provide the best possible 
non-ideal set of arrangements at any one point. 
 
The failure of agonism is not to recognise this problem of disequilibrium. 
Information is not only supposed to be easily accessible, but also static, so that it can 
disperse around the polity without a change in initial positions requiring a new set of 
information to be dispersed. This has to be the case, otherwise the demos would 
always be in disharmony, perpetually playing catch-up with little hope of any 
constructive co-operation. Yet with an apparently infinite number of potential 
overlapping political debates, and a citizenry encouraged to challenge one another at 
every opportunity, this assumption is fanciful. The agonistic system advocated by 
Barber, Gould and Mouffe simply couldn‟t work, because those tasked with acting 
upon the implications of the democratic process would not be able to tell what those 
implications are. Instead, the danger would be that well-meaning democrats would be 
quickly squeezed out, because their politics would produce no results and because 
they would be unwilling to persevere given the unintended results of their 
experiment. As Hayek (2007: ch. 10) argues, under these conditions only those 
willing to stamp out dissent and diversity in pursuit of „results‟ and „progress‟ would 
prosper. Indeed, such individuals would willingly pay lip-service to a radical 
democracy which removed the liberal shackles from their demagoguery and 
jingoism. Yet their final ends would, in all likelihood, be collectivist, nationalist and 
totalitarian, because these would be the only ends able to command assent under the 
chaotic conditions of an agonistic society (ibid. 159-161). 
 
The only way to avoid this potential catastrophe is to abandon the commitment to 
deeply democratic institutions and to base the agonistic project within civil and 
market processes, which are better equipped for and quicker at dispersing 
information. For it is only in this way that individuals will be able to freely converge 
on mutually beneficial and personally fulfilling agreements. Moreover, such a move 
towards a more market-based society would actually help democracy to work more 
effectively (Somin, 1998: 433-435). The considerable reduction in the size and scope 
of democratic institutions would drastically reduce the cognitive and temporal 
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democratic demands placed on the citizenry. And limiting the extent of 
interventionist state action would render political debates significantly less divisive. 
Since the terms of the modus vivendi would be effectively set in the marketplace, 
political debates would be able to concentrate more constructively on relatively low-
stake issues concerning basic regulations and protections. Individuals would thus be 
freed from their reliance upon distortive and limiting heuristics. They would be much 
more able to construct and present their own viewpoints and would come together as 
a political community. Yet this community would simply not have any meaning 
bereft of its wider classical liberal institutional framework. It is therefore to this 
framework – rather than to the political – that we must ultimately look when 
constructing an agonistic society. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Despite the somewhat trenchant criticisms of substantive communitarianism‟s 
agonistic turn set out in this chapter, it provides perhaps the most useful account of 
the problems raised by difference and diversity in modern societies. Indeed, the 
emergence of stubborn challenges to liberalism in the twentieth century – both 
locally and globally – does largely explain the movement away from traditional 
arguments within the liberal canon. As Gray (1995) argues, modern liberals have 
sought to shift the ground of their arguments in order to justify the imposition of an 
outdated and fundamentally illiberal power structure on ever more „delinquent‟ 
groups. But substantive communitarianism errs by seeing an emasculated democracy 
as the only answer to this problem because such a democracy would, at best, simply 
collapse back into elitism. While staying true to the agonistic argument, it would be 
far more productive to return to the classical liberal arguments which were so readily 
abandoned in the twentieth century. For these arguments were not left behind 
because they were no longer salient, but because they would have led to the very 
same radical pluralism which agonists seek to realise. Classical liberalism holds no 
truths sacred, and it militates against established political power. In effect, it offers 
the very pragmatic response to historical, demographic and intellectual change which 
substantive communitarians seek. As such, and to understand the true potential of 
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classical liberal arguments to the problems and dilemmas of multiculturalism, it is to 
this pragmatism to which we must now turn. 
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8. Conclusion: Liberalism and pragmatism 
 
None of the four possible democratic responses to multiculturalism is able to provide 
a practical solution to the problems it raises. Despite their genuine attempts to 
reinvigorate democracy as an epistemological method, they are blind to the obstacles 
which stand in the way of an efficient democratic process. In their stead, it has been 
shown that the best way of achieving this efficiency would be to realise the discovery 
processes found within civil society. It remains to be seen, however, how this liberal 
alternative could solve the dilemmas of multiculturalism. To fill this lacuna, and to 
show why deliberative and liberal democrats alike ought to embrace classical 
liberalism, this concluding chapter seeks to examine the classical and democratic 
alternatives alike through the lens of pragmatism. In so far as these alternatives are 
similar, it is demonstrated that this is because they each embody an open-minded, 
pragmatic approach to problem-solving. By exploring the development of pragmatic 
thought, it is nevertheless shown that the stronger and lesser democratic arguments 
alike err by neglecting the pragmatic requirement to treat their own methods 
pragmatically. Classical liberalism‟s comparative strength lies in its ability not only 
to efficiently solve problems, but to also evaluate different methods of problem-
solving. In this way, it offers the best hope for solving the problems and dilemmas of 
multiculturalism, and it ought to be embraced as such. 
 
The argument so far 
 
We began this dissertation by noting the peculiar responsibilities attached to political 
studies. These responsibilities arise because the study of politics is a form of politics, 
the outcomes of which inevitably elicit responses from real-world political agents. 
Now, as we come to our conclusion, it is worth reflecting on the fact that, after its 
own logic, this hermeneutical statement must itself have political implications. If we 
are going to alter our subject matter, our ethical intuitions suggest that we should 
concentrate our attentions on social problems which these alterations might plausibly 
help to ameliorate. We should act pragmatically, in other words, with the explicit 
intention of solving rather than creating social problems. And we should assess the 
fruits of our efforts according to their practical effects, and whether they go any way 
towards the alleviation of our chosen problems. In order to re-iterate the basis of this 
study, then, and to confirm and illustrate its practical and political implications, this 
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final chapter will show how and with what results it has sought to act upon these two 
maxims. 
 
Using the insights of classical political economy, the several chapters of this 
dissertation have sought to assess how well the democratic turn in political theory 
can resolve rather than reify the dilemmas of multiculturalism (explored in chapter 
one). Thus, it has been broadly shown that the various arguments posed in response 
to these dilemmas offer untenable solutions. In the first instance, they are grounded 
by a set of moral presuppositions which are unsuited to the new world of 
ethnographic value pluralism (chapter two). Moreover, it has shown that their 
methods would be unlikely to lead in practice to anything except further strife. Since 
they derive their particular democratic methods from contentious and competing 
political ideals rather than from a genuine assessment of the epistemic problems 
posed by radical pluralism, deliberative democracies would surely be self-defeating. 
The more individualist democrats, for instance, would pit egalitarians against 
libertarians (chapter four) or citizens against their communities (chapter five). More 
communitarian-leaning democrats, meanwhile, would leave individuals at the mercy 
of statist (chapter six) or cultural elites (chapter seven). Even if the multicultural 
dilemmas were of little significance before, these outcomes would be sure to inflame 
them. 
 
The various deliberative democratic arguments have therefore been shown to be 
distinctly unpragmatic. Universally, they seem to simply ignore the practicalities of 
real-world democratic experiences. Perhaps surprisingly, then, and especially in 
terms of their more critical edges, the deliberative arguments themselves have 
nevertheless been shown to be very valuable. This value results from their rather 
paradoxical proximity to the pragmatic commitment to problem-solving. It will be 
recalled that the deliberative and participative democratic ideals examined herein 
were offered in response to the perceived inadequacies of liberal representative 
democracies. Under plural conditions, inequalities and injustices reach down to the 
very foundational norms of liberalism, leaving the legitimacy and efficacy of liberal 
decision-making perennially open to challenge. As such, empowering individuals 
201 
 
through radical democratic processes seems to offer an improvement to democratic 
problem-solving which is seemingly pragmatic in two senses. In the first sense, it 
embodies a sheer improvement to the status quo. In the second, it goes much further 
to provide a vision of what ideal democratic problem-solving should look like. 
 
Even if it is not convincing, this has been shown to be a powerful vision. According 
to the various deliberative arguments, a strong and participative democracy promises 
to achieve harmony by being responsive to the changing needs of its citizens. That is, 
it seeks to give individuals the freedom to construct and live by their own moral 
goods (chapter four) whilst protecting the freedom and autonomy of the civil sphere 
so that these goods can evolve (chapter five). An ideal deliberative democracy would 
therefore be dynamic, since individuals would likely be far more responsive to real-
world social problems than the state. Moreover, if the deliberative process was 
agonistic it would guarantee restive groups the opportunity to challenge a society‟s 
moral goods, whatever their content (chapter seven), so that the outcomes of these 
various processes would be seen by all as fair and legitimate (chapter six). On the 
basis of this dynamism, the strong form of democracy explored herein promises to 
deliver the best possible decisions concerning how, as a society, we should act. In 
this sense, it is useful to view the deliberative turn not as an independent canon but 
rather as a direct off-shoot of American pragmatism. More to the point, these 
notional strengths also link it directly to the classical liberal project. 
 
In order to understand how this classical liberal study has itself contributed to the 
solution of social problems, it is therefore apposite to explore the history of 
pragmatic thought. This is firstly because it is by viewing deliberative democratism 
through a pragmatic lens that we can disentangle its overall strengths from its 
weaknesses. As the early pragmatists described in the first section of this chapter 
illustrated, the measure of a political theory lies in its tangible benefits. Accordingly, 
it is only by seeing precisely which aspects of the deliberative account can be 
operationalised that we can settle upon a final appraisal of its value. Furthermore, 
and since we know that deliberativism is not alone sufficient, it is by exploring the 
development of pragmatism that we can secondly understand how to operationalise 
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these strengths. As the third section shows, under John Dewey‟s stewardship 
pragmatism itself developed into a (quasi-) deliberative and egalitarian position, 
which helpfully illustrates the more valuable aspects of contemporary deliberative 
arguments.  
 
Dewey, however, did not write with a view to solving the modern problems 
presented by pluralism. As Richard Rorty‟s influential reading of Dewey illustrates, 
the latter‟s arguments presume too much by grounding our freedoms in the pursuit of 
a collective good. Yet Rorty‟s arguments also run into problems, as the fourth 
sections shows. If we take pluralism seriously, as Rorty instructs, it is unclear how 
we could ever ground a political society at all. Dewey and Rorty thus bring us 
precisely to the problems posed by multiculturalism, so it is by examining their 
impasse that we can fully understand the contemporary importance of classical 
liberalism. 
 
As the chapter and the dissertation wind their way to a conclusion, it is asserted that 
only classical liberalism can allow us to truly confront the problems of pluralism and 
the dilemmas of multiculturalism. For, the discovery mechanisms embodied by 
classical liberalism are the logical conclusion of the pragmatic method. Since we 
cannot offer a genuine basis for political society without controversially trading one 
set of values off against another, the answer is to abandon the hope of 
comprehensively grounding our society altogether. We should seek instead to 
discover the contingent and provisional terms upon which we want (qua need) to live 
together. These terms would embody the best solutions to our ever-changing 
problems, because they would illustrate the kinds of trade-offs that, in practice, we 
deem acceptable. Classical liberalism, in short, offers the solution to the problems of 
modernity by pragmatically eschewing solutions. As such, it should be embraced by 
multiculturalists, liberals, and pragmatic and deliberative democrats alike. 
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Pragmatism 
 
American pragmatism emerged out of an epistemological perspective remarkably 
similar to that outlined in chapter three. Indeed, the early pragmatists offered a mix 
of subjectivism, fallibilism and experientialism which has much in common with 
classical liberalism‟s political agnosticism. This is perhaps surprising, because, as we 
will see, successive pragmatic thinkers have advocated increasingly radical and 
participative democratic processes (see, for example, R. A. Putnam, 2009). Yet the 
speed with which pragmatism is associated with political progressivism belies the 
ambiguities veiled by the development of pragmatic thought. For, pragmatism says 
little about how its neutral methodology should be applied. The way in which Rorty 
has subverted the teachings of the early pragmatists in particular illustrates that there 
is no pragmatically acceptable justification for exclusive and coercive political 
practices. As such, progressive pragmatists are open to criticism for unjustifiably 
elevating their politics above their methods. While this might be understandable, it is 
nevertheless unpragmatic. Pragmatism has much to offer, but it can only do this if it 
is itself employed pragmatically. 
 
This political neutrality was forcefully defended by the first of the American 
pragmatists, Charles S. Peirce. Trained as a chemist, Peirce sought among other 
things to elucidate the role of philosophy in scientific inquiry (Colapietro, 2009: 14). 
In a similar fashion to the positions later taken by Polanyi, Hayek and Vanberg, he 
began from the argument that human inquiry in general is the result of our instinctive 
drive to learn about our environments (ibid. 21). By experiencing these 
environments, individuals form beliefs which act as rules for their behaviour. Since 
successful action requires accurate beliefs, individuals strive to keep these beliefs 
stable. When experience leads them to doubt the propriety of their behaviour, they 
automatically begin a process of inquiry in order to discover the source of this 
impropriety and form new, more stable beliefs (ibid.). It follows that all inquiry has 
the same basic function and structure. However, whilst we might „inquire‟ by 
introspection or by looking to external authorities, according to Peirce only the 
scientific method allows us to genuinely improve our perceptions of the external 
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world (Rosenthal, 2004). As such, the social sciences and philosophy are useful, but 
only to the extent that they are themselves part of general scientific inquiry. 
 
Peirce‟s empiricist thought was a forerunner for pragmatism, rather than positivism, 
because it relies upon perception through experience rather than perception in and of 
itself. Science is a superior method of inquiry because, in contrast to the suppressing 
tendencies of authority, it embraces doubt (Westbrook, 2005: 26). To use Karl 
Popper‟s term, the scientific method advances by trying to falsify past results. As 
such, though the scientific method would lead us to the truth if it were ever carried to 
its final and ultimate conclusion (Misak, 2004: 7), it would only do this because it 
offers the best approach to learning from our experiences, not because science itself 
approximates truth (Hookway, 2004: 146-147). Thus, Peirce (quoted in Colapietro, 
2009: 23) counselled scientists (defined as all serious inquirers) to consider  
 
what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the 
object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the 
whole of our conception of the object. 
 
This has two implications. The first is that the beliefs which result from our inquiries 
are fundamentally inter-subjective, because they must be based upon effects an 
object has in the physical world rather than any specific property it might have. 
Inquiry, therefore, is secondly a communal endeavour, from which no one can be 
justifiably excluded (Hollinger, 1980: 99). 
 
On this basis, Peirce‟s arguments were interpreted by William James as a 
justification of a subjectivist account of pragmatism. For James, Peirce‟s arguments 
showed that the independent nature of the external world is singularly uninteresting. 
In so far as „truth‟ is a meaningful concept, it must track information useful to the 
lived experiences of human beings (James, 2000a: 93-94). That is, a „true‟ 
proposition must correspond to our past experiences, so that we can be reasonably 
confident it will be reliable in the future, and so that it might satisfy our requirements 
for successful action (ibid.) It follows that we should disregard moral and 
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philosophical conundrums – which, leaving so much to our imaginations, can only 
pointlessly divide – in order to focus attention on those issues of practical import 
around which we can achieve agreement (James, 2000a: 39). And, as no one can 
speak for anyone other than themselves, the one principle we can practically agree on 
is the importance of allowing everyone as great a chance as possible to realise their 
own truths (Suckiel, 2009: 39). By implication, James‟s pragmatism therefore 
embodies a form of methodological individualism, whereby our „ultimate‟ truth does 
not denote all that inquiry could tell us (as Peirce would have it), but rather the 
totality of what is and could be useful to us as individuals (Pihlström, 2004: 30-31). 
In this sense, his pragmatism hints at an important point which was seemingly 
abandoned by the later pragmatists but is significant for our purposes. 
 
In The Will to Believe James (2000b) suggests that individuals will often confront 
situations in which there is insufficient evidence to form or act upon pragmatically 
valid beliefs. In these ambiguous moral or political situations, the „right‟ course of 
action is likely to be fiercely contested and yet we must still take action. Thus, 
whatever we do, whether we act or refrain from acting, our actions will embody a 
subjective choice (ibid. 218). Since we cannot turn to our intellect to make these 
kinds of choices, James counsels us to trust our passions or our volition, which he 
broadly construes as our „faith‟ (ibid. 200). As Ellen Suckiel (2009: 36-37) shows, 
this is significant because it allows pragmatism to deal with complex and indefinite 
problems, such as those which presuppose faith in their solution before they can be 
solved. James‟s (2000b: 214-215) examples here relate to religion and to collective 
action problems. In these cases, an actor‟s basic tendencies (whether she is inclined 
to believe in God/whether she is willing to trust others) often become self-fulfilling, 
because they illuminate the very miraculous proofs (or disproofs), or create the very 
fact of trust (or cynicism), which she would otherwise need to discover before acting.  
 
If we substitute here the belief in the democratic process for the belief in God, and 
the anarchy of an unregulated state for the collective action problem, we can begin to 
see the significance of James‟s pragmatism for the multiculturalists set out above. 
We live in a world now so thoroughly embroiled in state-led politics that it is 
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impossible to know what the state is and isn‟t responsible for, and what would and 
would not be the case if the state had not intervened or if it had intervened more 
heavily or more democratically. It is therefore a question of faith whether or not 
democratism has provided us with the benefits and successes of modern life, as we 
need to suppose that democracy works better (or worse) than the classical liberal 
alternative if we are to find proof for our beliefs. As such, there can be no a priori 
solution to the political problems we face today. Just as God-fearing and atheist 
actors alike can look around and find evidence which proves them right and which 
therefore adds value to their lived experience, actors divided between their 
respective faiths in political compromises and market freedoms could, conceivably, 
each find evidence which proves them right and which improves their lives. The 
difference is, however, that while many societies offer religious and secular 
freedoms, none – least of all the radical democracies explored above – offer 
economic and political freedoms. On James‟s argument this would seem both 
unpragmatic, as it precludes our learning about other ways of living, and unjustified, 
as it is the very opposite of what we would need to do to improve peoples‟ lives. 
 
These implications of James‟s thought are likely to seem unfamiliar, because James‟s 
political impact has been overshadowed by the illustrious John Dewey, who wrote 
directly on political theory (Westbrook, 2005: 52-54). In this sense, it is James‟s 
nominalism, which he shared with the latter (rather than his individualism which he 
didn‟t) that has had the greater influence on pragmatism. It will be recalled that, for 
James, our beliefs are only ever the product of our experiences. Thus, the analytical 
concepts we use to connect and make sense of our beliefs must themselves be 
subjective constructions. As our personal experiences will necessarily be limited, 
most of our knowledge will inevitably be a product of the experiences amassed over 
time and passed down, via language, in the historical record (Kloppenberg, 1996: 
104-105). Accordingly, James‟s pragmatism seems to point clearly towards the 
importance of the community. For it implies that individuals cannot be ontologically 
distinct. Since their constitutive beliefs will inevitably overlap, they must be 
mutually co-dependent (Westbrook, 2005: 66-69). Inquiry must always and 
everywhere be a co-operative, communal venture. In the context of Peirce‟s 
pragmatism, which counsels that beliefs are useful only in so far as they help us „fit‟ 
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with the environment, it follows that we owe it to one another to work together to 
assess and update our stock of beliefs in the light of experience. 
 
The problem for this rather settled view of pragmatism (offered, for instance, in 
Menand, 2001: ch. 13) is that it is not at all obvious how we should assess and update 
our beliefs (what does it mean for a belief to be „better‟?), or what duties we have 
towards one another (do those materially harmed by a belief have a duty towards a 
greater number of people benefitted to accept it?). After all, it is these very questions 
which divide citizens and theorists alike under conditions of value pluralism. And as 
we have seen, these divisions have proven inherently unworkable. Under the tutelage 
of the academic left, they have degenerated into the more simplistic distinction 
between accepting existing distributions as they are (i.e. accepting liberal 
democratism), and seeking to change them for the better (by giving strength to 
radical democratic mechanisms). This distinction is thoroughly unproductive, 
because, in practice, neither position can speak to the poignant questions which 
concern what we want our society to look like.  
 
Nonetheless, it is precisely this distinction which has divided pragmatists. Since 
pragmatism undercuts all of the false certainties which ground modern society by 
reducing them to language patterns derived from historical experience, we as 
democrats seem to be faced with a clear choice. The first option, of course, is to use 
our reliance upon language as the basis for an egalitarian and participative discursive 
democracy, wherein everyone can come together to achieve the shared aim of 
societal advance. Yet it might be argued that this radicalism does not take the 
fragility of our linguistic freedom seriously. On a more cautious reading, which 
emphasises how lucky we are to inherit liberal freedoms, the most we can hope to do 
is to simply consolidate these gains and spread liberal democracy as far as we 
possibly can. Roughly, these are the respective positions taken by Dewey and Rorty, 
who have led pragmatism along the same divergent paths which we have seen divide 
contemporary democrats from their liberal forebears. Since the former pair seem to 
offer a much more promising politics than the latter, however, we can learn much by 
exploring their respective failures. 
208 
 
John Dewey and deliberative democracy 
 
Dewey‟s extensive contributions to philosophy, pedagogy and political thought are 
particularly edifying for our purposes because they seek to reconcile the very 
structures and agents which, we saw at the outset, have diverged so problematically 
in modern liberal democratic societies. Indeed, Dewey‟s approach seems almost to 
pre-empt contemporary debates over egalitarianism and diversity. Thus, while his 
early „Social Christianity‟ led him to denounce the inequalities and divisions created 
by liberal capitalism in the same fashion as Fraser, he did not ascribe to traditional 
socialism. Instead, he enunciated a form of communitarianism redolent of Taylor, 
based upon the self-realisation of the individual through the community (Westbrook, 
2005: 78-83). This position sought not to enslave people to external political 
economic ideals, but rather to free them from the constraints of atomism by bringing 
them together in the pursuit of the common good. Dewey believed this common 
good – the basis of individual well-being – to be the desired end of pragmatic 
inquiry. His egalitarianism therefore led him to provide a robust defence of 
individual, democratic freedoms. Since we all benefit from what can be learned from 
one another‟s experiences, we have a duty to respect one another as equal and 
independent members of the democratic community (Dewey, 2002: 199). 
 
This teleological view of human communities does not immediately beg the question 
of what the common good is because Dewey grounds it in a wider attempt to set out 
an understanding of how we might assess the desirability of human ends. As Hilary 
Putnam (1995) and Matthew Festenstein (1997: ch. 1-2) show, Dewey‟s 
understanding of the common good is based upon his taking the ethics of Peirce‟s 
pragmatism seriously. Since inquiry is the common human response to our shared 
circumstances and shared problems, individual inquiries can never be purely private. 
Instead, all of our decisions to act rely upon putatively true claims concerning both 
the circumstances that define a problem and the courses of action that can be taken in 
order to solve that problem (Festenstein, 1997: 40). Private decisions, in other words, 
are public contributions to our inter-subjective value-judgements, which describe 
what should be done in any given situation (H. Putnam, 1995: 219-220). Yet we 
cannot simply accept these judgements at face-value, because they are only true in so 
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far as they actually improve our fit with society. They ought, therefore, to undergo 
the same form of rigorous testing as claims offered to the scientific community (ibid. 
223).  
 
This argument injects a complex morality into Dewey‟s conception of individual 
action, which turns not upon the content or outcome of the act but rather upon the 
motive. Thus, individual problem-solving acts are appropriate when the actor has 
done all they can to increase the likelihood of their correctly identifying and solving 
the problem, regardless of whether in the final analysis they are correct in the steps 
they take (Festenstein, 1997: 47). This means that the individual must act in a 
reasonable fashion, given their circumstances, and that they must always accept the 
provisionality of their beliefs. When another, better way of understanding the 
problem comes to light, or where there are reasonable grounds to doubt one‟s current 
understanding, Dewey‟s morality requires the individual to abandon their existing set 
of beliefs in favour of a more suitable and appropriate set. The ends of our actions, 
then, are never entirely given, and they are certainly not the expression of an internal 
or transcendent individuality. Good conduct is not realised by being true to one‟s 
self, but rather by being true to (i.e. making good judgements about) the „needs of the 
specific situation‟ (ibid. 53). To act morally is thus to act autonomously, to reflect on 
how our beliefs impact upon those around us and to grow by developing new beliefs 
which satisfy their needs as much as they satisfy our own. 
 
The parallels between this approach and the Austrian school of economics ought to 
be clear. For, in emphasising the unique contexts in which we encounter social 
problems, Dewey‟s conception of pragmatic inquiry suggests that knowledge is only 
contextual. It is the „knowledge of time and place‟, of Hayek‟s argument. While we 
can build up a body of background beliefs to guide our action (the same beliefs 
embodied by the cognitive rules identified by Polanyi and Vanberg), it is only within 
the specific context of action that these beliefs can be evaluated and improved. In 
Dewey‟s account, then, as in the liberal argument, knowledge consists in nothing 
more than how we interpret our problem-situations (Festenstein, 2001: 734-735). 
This has important political implications, for as the Austrian account emphasises, 
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there can be no a priori way of knowing where a problem may lie. More to the point, 
it reminds us that there can be no structure outside of action. As Josh Whitford 
(2002: 353-354) shows, Dewey‟s pragmatism rejects the dualism that underlies 
dichotomies such as this.
26
 In so far as human activity occurs within structures, these 
are simply dynamic conglomerations of our actions which shape, but do not 
determine, our future actions. If a structure is significant, this is because it simply 
describes a set of morally significant actions. Just as it is our private decisions which 
determine socially beneficial prices, it is our individual acts of interpretation which 
contribute to the common good. 
 
Despite these parallels, Dewey used this nascent, pragmatic form of structuration to 
reject liberal individualism as outdated and inappropriate. The old individualism errs, 
he argued, because it naively treats individuals as a pre-determined bundle of desires 
and wants. Since well-being depends on the satisfaction of these desires, this 
reductivism prioritises agency at the expense of any concept of structure. Man is in 
fact a social being who cannot prosper without a suitable social environment. Thus, 
while laissez-faire liberalism had suited the early American, petty bourgeoisie 
economy, it was poorly suited to the new age of rapacious and corporate capitalism 
(Westbrook, 2005: 83, 121). Therein, if liberalism was to remain relevant for the 
masses, it needed to offer workers the economic and political autonomy which was 
so poorly provided by free markets (Shusterman, 1994: 393). Accordingly, Dewey 
sought to realise a conception of freedom which combines negative liberties with the 
positive capacity for active and reflective judgement. On this rather Rousseauian 
conception, the individual must attain freedom through self-realisation. She will 
come to realise her true and most profound self, that is, when, she devotes herself to 
working with her community to solve rather than create social and environmental 
problems (Festenstein, 1997: 68-69). 
 
                                                          
26
 Whitford explicitly uses his account to attack rational choice theory, a branch of neo-classical 
economics. It is therefore worth emphasising here classical liberalism‟s distance from this school, 
which itself assumes pre-determined truths about human motivations and their means-end analyses 
(Whitford, 2002: 326-329). 
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It is in this common good of collective self-realisations that Dewey illustrates the 
possible achievements of a deliberative democracy, and their relevance to the 
dilemmas of multiculturalism. To understand these achievements, it is worth 
exploring how Dewey circumvents the inevitable objection to his account of social 
inquiry: how can it be known which acts of interpretation and belief are „right‟, and 
thus beneficial for the common good, rather than „wrong‟ and detrimental? Dewey‟s 
argument here is far removed from James‟s agnostic subjectivism, because it requires 
all beliefs to be mutually beneficial. The problem for our purposes is that a belief 
must be open to public questioning if someone disagrees, because the act of 
disagreement creates the very public which individual acts should be other-regarding 
towards (see Festenstein, 1997: 85). Thus, pertinent moral dilemmas – such as how 
we ought to balance the needs of different communities or what rights we should 
have to privacy – will inevitably become active political problems for the plural 
pragmatic state. 
 
The fact that pragmatism is concerned not with finding truths, however, but rather 
with merely realising tangible, practicable solutions to real-world problems removes 
much of the force of these dilemmas. Moral and practical dilemmas only bite when 
they threaten the stability and efficacy of our everyday mores, in which case they 
simply provide an impetus for „the operation of cooperative intelligence‟ (Dewey, 
1987: 143, quoted in Festenstein, 1997: 78). The first (and perhaps obvious) thing to 
note, then, is that the questions of how to balance individual and communal goods 
are not necessarily dilemmas at all. These questions come up in specific contexts and 
between specific actors, each of whom will have some goals they want satisfied, and 
other goods they are willing to compromise on. There is no a priori standard which 
must be satisfied in order to reconcile individual freedom and community coherence, 
for instance, because each individual and each community will want to realise 
different things. While I might offend a bohemian commune by reading Ayn Rand 
and eating a McDonalds, I would feel quite at home amongst home-owning 
cosmopolitan individualists. And if we were to find that the world is populated by 
such cosmopolitans then we would also find that our plurality of wants is not 
incompatible, and should by no means be the cause of political and theoretical hand-
wringing. 
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This might be seen as dodging the problem. The reason there is hand-wringing is that 
our wants are often incompatible. Yet this is to miss the force of the (admittedly 
deceptively simple) pragmatic argument, which seeks to focus our attentions only on 
really-existing problems. For, it is by taking these problems seriously that we do 
justice to one another as moral beings. That is, it is by being open to the possibility 
that one‟s wants are harmful to others, and by being genuinely prepared to solve this 
problem when conflicts arise that we realise the moral good, which is thoroughly 
independent of the outcome (MacGilvray, 2000: 494-496). The acts of interpretation 
and belief which benefit the common good are simply those which constitute genuine 
„experimental‟ attempts to overcome these problems, and which clarify, rather than 
obfuscate, the nature of an eventual solution (ibid.). To return to our opening theme, 
political scientists help by showing us where real, experience-based problems might 
exist in a plural society. But they do no good at all by presupposing a solution 
independent of lived practice. And they are positively harmful when they provide the 
impetus for state action which would close down experimentalism. 
 
To the extent that we can solve the dilemmas of multiculturalism, these solutions will 
only be discovered by our muddling through the contextual problems they present, 
much as scientists muddle through the problems presented by the physical world. On 
Dewey‟s argument, then, the strength of a deliberative form of democracy is that it 
encourages the citizen to subject the results of their inquiries to the same form of 
critical appraisal as scientists. Deliberation, that is, embodies the free, equal and 
inclusive exchange of ideas and beliefs, the rigorous subjection of these beliefs to 
critique and falsification and the openness to change and improve their content in the 
light of experience which Peirce celebrated as the hallmarks of scientific rigour 
(Misak, 2000: 94-96). Of course, we have seen that this conception of democracy 
both has radical implications and raises numerous practical questions. As Jack 
Knight and James Johnson (1996: 87) contend, for instance, it not only requires a 
radical redistribution of resources to ensure „free and equal access for relevant actors 
to all relevant arenas of deliberation, debate and decision‟, but also a sea-change in 
the culture of government to incorporate the results of these processes without 
stifling further inquiry.  
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Yet these questions do not detract from the strengths of the pragmatic conception of 
deliberative democracy. Deliberation is simply the guiding ideal of pragmatic 
democratism, rather than the end in itself which we have seen the various extant 
deliberative theories to decay into (Festenstein, 1997: 81, Misak, 2000: 98, 
MacGilvray, 2000: 502). It is this idealism which both unites and separates these 
arguments with Dewey‟s deliberative pragmatism. For, in the final analysis, they are 
both optimistic visions of the possibilities of human community. Thus, it is no 
coincidence that Dewey‟s democratism would extend both to the civil, associational 
democracy of R. Putnam and Hirst, and the workplace democracy of Gould (see 
Festenstein, 1997: 94-95), even as it seeks to ground the epistemic search for truth in 
the agonistic commitment to never-ending conflict (Misak, 2000: 83). But – and it is 
worth being emphatic here – the ends of Dewey‟s deliberative democratism would be 
realised not through deliberation itself, but through the ultimately liberal view of the 
individual he ascribed to. Given the different cultural, moral and practical problems 
the process is likely to run into, it is up to individuals themselves to realise the ideal 
ends of human flourishing by discovering piecemeal how to harmonise their own 
goods with the communal, common good. 
 
Because Dewey‟s deliberative strengths turn upon his individualism in this way, it is 
important to ask just how much is gained from Dewey‟s socialist, industrial 
democratic idealism. In particular, it is worth considering just how pragmatic it is to 
prioritise autonomy at the expense of economic development. As a superficial point, 
it should be remembered that corporations and large companies are themselves 
pragmatic solutions to the problem of transaction costs which arise from large-scale 
economic activity (Coase, 1937). Taking Dewey‟s interventionist progressivism as 
the basis for pragmatic thought (as, for instance, Kloppenberg, 1998 does) seems 
rather rash. Moreover, and despite the indeterminacy of his deliberativism, like his 
modern-day democratic counterparts Dewey is also weak to the claim that his 
unremitting emphasis on deliberation and exposing oneself to questioning comprises 
an unpragmatic moral good at odds with pluralism (Festenstein, 1997: 99). For this 
norm of reflective self-realisation effectively disallows individuals a private life. 
Since there is so much to be gained from pragmatism, it is thus worth exploring the 
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greatest illustration of these problems – Rorty‟s rather more self-defeating 
pragmatism – to see how we can save it. 
 
Richard Rorty’s liberal democracy 
 
It is useful to see Rorty in the context of what Richard Bernstein has called the 
„resurgence of pragmatism‟. Bernstein (1992: 815-816) argues that Dewey‟s 
„classical‟ form of pragmatism declined with the rise of logical positivism in the 
1930s. Positivism seemed to systematise all that was valuable in pragmatism, but it 
did so in rigorous, commanding terms imported from Europe. As academic 
philosophy became increasingly technical in response to this rigour, philosophers and 
political theorists steadily lost the social and political prominence which Dewey and 
James had enjoyed, and pragmatism‟s influenced waned (Shusterman, 1994: 403). 
Eventually, of course, positivism‟s rule came to an end. But when the postmodern 
linguistic backlash came, it was conducted in the same super-formal, sophisticated 
and effectively unintelligible terms which had characterised positivism (Bernstein, 
1992: 834). Rorty sought to reject this obscurantism, in favour of a more accessible, 
decentralised, and genuinely radical politics of emancipation (ibid. 831-832). While 
he agreed with the postmodernists that individuals are inherently constrained by their 
use of languages, Rorty sought to turn this structural constraint into a pragmatic basis 
for agency. As with Dewey, then, there is much that we can learn by considering 
Rorty‟s perspective as an attempt to overcome the dilemma of structure and agency. 
 
The principal feature of Rorty‟s „philosophy‟ (which, admittedly, he would have 
been loath to see labelled as such) is his anti-foundationalism. He wholeheartedly 
rejected the analytical tradition within which he was trained, because it assumes the 
existence of a „world in itself‟, something objective that could guide our 
investigations and that promises to tell us something of truth about ourselves 
(Westbrook, 2005: ch. 6). On Rorty‟s view, there is simply no such thing as „truth‟. 
There is nothing we can objectively know about ourselves, and nothing in the world 
which we haven‟t ourselves put there (Boffetti, 2004: 611). Thus, whilst making a 
superficially similar point about the kinds of inquiry we should avoid, Rorty‟s 
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pragmatism takes us far beyond Dewey and the classical pragmatists. Westbrook 
(2005: 147-148) notes that James and Dewey did not deny the presence of something 
external to us. They simply denied that we had to describe it in a certain way in order 
to track it. For Rorty (1989: 9-10), however, this belief is mistaken, because it 
ignores the fact that without our specific context which provides the contingent 
reason to look at one thing rather than another, and without a context-specific 
vocabulary with which to describe it, there would not be an external „thing‟ at all. 
 
If we take Rorty seriously, then, it follows that we must see everything – our 
identities, our beliefs and our ends – as relative to the contingent contexts in which 
we live. To be sure, when we share enough contingencies, and can empathise enough 
to use language, then we can co-operate through shared meanings (ibid. 14-15). We 
cannot get away from the fact that these meanings will be relative to the vocabularies 
we use, however. When we come across individuals whose vocabularies lead them to 
startlingly different conclusions from our own, there can be no way of proving the 
other wrong. For those individuals will not just think differently. By virtue of its 
dialogical construction, they will actually perceive reality differently. Thus, to use 
Rorty‟s (ibid. 53) oft-quoted example, even if we were to come across a hate-filled 
Nazi, we could not prove him wrong. At most, we could „push him up against a 
wall‟, only to discover that it is constructed from an alien vocabulary to which we 
can do no more than turn our noses up in disgust.  
 
As befitting a radical critique of philosophy, this argument leaves little for the 
philosopher or political theorist to do. Indeed, in one of the few instances Rorty (ibid. 
ch. 6) does speak positively about philosophy, it is with reference to Derrida‟s skill 
in deconstructing the very notion of „authority‟ to which, like so many other 
disciplines, philosophy appeals. The only role left for the embattled academic is to 
simply become an „ironist‟, and to devote her time to taking stock of and defending 
the freedoms and institutions which have so fortuitously boosted our well-being in 
the prosperous liberal democracies of the west (ibid. 93-94). On Rorty‟s vision of 
freedom, however, this is not a cause for lament. For, on reflection, Rorty (1987: 
565-567) is sure that we will agree that we owe our prosperity to our social 
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democratic institutions and negative liberties. Accordingly, he (ibid. 572) instructs 
academics to use the tools of postmodern linguistic analysis and deconstruction to 
fight spurious moral authority wherever it can be found and to push for the 
alleviation of human coercion and suffering. In a subversion of Laclau and Mouffe, 
Rorty sees this agonistic attempt to limit politics as the route to turning our „them‟s 
into a „we‟ (Tambornino, 1997: 69). 
 
As John Tambornino (ibid.) argues, this is a troublesome commitment to hold, given 
Rorty‟s self-enforced agnosticism. Why should we try and strengthen liberalism, he 
asks, when doing so is likely to impinge upon the freedoms of others to not be 
liberal? Rorty‟s (best) possible defence here is enlightening, because it adumbrates 
his understanding of agency. Robert Westbrook (2005: 175-176) notes that Rorty 
rests much of his argument upon his esoteric, postmodern readings of Dewey and 
James. In particular, he interprets James‟s Will to Believe as emphasising the basic 
importance of human needs (Rorty, 1998: 30-31). Once we have given up on the idea 
of truth, all we are left with to measure our well-being is our needs. And, crucially, 
once we have given up on truth, there can be no reason not to fulfil those needs. As 
pragmatists, then, we should evaluate human beliefs only in terms of how useful they 
are in delivering on our needs, and where an individual is satisfied with their beliefs 
the best thing we can do is to leave them in peace. Perhaps justifiably, Jason Boffetti 
(2004: 610) bristles at this rather creative reading of James, but it illustrates an 
almost Rawlsian aspect to Rorty‟s argument. While it can be beneficial to have any 
set of beliefs in private, it is only prudent in public to allow (and if necessary, to 
provide) others the freedom to have their private beliefs.  
 
Rorty‟s account, then, yields a rather different understanding of agency to Dewey‟s. 
But it is an understanding which elucidates yet another aspect of the classical liberal 
account. For Rorty (1998: 28), an individual‟s self-development is a personal, rather 
than public achievement. The relevant structural „good‟ with which their actions 
must converge in order for their personal „realisation‟ is self-contained in their own 
personal vocabulary, rather than embodied in an external measure of community 
health. If we transpose here Hayek‟s conception of „mind-maps‟ with Rorty‟s 
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emphasis on vocabularies, this suggests that Dewey‟s pragmatic focus upon our 
„knowledge and time and place‟ need provide no consistent conclusions across 
different actors. For, our knowledge of time and place is not merely physically or 
socially contextual – in which case it would ultimately offer the same conclusions to 
all – but is rather just another contingent occurrence which depends upon the unique 
history of the interacting agent for its interpretation. Whilst Dewey points to the 
democratic process to synthesise our multiple contextual inquiries into one common 
good, Rorty (and classical liberals) would be loath to countenance this synthesis, 
because it would inevitably ride roughshod over all that is unique to our individual 
interpretations. Though the individual ultimately relies upon having the opportunities 
to pragmatically discover for themselves what is of value in their lives (a sentiment, 
Rorty (ibid. 32) reminds us, that can be found in Dewey) Dewey‟s progressive 
democracy would inevitably result in relatively fixed and ultimately authoritative 
interventionist policies. Far from allowing us to realise our goods, these policies 
would likely sanitise those goods in order to fit them into the collective need. 
 
While Dewey usefully shows the role a deliberative democracy can play in 
identifying problems in need of resolution, Rorty makes it clear that we must clarify 
this role. Since our well-being is itself contingent upon being able to „be‟ ourselves, 
Rorty‟s account challenges us to consider whether or not we find well-being 
important. If we do, then we must accept that we cannot „redescribe‟ others without 
dismantling and ultimately humiliating them (Rorty, 1989: 89-90). Regardless of 
what they believe, forcing another individual to justify their beliefs in order to 
immediately tear them down is akin to cruelty. And as we have seen, this cruelty is 
only increased when those forced to justify themselves are minorities who must 
battle an overwhelming cultural majority on the latter‟s terms. In the face of the 
deliberative, participative and even the liberal democrats examined in this study, 
Rorty‟s arguments thus prescribe caution (Tambornino, 1997: 64). Following 
James‟s subjectivist argument, deliberation should be employed only when it is 
necessary to discern a clash amongst our private goods, in which case we should 
resort to the tried and tested mechanisms of liberal democratism. Under no 
circumstances, Rorty emphasises, should we indulge in fantasies concerning the 
„public good‟ (Shusterman, 1994: 401). 
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Despite leaning towards classical liberalism, therefore, Rorty curiously brings us 
round to the substantive individualism of Mill and Rawls. Yet the very reason we 
abandoned this political liberalism is because it unsuitable to our modern world of 
deep and thorough-going pluralism. Rorty cannot deny this pluralism, for as 
Bernstein (1987: 552) illustrates, he makes use of it to ground his case. More to the 
point, as both Bernstein (ibid.) and Tambornino (1997: 69-70) contend, Rorty‟s view 
of liberalism is too sanguine, for the „bourgeois‟ freedoms he celebrates in countries 
like the US do not come close to the kinds of freedoms Mill and Rawls advocated. 
Instead, these states have struggled with precisely the kinds of political and moral 
problems identified by the various multiculturalists. These problems call for a 
pragmatic solution, rather than a dogmatic denial. And as James suggests, it is only 
when we search for a solution with the belief that we will find one that we could ever 
succeed (Boffetti, 2004: 614-615). To find this pragmatic solution, we must therefore 
look beyond Rorty, because his relentless aversion to either metaphysical or theistic 
truths ultimately closes off all but the most conservative of inquiries.  
 
Fortunately, this comparison of Dewey and Rorty offers some helpful pointers as to 
where we can turn. In particular, in their parallel accounts of structure and agency, it 
has identified a common commitment which might be taken forward. Both use their 
conception of structure to guide their pragmatic judgements about which acts are 
beneficial, and to be encouraged, and which ought to be shunned. Dewey, of course, 
constructs a strong democratic account of our common good as the relevant measure. 
Recognising that this overbearing commonality is untenable in our modern world, 
Rorty looks instead to the individual‟s own contingent identity. The difficulty with 
this is, however, that in all of mankind‟s contingent environments Rorty‟s argument 
would inevitably recommend the same protection of negative liberties, so that 
individuals might realise what is of value to them. Rorty‟s account is thus 
unavoidably rather than contingently liberal. This means that he, too, must look to 
something like a common good, so that his arguments do not collapse into 
incoherence.  
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As such, the only aspect of Rorty‟s arguments that can separate it from Dewey‟s is 
his concern for negative liberty. Since his pragmatism looks ultimately to individual 
self-fulfilment for its (admittedly reticent) common good, the final end of society 
must pertain to a complete harmony of ends. Rorty (1989: 63) suggests as much, 
when he applauds Mill‟s assertion that liberal democracy is the best way of balancing 
the respect for privacy and the prevention of privation as the „last word‟ on social 
development. Yet this is a particularly unpragmatic statement, which illustrates the 
limits of Rorty‟s account. For it fails to do justice to Mill‟s instrumentalism. For 
Mill, negative liberties are more „pragmatic‟ than an interventionist public sphere 
because they allow the largest plausible amount of social inquiry. We ought to 
respect negative liberties, therefore, not for any contradictory anti-foundational 
reason, but rather because they help us to transmit and interpret socially useful 
information. To do this effectively, however, they require a much more laissez-faire 
attitude to society than Rorty, Mill or Dewey would be prepared to accept. To see 
how we can operationalise pragmatism‟s strengths in practice then, and to see how 
they apply to the dilemmas of multiculturalism, we must return to the classical liberal 
account first set out in chapter three. 
 
Liberalism as pragmatism 
 
This brief discussion of pragmatism suggests not only that pragmatists are faced with 
a dilemma similar to those facing egalitarians, but that they have the solution to this 
dilemma within their grasp. Their dilemma, in short, is this: while both Dewey‟s and 
Rorty‟s arguments are essentially solutions to the failures of really-existing liberal 
democratism, Dewey‟s attempt to correct liberal democratic inequalities through 
deliberative democracy is incompatible with Rorty‟s attempt to protect individual 
freedoms by rejecting foundational truths. Pragmatism, in other words, offers us 
either a substantive, perhaps even communitarian form of equality, or a procedural, 
agnostic and individualistic vision of freedom. The problem is that we are likely to 
disagree about which of these norms we want to be guided by, just as we are likely to 
disagree about how we want to realise our cultural and moral goals. So, as in our 
response to multiculturalism, the pragmatic option seems to be to return to the very 
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liberal democracy which pragmatism seeks to improve, because this allows the 
greatest scope for realising our various differing ends at once. 
 
On reflection, however, pragmatism need not lead to this self-defeating result. For, as 
James‟s (2000: 25) definition reminds us, pragmatism eschews the search for a priori 
theoretical solutions to real-world problems. After all, neither theoretical elegance 
nor logical completeness are relevant to messy real-world problems. Instead, 
pragmatism encourages us to consider our options in terms of the practical effects 
they entail for really existing actors. We can only „solve‟ social problems by 
encouraging and aiding the transmission of this useful and relevant real-world 
information, so that individuals can make more informed choices and exert more 
control over their circumstances. Like the liberal and democratic theorists considered 
in this dissertation, both Dewey and Rorty err by losing sight of this epistemological 
necessity, and by treating their own theoretical preferences as exclusive. All of these 
theorists would avoid their disabling theoretical dilemmas if they simply applied the 
pragmatic method to their own ideas, by allowing both the bottom-up, creative 
destruction of the social marketplace and the top-down guidance of the democratic 
mechanism to exemplify their comparative merits in a competitive bid for public 
support. 
 
It is here that we find the value of the classical liberal account and its emphasis on 
free and unbridled competition. Like deliberative and direct forms of democratic 
decision-making, and like the pragmatic method in general, market competition is 
simply a mechanism by which we can signal to one another the need to consider our 
otherwise unreflective and often inaccurate views and opinions. While both 
deliberation and pragmatism have been shown to require some kind of central 
direction in order to realise coherent but necessarily limited ends, however, the 
market is an open-ended, decentralised discovery process which itself spontaneously 
directs all of our individual trade-offs and practical deliberations towards the 
realisation of socially valuable ends. Market competition, in other words, is simply 
the pragmatic method in action. Because it emasculates us all from the ability to 
realise our ends through coercive means, our well-being in the marketplace rests 
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upon how well we can incorporate one another‟s changing interests, ideas and 
opinions in our own self-directed activities. This ensures that our accurate reasoning 
(qua inquiry) is systematically rewarded and selected for, whilst our poor reasoning 
is quickly abandoned. Markets allow us to progress and solve our collective 
problems, as Dewey requires, but they do so by respecting the individual freedoms 
which Rorty is concerned with protecting. 
 
In so far as we are uncertain about which of our moral and philosophic ends we 
ought to realise, the classical liberal argument therefore suggests that we ought to 
subject these ends to market competition. Indeed, classical liberalism is particularly 
pertinent to the solution of the problems which we have seen arise from our 
divergent ends because it would encourage competition and innovation across and 
between three different levels of action.  
 
The first of these levels relates to the kinds of consumer actions we perform privately 
as individuals. Though it is often maligned, consumerism provides one of the easiest 
and most important mechanisms by which we can signal and meet our cultural needs. 
Since our purchases in the aggregate define the shape and content of the economy, 
our individual purchases inevitably go some way towards influencing the behaviour 
of others. In this sense, indeed, our willingness to buy can exert more social power 
than government actors ever could. The ever-present market for drugs and 
prostitution, for instance, ensures that there will be a constant supply of these goods, 
regardless of their prohibition. Similarly, our aversion to certain goods can prevent 
them from being successful. The public aversion to the use of animal fur in clothing, 
for instance, means that fur-based clothing only has a very limited market in the UK, 
whilst disgust over the conditions of battery-farmed poultry has led to a marked 
surge in the supply of „free range‟ products. In other cases, our preferences are more 
ambivalent; our divided opinions over the use of poorly paid labourers in developing 
countries mean that some suppliers trade upon their ostensibly ethical practices, 
whilst others rely purely on their low prices. In any case, our consumer choices say 
as much about who we think we are and what we think is worthwhile as about what 
we desire.  
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Accordingly, and though the benefits of consumerism are concentrated at the level of 
the individual, consumer action allows us to unite with those of a like mind to realise 
communal goods. The consumers of Islamic banking and kosher meats for instance, 
represent distinct groups who come together, albeit remotely, to act upon their 
religious views. The value of these kinds of associations, and the reason why it is 
important to encourage them alongside traditional forms of association is that 
markets allow us to be members of numerous disparate and even incompatible 
groups at once. Through their shared love and consumption of a particular fashion or 
lifestyle, for instance, individuals from conflicting religious or social groups can be 
brought together to celebrate their tastes in the same way that the religious celebrate 
their beliefs through religious events. This is not a flippant point: though secular, the 
tastes in thrash metal music and literature are not necessarily any less rewarding than 
the belief in God, and their festivals no less invigorating than Christmas or Easter. 
Since the market allows both secular and religious tastes such as these to proliferate, 
it follows that, compared with a society which is heavily segregated and politicised, a 
market society will allow the most opportunities to learn about one another and come 
together through shared identities. 
 
And as it is with culture, so it is with morality. Sandel (2009) intriguingly suggests 
that the market is an inappropriate forum to decide our tricky moral questions, such 
as how we should manage organ donation, surrogate pregnancies and assisted 
suicides, and who we should have in our armies. Instead, he suggests, it is up to the 
community to discover the solutions to these problems through the common good, as 
if it were inscribed upon a hidden scroll, waiting to reveal the answers to all of our 
moral quandaries. But it is precisely this common good which we do not have access 
to. For, in practice, the common good can refer to little more than the sum of our 
individual goods, unless it is to beg precisely the kinds of challenges offered in this 
dissertation. Accordingly, the best way to discover that good is to expose all of our 
troublesome questions to market evaluation, so that we can each discover what we 
are and are not satisfied with. Thus, if there is indeed a problem with the sale of 
organs, and if the contracts governing surrogate pregnancies leave both parties 
unhappy, then so long as individuals continue to seek to exchange these bodily goods 
then the agencies which bring them together will innovate to provide the best 
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possible experience. If they fail in this regard, then the practices will end and we will 
know that, at least for the current population, these practices are unsuitable. If they 
succeed, however, then their innovations will spread and many people will, through 
purely voluntary agreements, be made a lot better off. It is hard to see why this 
wouldn‟t be commonly good. 
 
Nevertheless, individual marketplace consumption cannot meet all of our cultural 
and moral needs. A specific difficulty seems to arise concerning those whose 
preferences extend to the consumerist actions and identities of others. For, while it is 
undeniable that individuals in a classical liberal system would have to learn to accept 
the choices of others, it is to commit the error of procedural individualism to assume 
that this is part of the universal „good‟ of a diverse society. In particular, those of a 
communitarian bent are likely to object to the individualism of the marketplace, 
while others who are comfortable with individual diversity might object to the 
externalities of private consumption. In these cases, what is at stake is not our 
particular goods as such, but rather the norms by which we live and the common 
action of which we are a part. But here, too, classical liberalism is apposite, because 
it allows maximal freedom for innovation and experimentation in the face-to-face 
interactions and co-operation which take place at the second, communal level of 
action. 
 
Because it would refrain from dictating and directing these norms and agreements, 
the classical liberal state would leave it to individuals themselves to choose the 
norms by which they would live. Significantly, this happens to some degree even 
with central and political direction; the differing norms found in cities on the one 
hand and close-knit villages and small towns on the other exemplify the respective 
goods of anonymity and fellowship, and it is very likely that these goods factor in to 
the decisions of those choosing where to live. Similarly, the decisions of certain 
religious or ethnic groups to live close together demonstrate the way in which groups 
can secure communal goods such as companionship and comfort by informal or 
implicit agreements. The scope of these kinds of agreements is limited, however, by 
the democratic provision of public and communal goods, because this enables 
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individuals to free-ride on the other goods and services provided by communal 
living. In the absence of this kind of political oversight, it is likely that agreements 
and norms would play a far greater and more explicit role in the management of 
community affairs, so that individuals would have to actively consider one another 
and their contributions to the community in precisely the fashion described by 
Dewey. 
 
These agreements would be subject to collective action problems, of course, but this 
is part of their appeal. For, in the absence of central direction, agreements would 
have to be reached, but they would probably be quite demanding, and so it would be 
beneficial for all if only those with a reasonable chance of success amongst 
genuinely committed individuals were embarked upon. On the one hand, this would 
minimise unwanted coercion and would allow individuals an easy escape route to 
undemanding environments which allow maximum liberties. But on the other, it 
would make the costs and benefits of these various communal „choices‟ more 
apparent, so that individuals would be better equipped to assess their marginal value. 
For, if it is indeed the case (as intuition suggests) that the most orderly communities 
are those which impose the greatest burdens, and the least burdensome those which 
provide the least order, it would be up to individuals to actively decide what they 
value most. They would have to decide precisely what they want from others, and 
what they would be willing to sacrifice (in terms of time and commitments) in return. 
In a diverse society we would expect to see a wide variety of different trade-offs in 
this regard, so, concomitantly, we would expect to see a wide variety of different 
community outcomes. 
 
This variety would concern the extent of the commitments to collective action as 
well as the type. Relative to how much control individuals want over their 
community and public spaces, community agreements could vary from implicit 
norms to contractual agreements, and they could cover the caretaking and upkeep of 
local amenities through commitments to specific kinds of behaviour to the co-
operative ownership and provision of local goods and services. Take, for example, 
the management of public spaces, such as parks and streets. Under current 
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conditions, these spaces might meet our needs because we are satisfied that we can 
use them as we like, in which case we will be content with their notional communal 
ownership (though we might still pour scorn upon those we believe to be 
disrespecting this ownership). Or, alternatively, these spaces might be unsatisfactory, 
because they do not realise a specific good which we desire, such as horticultural 
excellence or serenity. Where a community can organise around such a good, the 
classical liberal state would allow it to either impose specific rules upon its members 
(which prohibit littering or loud noise, or else require regular maintenance), or 
organise contributions to a collective fund to pay for security, gardeners or 
whichever other services it desires. Depending on the community‟s desired good and 
its tolerance of free-riders, it would therefore be free to exclude others from using the 
public spaces or else moderate their behaviour as necessary.  
 
Another example is provided by the British Conservative Party‟s (2010: 53) election 
manifesto, which suggests that communities ought to be allowed the chance to run 
their local schools. While the manifesto offers merely a suggestion of a policy here, 
when combined with the marketplace freedoms intimated above it is a promising 
idea. For, to provide the kind of innovation in curricula and in teaching methods 
referred to in chapter three, schools would have to be able to compete in terms of 
both price and quality, and they would need to be able to make substantial profits. 
More to the point, allowing businesses to run schools would lead to many 
independent schools and chains alike being floated on the stock market. This would 
give concerned groups and communities the ability to directly influence the practices 
and policies of specific schools through the collective purchase and ownership of 
shares.
27
 Thus, cultural and social groups or communities could come together to 
exert more or less control over their local schools, with perhaps the most interested 
groups, such as religious or philanthropic entrepreneurs, assuming complete 
ownership in order to realise specific, thoroughgoing goals. Again, the scope of 
                                                          
27
 In fact, there are numerous benefits that would be provided by share ownership of schools. If 
communities were given shares in their local schools, for instance, they could be directly encouraged 
to help those schools to achieve profitability, which would thus impact positively on education 
outcomes and the tenor of the local millieux. Alternatively, parents could be given the option of 
purchasing shares at a reduced price upon commencement of their children‟s education, in order to 
improve both their commitment to the school and the impact of their „voice‟ in the school‟s 
governance. 
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collective action here would depend upon the coherence of local or group interests 
and the ability of group leaders to organise collective action. In so far as consensus 
could be reached, cultural groups could realise collective ends which could only be 
dreamt of in a democratic system. Yet for those individuals who would balk at this 
kind of control, the market would continue to offer a myriad different schools based 
upon diversity and agnosticism.  
 
Extensive mutually advantageous arrangements at this second level would probably 
lead to a patchwork of agreements and norms, which would allow individuals to 
realise many of their goods while also retaining access to the marketplace. Yet it is 
conceivable that even this arrangement would still leave some individuals unhappy, 
such as those whose goods are substantive and who object to seeing others embrace 
lifestyles which differ from their own. Indeed, it is the prevalence of views such as 
these which makes value pluralism such a tricky problem for modern liberalism. 
Individuals are often intolerant of others, and yet it is difficult to justify an 
intolerance of them without contradicting oneself and indulging in the very 
intolerance one seeks to banish. When individuals disagree about basic 
understandings of what freedom and equality should entail, the only way of fully and 
fairly respecting their contradictory claims is to allow everyone to live separately, if 
they so wish, by the lights of their own beliefs (the philosophical basis of this claim 
is defended extensively by Nozick, 1974 and Kukathas, 2003). This is precisely what 
classical liberalism encourages us to do at the third level of action, which relates to 
the regulatory and political systems we desire to live under. 
 
The choices of individuals at this level would relate not to the specific norms they 
wish to realise or the goods they would like to attain, but rather the politics by which 
they would like to live. The classical liberal state would allow individuals to make 
choices in this fashion by way of a (relatively) simple decentralisation of economic 
and political power to a number of small federal units. Beginning from a laissez-faire 
base, these federal units would be free to develop their own regulations and political 
obligations in order to satisfy the requirements and worldviews of their various 
inhabitants and communities. These frameworks would very likely differ in the mix 
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of liberties and obligations they would offer to their citizens; their organisational 
norms could extend across the range of democratic methods explored above, and, 
depending upon their particular social, communitarian and cultural goals, they would 
allow different forms and different levels of self-expression. And as long as central, 
classical liberal state institutions remain to uphold basic criminal and civil laws, we 
could be as sure as reasonably possible that the adherents to these frameworks would 
be voluntary. For, with these laws in place, individuals would always be able to exit 
onerous and illiberal rules and contracts, if they so choose, by simply appealing to 
central rather than local legal and regulatory institutions (see Kukathas, 2002: 196-
197). 
 
As well as giving individuals the freedom to follow and live by their own 
philosophies, such a federal system would allow individuals to learn from their own 
and one another‟s experiments in a way that could never be achieved in a democratic 
system. In a similar fashion to the Aboriginal reserves in Canada, the Amish 
communities in the United States and the western residential compounds in Saudi 
Arabia, individuals opting to separate themselves from the majority culture would be 
able to choose precisely what rules and public institutions they want to live under. In 
a classical liberal state, however, these political „goods‟ would have to be paid for by 
internal taxes rather than government subsidies, because there could be no recourse 
to public funds. As such, individual members of each federal framework would have 
to pay the costs of their implementation and face the risks of their failure directly. 
This would serve to direct their attention to those marginal issues which determine 
whether living in a particular framework is just about worth the cost or not. In effect, 
different communities would therefore have to compete for membership. Those 
political frameworks and rules which prove unreasonably costly or unpleasant would 
lose both members and tax revenues and could even face failure unless they could 
adjust their „policies‟ to better satisfy demand. 
 
This competition would teach us much about what we can achieve together. The 
various federalised systems would set very public examples, so that individuals 
would be able to learn and benefit remotely from innovations in alien communities in 
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much the same way that consumers of one good benefit from the responses of its 
producer to innovation amongst its competitors. And the public significance of 
learning how to live with others would rise proportionately with the difficulty of 
doing so. For, it would be a gargantuan task for any one group to assume and 
maintain control of any one federalised authority without coercive assistance. In 
practice, even the most insular and isolationist of groups would have to co-operate to 
some extent, if only to secure some form of „opt out‟ from local arrangements. Due 
to the variety of goods that such a group would have to countenance and the scope 
for individual learning amongst its members, it is thus unlikely that its goals would 
survive unscathed. Instead, their strictures would have to be adjusted and adapted 
(again, at the margin) so that their realisation would sustainable and compatible with 
the goals of others. On this basis, the agreements which different groups would have 
to make would demonstrate precisely where the limits of our different ideals lie. It 
would be difficult for individuals facing difficult trade-offs to escape into fantasy in 
the fashion allowed by democratic politics, because the difficult trade-offs faced by 
other groups and philosophies would be just as clear. 
 
The competitive federal system is important in this regard because it would allow for 
different combinations of arrangements and agreements. Since there could be no 
single set of arrangements which would satisfy all groups and individuals, to prosper 
they would need to find those other actors willing to agree on a mutually beneficial 
regulatory framework. Those groups and individuals, for instance, who desire some 
form of substantive equality, and are thus willing to contribute to the wealth 
redistribution and curbs upon individualism which go along with it would be better 
off together than spread separately amongst liberals, cosmopolitans and 
individualists. Under these conditions, the federal unit would act much like the firm 
in the marketplace: its income to costs ratio (qua profitability) would depend upon 
how well it could bring together actors whose needs and contributions are 
complementary compared with other federal units. Since actors would compare these 
efforts according to their prices and benefits, it follows that they would tend to settle 
on those units which best serve their needs and match them with complementary 
groups.  
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The upshot of this discovery process is that the pattern of political and philosophical 
frameworks that would arise, and the pattern of compromises and concessions they 
would require, would embody the best possible solution to our problems of diversity 
and value pluralism. These problems, to repeat, arise because we disagree about the 
aims of social organisation. In so far as we agree that existing social arrangements 
are imperfect, we agree that it can be improved. Yet we disagree about precisely 
what kinds of improvements can be made – whether our outcomes should be more 
equal, whether we should have more agency, whether we should seek a 
philosophically derived common good, and so forth. On the classical liberal 
argument presented here, these are not ideal judgements which selected individuals 
can make on behalf of others, because they would have no way of knowing whether 
these subjects would be satisfied with the consequences of their judgements. They 
are instead exactly the kinds of choices which all individuals should be free to make 
for themselves. For, in having to choose between really-existing courses of action, 
individuals in a liberal market society would in fact be choosing between the results 
of the various options that are feasibly available, given the pattern of ends similarly 
pursued by others in society. They would, in short, be making enlightened choices. 
By settling, say, for a particular political framework, they would be settling for that 
form of living which, of all of those compatible with the ends of others, is the most 
appropriate for their particular beliefs and requirements.  
 
In so far as these frameworks would still leave some unsatisfied, they would still be 
able to influence the behaviours and decisions of others via the consumer goods 
market, and they could still set about encouraging non-market normative agreements 
as well. In this sense, the three forms of liberal action described here would 
themselves compete to satisfy our moral and cultural needs. This can be usefully 
illustrated by the example of those whose cultural and moral choices concern the 
future of the environment. In a democratic system, such individuals would have to 
somehow persuade the majority of the population of the importance of their views, 
and they would have to reach some kind of consensus on how best to act upon these 
views. Moreover, they would also have to somehow monitor individual behaviour 
and continually update their beliefs and the beliefs of others according to the results 
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of past action. The costs of this enterprise would be so high, and the chance of 
success so low, that it is difficult to see how it would not end in despair. 
 
Contrastingly, in a society organised around the market, environmentally-minded 
individuals would be able to choose from a wide range of actions on the basis of their 
effectiveness at influencing the behaviour of others. In the first instance, they would 
be able to choose between federal states on the basis of whether they want to 
contribute to the sustainable and ethical plans of fellow-minded greens or whether 
they want to use their consumer power to apply pressure on those who do not 
prioritise the environment by agitating for change in wasteful states. In either case, 
they would have much more influence over the environment than they would as a 
member of a democratic system. In the first case, as members of the greenest states, 
they would be able to contribute to the specific rules and requirements imposed upon 
those within their chosen states‟ jurisdictions, and they would be able to assess the 
efficacy of these rules by experiencing their effects first-hand. Poor and ineffective 
rules could be updated or abandoned, whilst those which are efficacious would set an 
example for others to follow. In so far as the environment is an intrinsically valuable 
good (and in so far as they are able to realise it), the effects of successful rules would 
thus help to publicise this value, by demonstrating to outsiders precisely what 
sacrifices would need to be made to achieve a flourishing natural environment. This 
is not to say that non-environmentalists would necessarily embrace 
environmentalism wholesale, but they would at the least learn what they could do to 
achieve marginally more green outcomes. 
 
In the second instance, as agitators in non-green states, environmentalists would 
exemplify the importance of the need for even the most extreme and isolationist 
groups to co-operate and adjust to others. In order for federal states to succeed, they 
would effectively have to mobilise different coalitions of groups and interests, which 
together would be able to run a set of public institutions sustainably and in a way 
which is mutually beneficial for all. For if these institutions and rules prove 
unwieldy, the attrition of members would mean that they would fail and the state 
would default back to its laissez-faire base. As such, cultural outcomes would be 
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determined by the comparative adjustments different actors would be willing to 
make. Since federal states would in many cases have to incorporate numerous 
disparate partners such as greens and liberals in order to work, these actors would be 
able to extract concessions in terms either of immunities from or amendments to state 
rules. Whilst liberals would therefore be able to bargain in order to secure their 
individual freedoms in return for respecting the autonomy of other groups, greens 
would be able to bargain in order to secure their key environmental goals. Of course, 
not all groups would necessarily succeed in realising their goals in this way, but the 
federal system would nevertheless allow them all to find those partners from which 
they could extract the biggest gains. 
 
The pattern of adjustments which would arise from these bargains would represent 
the most that greens could extract from others in political terms. Such a pattern 
would be imperfect, and it would leave some parts of society free to continue their 
harmful practices. In these cases, however, concerned individuals would be able to 
exert pressure by way of their individual purchases and common acts. The growing 
markets in sustainably produced clothing and food present a good example of this 
intention. Similarly, the attempt by some charities to purchase parts of some 
rainforests is an example of the possible power of consumer action. Significantly, 
these attempts probably experience many difficulties because of the poor 
enforcement of property rights in developing countries. It is likely that such schemes 
would be far more successful – and thus far more popular – within western, liberal 
nations if public resources were auctioned in an orderly fashion. Such collective 
purchases blur the boundary between consumption and collective action, but there 
are also several forms of the latter which a classical liberal system would allow.
28
 It 
would be possible, for instance, to co-ordinate and encourage groups of volunteers to 
service the local environment or run local farms and allotments. Others might instead 
seek to encourage their associates to live more efficiently while still others might 
encourage collective investment in sources of renewable energy. 
 
                                                          
28
 Indeed, since many of those concerned with environmental issues would have other goods which 
would preclude their joining communes, it is likely that collective and community-based actions 
would be the most common form of environmental action. 
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Which of these courses of action would be successful would depend upon the 
particular interests and ideas of the individual in question, and their relation to the 
interests and ideas found in wider society. For the three levels of action described 
above would each appeal to different motivations. Our acts of consumerism in the 
market, first of all, appeal directly to the self-interest of others. When we purchase a 
good, we send a signal which indicates precisely how other actors can benefit by 
furthering our ends. Secondly, our collective acts appeal to one another‟s beneficence 
and sense of community. This sense is largely crowded out by the state‟s monopoly 
over the provision and direction of public goods, but in a classical liberal state we 
would expect to see many institutions arising on this basis because for so many 
people see community as itself a moral goal. And our desire to exit the laissez-faire 
liberal framework and pursue our own politics would, thirdly, rest upon our appeal to 
one another‟s visceral reasoning. Perhaps more than the other two levels of action, 
the political ideals by which we want to live embody the very essence of our 
plurality. Like James‟s religious believers, we often cannot rationally defend our 
beliefs, because holding them is itself a facet of their value. Devoid of the power to 
coerce and absent the democratic need to state a convincing case, individual political 
and moral appeals at this third level in a classical liberal society would be appeals to 
one another‟s humanity. It is for this reason that we would have little to fear from a 
classical liberal society; unlike the destructive capacity in democratic politics to 
coerce individuals „for their own good‟, the agreements which would underpin a 
classical liberal society would rest fundamentally upon a respect for the other. 
 
The realisation of any of our particular goods would rest upon appealing to different 
mixes of these motivations, because our goods would be more or less private, 
communal and political. But it is for precisely this reason that we require a classical 
liberal system to enable us to solve our problems and reach our goals. For we could 
never know in advance (and we can rarely be sure even in hindsight) which mix we 
must mobilise in order to achieve a certain outcome, whether that outcome pertains 
to environmental sustainability, the effective education of the poorest or the cultural 
health of the oppressed. By resting simply upon our natural tendency to act more 
sagaciously, the classical liberal market state would subject all of our theories and 
beliefs in this regard to competition and scrutiny. It would continually indicate to us 
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the costs and the benefits of our decisions so that, over time, we can shift our 
attentions and resources to those courses of action which best achieve our ends. As a 
result, just like the social and cultural patterns that would arise, the actions and 
methods which people would depend upon to realise their ends in the market society 
would tend towards the best they could possibly use, given the diversity of beliefs 
that exists. As such, and quite emphatically, there is no reason to think that even 
those who fail to achieve their goals in a classical liberal society would be better off 
under any other system. 
 
Why democrats should be liberals too 
 
It should be easy to see how this classical liberal solution satisfies the various 
theorists and positions explored in this dissertation. First and foremost, it should 
appeal as the most pragmatic solution to our imponderable problems because it 
extends beyond the mere pragmatism of means disputed by Rorty and Dewey to a 
pragmatism of ends as well. Thus, in the classical liberal system, the very questions 
which would need to be answered in order for us all to live together amicably would 
become progressively clearer through our interactions and agreements. Despite 
setting out with one set of ends, we would quickly realise through our successes and 
failures that these ends would need to be adjusted according to the differing ends of 
others. Which adjustments would be necessary, and with whom we would need to 
co-operate would, as pragmatism implores, become our most pressing questions. But, 
in contrast with the imperial theorising of Dewey and Rorty, we would approach 
these questions on our own terms, and at our own pace. We would be free to embrace 
as many foundations as we please, and to act as individualistically and selfishly as 
possible. Yet the market system would ensure that we would nevertheless have to be 
disciplined, so that the adjustments we would collectively make would lead to the 
only genuinely common good conceivable. 
 
The pragmatic pattern of outcomes that would arise from our adjustments should 
therefore satisfy the various procedural, substantive, individualistic and 
communitarian positions which characterise the debate over multiculturalism too. 
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Individualists and proceduralists, such as Dworkin and Kymlicka on the one hand 
and Benhabib and Hirst on the other, should embrace the capacity for individual 
choice and autonomy embodied by the three-levelled market system. For the choices 
this system would require individuals to make would be genuinely empowering. 
Instead of labouring under the unrealisable ideals which a centralised political system 
would encourage, individuals in the market system would be exposed to those 
choices which genuinely embody their best possible alternatives. Compared to their 
ideals, these choices might well be unfavourable, but only in the way that compared 
to the ability to fly our capacity for walking is disappointing. And just as it is 
irresponsible to encourage flying, it is irresponsible to focus on our ideals, because in 
the presence of radical diversity, idealism is virtually indistinguishable from 
intolerance. In the long run, we would therefore all be better off if we embraced the 
reality of diversity, so that we might adjust to it as much as we can, rather than to try 
to wish the problems it poses away. 
 
The market state should also be satisfactory for the various communitarian-minded 
theorists, however, such as Gutmann and Thompson on the one hand and Wolin and 
Sandel on the other. Far from encouraging the cynicism and soullessness which are 
often ascribed to the market, the liberal market society would give different 
communities the maximum freedom to realise their own truths. Because they would 
be able to choose with whom to interact, co-operate and live, communities would be 
able to act upon and propound their own principles without opposition. And these 
principles would be unlikely to go stagnant, as they would continually be invigorated 
by the need to adjust to the realities of society. Just as the specifics of the religious 
practice of fasting arise from the interaction of the religious value of abstinence and 
the bodily requirement for food, the communal truths we would all realise would 
result from the interactions of our principles with the social requirements for 
resources and services provided by others. Since the necessity and the value of the 
obligations owed to these providers would form a part of the „truth‟ of the 
community, communities would converge on those „truths‟ which are externally and, 
accordingly, socially valuable. 
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This ability to realise substantive goods notwithstanding, the competitive market 
process would also satisfy those such as Mouffe and even modern day adherents of 
Nietzsche and Arendt by operationalising their agonistic concerns. Whilst individuals 
would be free to maintain stability and truth, the classical liberal market system 
would know no finality, because it would always provide space for those who dissent 
from majority practices to exit and to innovate. The principles, beliefs, morals and 
norms which underpin our lives and values would therefore only persist so long as 
people find them valuable and useful in comparison to their competitors. Yet, unlike 
democratic agonism, the classical liberal system would be unlikely to devolve into 
violence or hegemonic power relations because our value conflicts and interactions 
would persist only as long as it is fulfilling to engage in them. They would offer no 
space for hierarchies and no succour for despots. Thus, society as a whole would 
continually progress and re-evaluate its sense of self, via the creative destruction of 
the marketplace, but, true to the agonistic argument, it would also allow those who 
dissent from agonism itself to remain as oppositional bulwarks of tradition and truth. 
 
These are formidable strengths, and they ought to appeal to the majority of 
individuals concerned with the practical and moral problems raised by the extensive 
diversity of ends in modern societies. Yet it is nonetheless possible that many would 
object, perhaps furiously, to the classical liberal argument sketched here. They might 
firstly contend that a classical liberal state presupposes a specific and controversial 
understanding of value, which might be roughly characterised as „worldly‟, but might 
also be supposed to be purely economic or materialistic. After all, aren‟t the cost-
benefit calculations that individuals would have to make at the margin alien to the 
„right‟ thing to do? Secondly, it might be argued, this materialism would lead to a 
very specific, undesirable kind of society, characterised by greed and atomism. As 
committed democrats would enquire, isn‟t it up to society as a whole to decide what 
society should look like? And thirdly, even those who are sympathetic might worry 
about the practical implications. What about those individuals who are trapped by 
economic circumstances in particular localities or communities, or those who lack 
the capacity to make informed choices? Wouldn‟t their unhappiness undermine the 
implicitly utilitarian calculation which underpins market outcomes? 
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Compelling as these criticisms might appear, they rest upon a mixture of 
misapprehension of classical liberalism and the nascent idealism which, it was 
suggested above, is so dangerous for society. First of all, the market society would 
make no aspersions about the source of value. As in the few really-existing free 
markets, it would be left completely up to individuals themselves to decide what they 
find valuable and what they think can be traded-off at the margin. Now, marginal 
trade-offs might be unsatisfactory for idealists, but we have no practicable alternative 
if we want to solve rather than ignore the problems of diversity. The significance of 
the classical liberal argument is that it would provide as much opportunity as 
possible, given the make-up of society, for individuals to decide what to trade-off. If 
the compromises they are willing to make are spiritual or unworldly, it would allow 
them to discover those individuals or groups with whom such compromises could be 
made. And if these individuals or groups do not initially exist, the market system 
would encourage their forthcoming so long as the spiritual individuals concerned 
would be willing to pay the requisite price (qua trade-off). It is obviously possible 
that such individuals wouldn‟t want to pay the necessary price here, but this would 
only be because they find something else more important. In this instance, we might 
lament the fickle nature of really-existing individuals, but we should not lament the 
market system. 
 
Similarly, the question of what society should look like is precisely what the market 
system allows us to answer. It does so, however, in a conspicuously unelitist fashion. 
That is to say, its solution to the dilemmas of equality and agency is to give 
everyone‟s preferences absolute equality of status, and to offer them the same chance 
of being realised. From the classical liberal point of view, our plural wants are 
guaranteed to realise plural ends, regardless of whether or not we would like them to. 
After all, even elitists disagree about what society should look like, so unless they are 
each to agitate for their own, individual dictatorships (which they would be free to try 
out), like society as a whole, they need to discover some way of these viewpoints co-
existing. The classical liberal state would simply take this process a step further, by 
giving everyone an equal opportunity to discover the aggregate mix of ends in 
society, the way in which they need to adjust and change to co-exist peacefully, and 
what we can collectively learn from them. This may not satisfy those whose goods 
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rely upon coercing and imposing upon others, but since such individuals would only 
object if social choices go against them, it is difficult to see what other-regarding 
grounds they could base their claims upon. 
 
Finally, it is certainly true that classical liberalism does not provide a panacea to the 
poverty and inequalities which give some individuals greater agency and better 
judgement than others, just as it would not be able to turn all individuals into 
respectful and moral altruists. Regrettably, the darker, less desirable characteristics of 
humanity and association would persist in a market society, as they have done in 
every society and under every form of social organisation in history. Nonetheless, the 
liberal market society would give us the best possible chance of minimising their 
effects and the misery they entail. If there is one thing we can take from democracy, 
it is that many people do tend to care about one another. There is no reason to think 
that this sympathy would not be similarly manifest in a liberal market state. Such a 
market state, however, would be much more efficient and effective at showing us 
what we could do to effectively ameliorate these problems, and it would give those 
individuals at the bottom of society the best chance of reaping the benefits of 
diversity and prosperity. For, while it would perhaps be preferable if it were not so, it 
is only by allowing the successes and failures of our different choices to play out that 
we can, as limited, ignorant and short-sighted humans, learn from one another‟s 
mistakes and emulate successes. Contrary to democratic theory, this learning and 
error correction can only be effective if it is left to individuals themselves. 
Accordingly, it is the pragmatic recommendation of this dissertation that this is what 
we, as theorists, should encourage. 
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